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Abstract:  
International labour migration has become an issue widely addressed in international 
relations, due to the many spheres that are related to this area, such as economics, 
human rights, labour rights as well as sociological issues. In recent years, the Middle 
East and especially the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have 
become some of the most sought-after labour destinations in the world. As a newly 
oil-rich nation, Kuwait relied on foreign workers to fill the gaps in the labour market 
that existed due to a shortage of skills among the local population. Modern 
infrastructures, large-scale projects and basic services such as health care and 
education all needed human resources that were unavailable at the time. The reliance 
on foreign labour in Kuwait has increased rapidly in the last forty years and shows no 
signs of abating. What began as an effort to import labour for the purpose of building 
and developing modern infrastructures in a recently oil-rich nation, has developed 
into a reliance on foreign labour that generates a great deal of wealth for nationals, 
without offering proper protections for those laborers. Millions of Asian men and 
women migrate to the GCC seeking better opportunities for their families in their 
home countries, however in most cases this is less dependent on legal guarantees of 
labour protection and more on luck. In theory, unskilled foreign laborers, like other 
expatriate workers in Kuwait, are granted the same legal rights that are granted to 
nationals. Although there are some exceptions pertaining to nationals in the labour 
laws, in general, both groups are protected by the Kuwaiti Constitution, as well as 
international agreements that Kuwait has signed. In practice, however, the situation 
is very different. Due to the confines of the sponsorship system, and the immense 
control over workers’ lives it grants nationals, unskilled foreign workers face wide-
scale discrimination and violations of their rights every day, a situation that is best 
described as forced labour and slavery. In many cases, the failure of the government 
to act in respect to the abuse of migrants’ rights reveals its inability to balance its 
international and national obligations. The purpose of this thesis is to show how the 
lack of enforcement of national and international labour and human rights laws 
concerning unskilled foreign workers in Kuwait constitutes modern slavery and 
forced labour. There are three main factors that will be addressed: the lack of 
enforcement of existing national laws, as well as international treaties and 
conventions; the ways in which the sponsorship system, as it exists today, is in breach 
of international laws and human rights standards; and the responsibilities of 
governments, recruitment agencies, and other organizations involved with migrant 
labour. Issues such as wages, housing and working conditions, dispute resolutions, 
and labour contracts will be discussed.  
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Introduction 
 
Aims and Objectives: 
My aim is to evaluate the current situation of unskilled foreign workers in Kuwait. This 
includes the nature of their work, the conditions under which they live and labour and the 
national and international laws that apply to them. This thesis aims to identify and analyze 
the reasons for Kuwait’s establishment of the sponsorship system, and its effectiveness in 
offering protection for unskilled migrant workers and examine the ways in which the 
system is in breach of international laws, conventions and treaties. This thesis will also 
examine how the lack of enforcement of current laws, ratified treaties and conventions and 
other agreements creates a situation of forced labour and slavery.   
 
Methodology and Limitations: 
The research methodology for this study is designed to focus on current laws in Kuwait, as 
well as international and regional treaties that Kuwait has ratified. The focus of the 
research has been on unskilled foreign laborers, including domestic workers, mainly from 
India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Philippines. This thesis does not contain original 
statistical data collection, but rather an examination and analysis of materials produced by 
international organizations and academics. The bulk of the fieldwork was conducted during 
visits to Kuwait between the years of 2007-2012, while the most recent visit in 2018 was 
meant to obtain information on court cases. The fieldwork consisted of interviews with 
academics, lawyers, staff from NGOs, embassies, recruitment agencies and domestic 
workers. I visited several recruitment agencies in Kuwait, and organizations involved in 
migrant labour. Although I had planned to conduct more interviews while I was in Kuwait, 
there were many obstacles. Mainly, it is very difficult to gain access to laborers for many 
reasons, and even more difficult to gain access to domestic workers. Most of the laborers 
do not speak English, and have only a limited understanding of Arabic, therefore, 
communication with them was challenging.  Researchers and civilians are prohibited from 
entering labour camps to interview workers, so I have relied on reports from Human Rights 
Watch (HRW), Amnesty International, the International Labour Organization (ILO), the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM), the World Bank and Slavery International 
for current and reliable information regarding migrant laborers. These organizations have 
an ongoing relationship with embassies and they are better able to gain access to their 
camps through formal government permissions, which are not granted to research students. 
In some cases, even these organizations have reported problems in obtaining information 
on particular subjects. The World Bank,
1
 Nasra Shah,
2
 Bina Fernandez
3
 as well as other 
organizations and authors have mentioned the difficulty in obtaining certain information in 
                                                          
1
 Georges Corm (2006). Labour Migration in the Middle East and North Africa: A View from the Region. 
The World Bank, p.1, Washington, D.C. [Online] Available from: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMENA/Resources/SF_background-3.pdf  
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 Nasra Shah (2004). Arab Migration Patterns in the Gulf. In: Arab Migration in a Globalized World, p.92. 
International Organization for Migration.   
3
 Bina Fernandez (2011). Household Help? Ethiopian Women Domestic Workers’ Labour Migration to the 
Gulf Countries. In Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, Vol.20, No.3-4, p.435.  
 
Kuwait. Access to domestic workers was also difficult at times, due to a variety of reasons. 
Embassy staff would not grant me access to their shelters; only the Indian embassy allowed 
me to interview five domestic workers from the women’s shelter, and the interview was 
conducted in the presence of an embassy employee who served as a translator. The Filipino 
domestic workers I interviewed were referred by domestic workers I know in Kuwait, and 
apart from being away from their families, were happy with their employers, in the sense 
that they were paid on time, were given weekly rest, and did not experience any 
maltreatment. Although these domestic workers represent a minority, I was hoping to 
contrast those interviews with narratives that were more consistent with reports from the 
various organizations mentioned above. I learned that access to workers currently 
employed in abusive households was rare due to the fact that in most cases, those workers 
are prevented from leaving their employer’s home. After discussing it with my advisor at 
the time, Douwe Korff, we decided that the interviews would serve more as examples to 
supplement the research, than as statistical data. Other interviews I conducted were with 
embassy staff, academics, employers and senior employees of ministries, NGOs and other 
organizations. In addition, obtaining information on official legal cases involving migrants 
and nationals was very difficult, and I was told by employees at the Ministry of Justice that 
the information is confidential. Lack of access to legal materials was substituted with local 
and international news reports, information from embassies and NGOs in Kuwait, as well 
as information from interviews I conducted with lawyers and academics. The fieldwork 
provides insight into the operations of what may be perceived as modern slavery in 
Kuwait, highlighted by the difficulty in obtaining overt information.   
The legal framework of the research will focus on current labour laws and their 
implementation, or lack thereof, and the reasons for the lack of enforcement. It analyses 
Kuwaiti legislation, and the various institutions that are involved with the issue, both 
governmental and non-governmental. It also includes an analysis of dispute resolution 
systems available to foreign workers. I highlight certain cases from the European Court of 
Human Rights to analyse the court’s definitions or interpretations in relation to certain 
definitions and limits, especially in terms of forced labour, servitude and slavery. 
 
Rationale: 
International labour migration in the GCC has been a widely discussed and debated 
subject. In Kuwait, the presence of migrant workers is ubiquitous and has compelled the 
government to take measures to control their inflow without disrupting the labour market. 
This thesis seeks to add to the current literature on labour relations in the Gulf. Using 
Kuwait as an example, I aim to show how oil-rich Gulf countries are coping with the influx 
of migrants in their countries by relying on the sponsorship system and the ways in which 
the system leads to exploitation. In recent years, as cases of abuse and maltreatment against 
migrants continue to rise, it has become impossible to ignore the issue. As academics, 
international courts and organizations continue to link the sponsorship system with 
modern-day slavery, the need for change becomes necessary. My aim is to present an 
investigation into unskilled foreign workers, their motivations and their journey, beginning 
with their recruitment and culminating in their employment in the country, in order to put 
into context their experiences within the wider labour migration subject. The specific ways 
their labour rights are violated are outlined to show the contradictions that exist within 
Kuwait’s labour policies, as well as the possible reasons for these contradictions. As a 
Kuwaiti national, I hope to raise awareness and contribute to the current discussion on the 
topic, in order to better understand the migrant experience, and the reasons for the 
government’s slow response in replacing or amending this system despite increasing 
national and international pressure. 
 
 
Chapter Summaries: 
Chapter 1 
The first chapter of the thesis will be an introduction into the topic, beginning with a brief 
history of labour in Kuwait in the years after the discovery of oil, in order to analyze how 
its current reliance on foreign labour began and contrast it to the situation as it exists today. 
At first, skilled migrants
4
 made up the majority of foreign workers in the country, but as 
the Kuwaiti government began to expand its welfare benefits to citizens, a gap in the 
labour market began to appear. As the government continued to distribute its oil revenue 
income to the native population, the majority of nationals began to shy away from manual 
labour and as a result, reliance on foreign labour increased.  This section includes the 
political, social and legal conditions surrounding foreign migrants in Kuwait. I investigate 
the deeply entrenched characteristics within Kuwait’s society that makes reliance on 
foreign labour necessary.   
The second section concerns the introduction of the sponsorship system into law and its 
impact on migrant workers in the country. It evaluates the sponsorship system and the New 
Labour Law, most recently updated in 2010, and their impact on unskilled foreign workers. 
This section investigates the ways in which the sponsorship system contributes to the 
infringement of rights of migrant workers in Kuwait, and examines the ways by which 
those rights are compromised, leading to a situation of forced labour and slavery. Articles 
and reports are used to identify the weaknesses within Kuwait’s political and social 
cultures, which complicate the issue of foreign labour. This section relies on reports, 
publications and other information from organizations such as HRW, the ILO, IOM, 
Slavery International, Migrant-Rights.org and Amnesty International that call for reforms 
to the sponsorship system, and highlight abuses towards migrants. Although the 
government has enacted certain measures aimed at protecting the rights of unskilled 
foreign workers, such as standardized contracts, minimum wages and restricting working 
hours, enforcement has been ineffective. Consequently, many violations continue to be 
commonplace. Issues such as unions, wages and work conditions are also addressed in this 
section. In an attempt to improve protections offered to migrants, governments from India, 
Bangladesh, and the Philippines have drawn Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) with 
Kuwait in order to compensate for gaps in the sponsorship system. MOUs vary in degree 
of protections they offer migrant workers from country to country, though they are an 
improvement on measures currently in place for the protection of migrants. In this section, 
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 Al-Moosa, A. & McLachlan, K. (2017)   Immigrant Labor in Kuwait. Croom Helm Ltd, Kent, p.140.  
the case of Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia
5
 will be used to supplement the argument that the 
parameters of the sponsorship system may contribute to the mistreatment of migrant 
workers in Kuwait. This case demonstrates that a sponsorship system that exercises control 
over migrants in the ways that it does in Cyprus and Kuwait, violates the rights of migrants 
against the threat of trafficking and exploitation. These factors are analysed in this chapter 
to support the theory that the system itself perpetuates forced labour. Other factors are also 
analysed, such as the rise of visa trading and visa trafficking, which are directly linked to 
the establishment of the sponsorship system. The topic of corruption is also addressed here, 
as it relates to the lack of enforcement of labour rights as they currently exist.  
 
Chapter 2 
The second chapter concerns male laborers, mainly those working in construction and 
sanitation sectors, and includes an analysis of their motivations in seeking employment in 
Kuwait, the nature of their working lives and the ways in which they live, as well as the 
national and international laws and treaties that are specific to this group of workers. This 
chapter will examine the extent to which Kuwait complies with its international obligations 
in terms of labour and human rights towards unskilled male laborers. In many cases, 
migrant workers do not have an outlet for their frustrations and any incidents of protest 
have been dealt with by threat of deportation. Kuwait has ratified treaties, conventions and 
MOUs designed to ensure protection for these workers, which are included in this chapter 
in order to contrast Kuwait’s international and national personalities. There is disparity 
between what is occurring in international forums, with the ratification of these treaties and 
the ways in which those treaties are applied. This section analyses the reasons for the 
discrepancies between the conventions, treaties and laws that apply to these workers and 
the reality of what is actually enforced. Conventions from the ILO are discussed in terms 
of their applicability to unskilled male laborers, such as the Migration for Employment 
Convention, the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize 
Convention, the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, and the 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. There are also several 
important UN conventions that Kuwait has ratified that will be discussed in this chapter, 
such as the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
(ICERD), and specifically Article 3 of this convention which condemns racial segregation.  
 
Chapter 3 
The third section focuses on domestic workers and the laws that pertain to this group of 
workers. I will examine their motivations in seeking employment in Kuwait, the ways in 
which they live and access to grievance mechanisms that are available to them. This 
chapter will discuss the difficulties domestic workers face and their vulnerability to 
maltreatment and abuse. The chapter will focus on the New Labour Law of 2010, the 
Domestic Workers Law (2016), as well as Ministerial Orders in order to study the 
discrepancies within these laws. Issues such as standardized labour contracts, wages, hours 
of work, annual leave, weekly rest and the confiscation of passports will be examined in 
                                                          
5
 European Court of Human Rights. Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, 25965/04, 7 January 2010. 
the context of existing labour protections in Kuwait. In this section, I rely on reports from 
international organizations to provide data on domestic workers. Reports such as Walls at 
Every Turn Abuse of Migrant Domestic Workers through Kuwait’s Sponsorship System, by 
HRW (2010) are one of the few reports written exclusively about Kuwait. Abuses and 
violations will also be examined in regards to the lack of enforcement of existing laws and 
international treaties and conventions, and the development of customary law. Specific UN 
treaties and ILO conventions will be discussed such as the Domestic Workers Convention, 
the Migrant Workers Convention and the Convention on the Protection of Wages. This 
chapter will also examine social issues and attitudes of nationals towards domestic 
workers, and the effects of these views on their lives.  
 
Chapter 4 
The fourth chapter focuses on the recruitment involved in the unskilled foreign labour 
market, and examines the labour recruitment agencies that are connected with this group. 
Recruitment agencies, agents and subagents, have an important role to play in labour 
migration, and in many cases, their actions determine whether or not migrants have a 
favorable experience overseas. Reports from the ILO, the UN and other migration 
organizations regularly recount stories from migrants about unscrupulous agents, inflated 
fees, false contracts and other issues. Without proper monitoring of recruitment agencies, 
migrant workers will remain at risk in both their own countries, as well as the country of 
employment. Nicholas McGeehan takes this further to assert that deceptive recruitment by 
these agencies can be categorized as trafficking in persons.
6
 The issue of trafficking is 
examined in this chapter in the context of recruitment agencies and contract substitution. In 
cases where the recruitment of migrant workers is tainted by false information, charges of 
trafficking are applicable, as shown in Rantsev v. Cyprus. This section evaluates the 
migration mechanisms that are available to them in their home countries, the consequences 
of debt accruement and the role of agents and subagents in the overall migrant experience. 
The second section of this chapter focuses on remittances and their importance in the 
discussion of migrant workers. Today, remittances account for a substantial portion of the 
economies of labour-exporting countries and have provided support for the families of 
migrant workers. This will be examined in terms of the benefits and effects of remittances.   
 
Chapter 5 
This leads to chapter 5, which analyzes rentierism and slavery as legal theories that are 
applicable to the situation of unskilled foreign workers in Kuwait. The first section of the 
chapter focuses on slavery and forced labour. Whereas in the past, forced labour has 
implied physical force, today, the term includes poverty, debt and other hardships as 
driving forces. It is not within the scope of this thesis to analyze the history of slavery in 
the region, the focus is on modern-day slavery and its factors. The ILO and NGOs such as 
Anti-Slavery International and HRW, as well as authors such as Kevin Bales, and Ethan 
Kapstein, are in agreement on the definition of slavery, and the circumstances that may 
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 Nicholas McGeehan (2015). Transnational Crime or State Exploitation? The Trafficking of Migrant 
Workers to the United Arab Emirates. p. 53,   
lead to forced labour. These definitions match the conditions of work currently 
experienced by unskilled foreign workers, who are often underpaid, or not paid at all, 
living in isolated spaces, work under risky conditions and are tied to their employers 
regardless of any disputes or violations. Unskilled migrant laborers have zero bargaining 
power over their contracts and in many cases, are unaware of the terms of the contract 
itself. The entire process is one that is tainted with deception, beginning with the 
recruitment and fees, leading to unfair or harsh working conditions and an employer-
employee relationship that is vastly skewed in favor of the employer, and culminating in a 
system that does not offer proper protection in cases of exploitation or abuse. Under these 
criteria, slavery is an applicable term to use in describing the situation of unskilled foreign 
laborers in Kuwait.   
The second section is an examination of the country’s history as a rentier state, and the 
ways in which this history has had an effect on the legal system as it pertains to unskilled 
foreign workers. Beginning with Hossein Mahdavy’s definition of rentier states,7 in which 
rent refers to income the government receives from its natural resource-in the case of 
Kuwait-oil, and Matthew Gray’s definition of rentier state theory (RST)8 to examine the 
characteristics of this theory and the way in which it applies and does not apply to labour 
migration in Kuwait.  
In addition, several cases from the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) are used as 
examples in this section, including Siliadin v. France, which states that States have a 
positive obligation under Article 4 to establish a legal and administrative framework that 
would enable them to better prosecute acts of slavery, servitude, or forced labour. Another 
important case is Chowdury and Others v. Greece,
9
 where the ECHR recognized that the 
recruitment process is included within the wider scope of trafficking and the fact that 
workers who freely accept jobs are not precluded from being victims of trafficking. This is 
applicable to Kuwait because it ties trafficking to recruitment and thus to forced labour. 
This is another case that underlines the importance of positive obligations for States to 
address trafficking. Yet another example of positive obligation is C.N. v. the United 
Kingdom,
10
 where the ECHR held that the burden is on authorities to identify 
circumstances in which workers are being put at risk of servitude. This is applicable to 
Kuwait in the sense that it ought to be the State, and the proper authorities, not individuals, 
to take measures to ensure workers are not at risk of servitude. Certain mechanisms must 
be in place in order for authorities to be aware of, and identify workers who may be at risk. 
Another case that is analyzed in this section is C.N. and V. v. France,
11
 which outlines the 
terms servitude, slavery, and forced or compulsory labour. This is applicable to migrant 
workers in Kuwait who are unable to leave their sponsors for fear that they will be forced 
to return to their home countries. 
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Chapter 6 
More is needed from the government in terms of fulfillment of the many international 
labour treaties and conventions that Kuwait has ratified and not ratified and 
recommendations are suggested in the final part. Firstly, the sponsorship system needs to 
be abolished or reformed. Replacing individual sponsors with a government authority 
would lessen the level of control given to sponsors through personal sponsorship and 
would have more authority in regards to inspections. Secondly, it is crucial that migrant 
workers are informed of their rights before they depart their home countries and upon 
arrival to the country of employment. HRW and other organizations recommend that 
governments should take initiatives to inform migrant workers of their rights in the 
country. Many workers are unaware of their rights under existing laws and face language 
barriers, which makes it difficult for them to report maltreatment. Thirdly, migrant workers 
should be able to change employers while remaining in the country, and without the need 
for their employer’s permission, therefore the laws should be amended to facilitate the 
transfer of employment. Criminal penalties on absconding should be removed and a 
labour-complaints department should be created to provide migrants with information on 
dispute resolution. The ILO recommends the establishment of a court that can expedite the 
resolution of disputes allowing migrants who have been abused to return home in a timely 
manner. Also, strict penalties should be imposed on recruitment agencies, employers or 
other sponsors who exploit migrant workers or put their lives at risk. Furthermore, it is 
essential that the government of Kuwait establishes a database on all complaints by 
migrants, and publish annual statistics regarding that data. In collecting information 
regarding the number and nature of the complaints, the government may be able to address 
shortcomings within the labour law that allow abuses to occur, thus preventing future 
complaints. It is only by remaining open and opaque regarding violations against migrants 
that real progress will take place. These suggestions are based on findings by international 
organizations such as the ILO and HRW, as well as the authors and academics that are 
cited in this thesis. In recent years, the Kuwaiti government, under international pressure 
from human rights and labour organizations, has taken certain measures to attempt to 
alleviate problems associated with unskilled foreign laborers by implementing 
standardized contracts and getting more involved with non-governmental organizations. 
Although these are important steps, the sponsorship system remains intact despite the 
government’s promises over the past years that it will be scrapped in favor of a better 
system.  
1 
 
Chapter 1 
The Sponsorship System 
 
1.1 Introduction 
An examination of Kuwait’s history with foreign labour is important in understanding the 
overall issue of migrant labour laws in the country. The economy of Kuwait before the 
discovery of oil relied mainly on revenue from pearl diving and sea trading activities. The 
discovery of oil paved the way for rapid development, which included the establishment of 
infrastructures and projects that are necessary in the building of a modern nation-state. The 
small local population size was unable to meet the large demand for labour, and the 
government had to seek alternate sources of manpower. Foreign workers began flooding 
the country eager to earn higher wages than they were earning at home. Throughout the 
years, the importation of foreign labour has been used to fill a gap in the domestic labour 
market, with migrants taking on jobs that are shunned by the local work force. In recent 
years, the Kuwaiti government has attempted to deal with the influx of foreign workers in a 
variety of ways, one of which is the sponsorship, or kafala system. The sponsorship system 
is the legal framework which regulates the employment of migrant laborers in the country. 
Essentially, this system requires that all foreign workers must be sponsored by a national, 
or a licensed company owned by a national. It is a system that is enforced in all GCC 
countries (Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman and Qatar), 
and other Arab countries such as Jordan and Lebanon, but one that has provoked 
discussions and debates concerning forced labour and slavery across the international 
community. This chapter provides an overview of the history of foreign labour in Kuwait, 
in order to put into context the country’s reliance on migrant workers. The sponsorship 
system is examined in terms of its constrictions on migrant workers, and the ways in which 
those constrictions amount to forced labour and slavery. As well as forced labour, other 
issues that have emerged as a result of the sponsorship system include visa trafficking, and 
widespread corruption. This chapter also includes an analysis of the Memorandums of 
Understanding (MOU) and the international laws, conventions, and cases that apply to 
migrant workers. Finally, this chapter concludes with suggestions for an alternate system.   
 
1.2 History of Labour in Kuwait from 950-Present 
Kuwait’s pre-oil history revolved largely around trade, seafaring, pearl diving, and 
ship building, all activities that took advantage of its environment, mainly the Arabian 
Gulf. As keen fishermen and pearl divers, Kuwaitis constructed a new type of boat, which 
they named a boom. Using these sleek vessels, they travelled along the coast and traded 
with countries as far as India, and eastern Africa in what is known as the spice trade. 
Trading by sea allowed Kuwaitis to interact and form relationships with other cultures and 
societies. Through these trades, they formed ties with different nationalities, which helped 
shape their attitudes and beliefs. The sea served as a source of trade, income, and culture, 
all of which shaped Kuwait and its inhabitants. With the discovery of oil in 1938, Kuwait 
entered a new economic age, and an era of massive development and progress began. At 
first, oil revenues were spent on healthcare and education, but gradually, transportation and 
communication networks were also developed. As these services expanded, a skilled 
foreign workforce was necessary to provide input, guidance, and expertise in order to 
execute various projects. During this time, a skilled workforce was distinctly lacking in 
Kuwait; since most of the population was employed in trade, agriculture, pearl diving, and 
fishing. Shehab notes that, according to the first population census in 1957, the total native 
labour force (those between the ages of 15 and 60) totaled 23,977, of which 4,000 were 
considered skilled or professional.
1
 Illiteracy rates were high during this time, with 59.7 
percent of Kuwaitis unable to read or write, and only 14 percent with an education higher 
than the elementary school level.
2
 Due to the lack of an available skilled labour force that 
was needed to implement these large scale projects, foreign labour was required for almost 
every type of work, from manual laborers to highly skilled professionals. Thus, the lack of 
human resources was the initial drive behind the importation of migrant labour.  
Oil companies were the first to import foreign professionals to perform the highly 
skilled tasks needed to operate oil refineries and plants. The government, on the other 
hand, gave preference to Arab migrants to fulfill the demand for teachers, doctors, and 
other non-oil sector fields of work. Arab migrants came to Kuwait with their families, or 
were followed closely by their families, who in turn, found jobs in Kuwait or attended 
schools. In addition, there was also a large number of Asian migrants, especially Indians 
and Pakistanis. Since entry conditions into Kuwait were relatively relaxed, foreign workers 
began to flood the country searching for better opportunities and careers. As Ruhs states, 
“arguably, the primary reason for adopting a laissez-faire approach and for not 
implementing serious labour market tests in these countries is that they were afflicted with 
either absolute shortages of labour…, or with citizens’ unavailability for certain jobs.”3 
During this time, many of the Asian workers that came to Kuwait were also accompanied 
by their families. The government’s policy at the time was not very strict, and appeared to 
encourage family settlement through major subsidies and services. Employers, whether 
they were government entities or other private companies, paid most of costs for these 
workers, such as visa fees, transportation, food, and housing, thus allowing them to save 
most of their earnings. Most found Kuwait to be a pleasant, calm, and safe environment in 
which to raise a family.  Since the population was still relatively small and the country 
only beginning to develop, relations between locals and foreigners could be described as 
being amicable and without conflict. Gradually, however, these services were reduced as 
the government became concerned by the large influx of migrants that occurred during this 
time. As Table (1) shows, by 1965, the number of non-Kuwaitis made up 63.9 percent of 
the total population.
4
 (See Table 1) 
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  Although incidents of conflicts between nationals and expatriates were low, many 
important social changes were beginning to take shape in Kuwait. The most important 
social change has been a tremendous increase and concentration of population in Kuwait. 
According to a study conducted by the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) in 1900, the town contained 10,000 to 12,000 residents; by 1910, the 
population grew to approximately 35,000 residents.
5
 As more foreigners entered the 
country, the population continued to grow, and by 1957, a government census showed the 
country’s population at 206,468,6 four years later in 1961, the population was 321,621,7 
and by 1965, the population had increased to 467,339, of which Kuwaitis represented 
about 47 percent.
8
 This increase in population, coupled with an influx of foreigners, began 
to change relations between Kuwaiti nationals and foreign expatriates. Over time, the 
government’s relaxed attitude toward importing foreign laborers began to have its effects, 
and a system was needed to control the flow of migrants.  
 
1.3 Origins of the sponsorship system 
The origins of the sponsorship system are unclear, with some saying that it is a 
custom that originated from the Bedouins, who vouched for strangers and offered security 
and temporary admittance to the tribe.
9
 “The noun kafala comes from the root k-f-l. Some 
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of its derivative verbal forms mean (1) to feed, (2) to vouch for, be responsible for; and (3) 
to be legal guardian of.”10 Others suggest it was the British who instituted this custom in 
order to monitor the type of people wishing to visit Kuwait at the time. Peter Lienhardt 
writes that, during the time when the British Foreign Office was in charge of Kuwait’s 
external affairs, all visa applications were scrutinized “in order to exclude as many as 
possible of the opportunists and tricksters any oil state attracted, for whose misbehavior the 
British might have been blamed.”11 According to Lienhardt, it was the idea of the Foreign 
Office, not the Kuwaitis, to introduce a sponsorship practice, not only to exclude 
opportunists, but also for practical reasons. He states, “the Foreign Office…made it a 
condition of granting a visa that any visitor to Kuwait should first find a host there, 
because the hotels were at that time very simple indeed, and the Political Agency did not 
want to be used as a general emergency rest-house.”12 Whatever the initial reasons for 
establishing a sponsorship system, it filled a gap within the governmental institutions that 
governed Kuwait before, and after its independence. 
By 1959, according to the Aliens’ Residence Law, all migrants wishing to work or 
visit Kuwait were required to obtain a visa, and a sponsor. The Aliens’ Residence Law 
exists within the general Labour Law, although it applies only to non-Kuwaitis. The law 
stated that all foreigners and migrants entering the country must be sponsored by a 
national, who effectively guarantees their status as a legitimate worker. Sponsors, in effect, 
Kuwaiti nationals, were now an integral component of the unskilled foreign labour force. 
Furthermore, laborers may only be retained on short-term contracts, most of which are no 
longer than five years, with the requirement that once the contracts expire, workers must 
leave the country for a specified period of time. It wasn’t until 1975, when the Residence 
Law was amended, that detailed references are made concerning the different categories of 
workers (public, private, or domestic sectors), and the different visa requirements for each. 
Throughout the 1960s, as the country’s development grew, nationals began slowly 
adjusting to contemporary life. In order to make this adjustment smoother, the government 
began to distribute its new found oil wealth to nationals, and adopt the role of a modern 
welfare state. This translated to nationals being able to enjoy free healthcare and medical 
services, free comprehensive education and scholarships, “housing and home sites at 
below-market prices and on easy credit terms, highly subsidized basic services and 
essential items, generous retirement pensions at a relatively early age, and the right to 
government employment at last resort.”13 This modern welfare system replaced the tribal 
systems of the past, and allowed nationals to enjoy a higher standard of living than ever 
before.  This, however, gave way to a new set of problems, mainly the lack of structural 
infrastructure necessary to accommodate a welfare state. Not only did the country lack a 
skilled work force, but it also lacked adequate administrative and organizational structures 
that were needed to bridge the gap between the older tribal structure and a new system in 
order to make the adjustment toward a modern nation state. As Amuzegar points out when 
discussing GCC economies,  
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Under irresistible political pressures from a largely poor, frustrated, and 
impatient population demanding to receive its share of the oil revenues for a 
better life now, most government leaders simply could not afford to sit on 
the oil money and avoid spending it one way or another.
14
  
At the same time, the government began encouraging its citizens to enroll in newly 
established schools and educational institutes. It did this by providing free education as 
well as scholarships to study abroad for students of university age. This surge in 
development was one of the first steps towards modern nation building that the 
government was eager to embrace. Amuzegar states, “material prosperity and progress, in 
turn, were hopefully believed to lead to more social cohesion, greater political stability, a 
meaningful industrial democracy, and an eventual advanced-country status.”15 It was the 
objective of the government to transform the newly wealthy country into a modern state.  
In the course of these developments, the government established permanent 
infrastructures to deal with a growing population as well as increased wealth. These 
included ministries and industries that needed workers to sustain their various operations. 
For Kuwaitis, a major part of the adjustment to modern life was adjusting to the concept of 
a “job”, away from the old agricultural, fishing, and pearl diving industries. Gradually 
however, Kuwaitis began moving toward these professions in government, and other 
public sector jobs. As a result, the government became the highest employer of nationals. 
As Shah states, “the historical high reliance on the government as the main employer of 
about 80 percent of Kuwaitis has resulted in the expectation that it is the Government’s 
duty to provide gainful occupations for nationals.”16 In fact, the Kuwaiti constitution is 
clear on the issue of work for national citizens, as mentioned in Article 41 [Right and Duty 
to Work], which states, “every Kuwaiti has the right to work and to choose the type of 
work…The State shall endeavor to make it available to citizens and to make its terms 
equitable.”17 With an almost guaranteed job in the public sector afforded to all Kuwaiti 
nationals, those who entered the workforce during this time gravitated towards those 
professions. Gradually though, more Kuwaitis began working in the private sector in 
banking, and other private businesses. These white-collar jobs proved much more 
attractive than jobs requiring manual labour. As a result, reliance on foreign workers in 
manual labour jobs began to increase. Even as early as the 1960s, the United Nations 
observed that the Kuwaiti population would need to increase rapidly in size in order to 
replace the foreign workforce at the time.
18
  Although the government realized its need for 
foreign laborers, it did not yet have the proper mechanisms in place to deal with this 
reliance in the long run.  
 
1.3.1 Effects 
 Problems began to emerge during the 1980s, as Kuwaitis, now more comfortable 
with life in a modern society, began enjoying the many benefits and large salaries the State 
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was providing. Certain jobs, mainly those requiring manual labour were seen as “socially 
inferior” to nationals, who viewed their new found status as part of the country’s overall 
wealth. This led to a lack of ambition among many Kuwaiti workers, who are generally 
guaranteed a job by the government, regardless of their skill level or work ethic. It brought 
about low productivity rates among the national labour force.  
The low productivity often found among the national labour force can, at 
least to some extent be explained by the perception that many nationals 
maintain, that payment received is a rightful share of the state’s wealth, and 
that this transfer of money is in no way tied to job performance just as 
promotion is not related to accomplishment. Thus, there is no incentive to 
work harder or even to gain further qualifications or skills.
19
  
Lack of ambition and low productivity created a workplace atmosphere lacking 
competition, one in which workers didn’t feel the need to challenge themselves. This 
discourages the acquisition of new skills among workers, thus producing a sluggish labour 
market.   
Together, low productivity rates as well as national wealth, created a national 
workforce that was concentrated only in certain areas that were deemed acceptable. In 
addition, Kuwaitis were offered a great deal of benefits for work in government sectors, 
some of which include generous pension and salary remunerations. This pattern of 
providing generous welfare benefits to nationals, while importing foreign labour in order to 
fill the gap in the labour market abandoned by locals, only works to reinforce the negative 
attitudes of nationals towards certain jobs. Because of this, certain areas of work have 
remained without a national labour force, such as sanitation, garbage collection, janitorial 
jobs and other forms of manual labour.  
 Various other structural problems also began to appear. As Kuwaitis shied away 
from manual labour, the country began to rely heavily on low, and unskilled foreign 
laborers to fill jobs that were needed in order for the State to operate at its optimal level. 
These jobs involved construction, cleaning and maintenance services, as well as other jobs 
requiring manual labour.  
There are undoubtedly influences of cultural predilection by the Kuwaitis 
against certain forms of work, attitudes hardened by economic realities of 
comfortable, well-paid and socially acceptable employment with the 
government and its agencies. But the dominating variables would seem to 
be the twin problems of the nature of the Kuwaiti workforce as defined by 
quality of skills and its lack of incentive to participate in regular 
employment, together with the sheer inadequacy of the size of the Kuwaiti 
labour pool against the claims being made upon it.
20
  
As the local population grew, and the country expanded its infrastructure, the Kuwaiti 
work force remained low. In 1980, the total number of Kuwaitis in the labour force was 
103,474, compared to 380,570 non-Kuwaitis.
21
  Nationals in the labour force almost 
                                                          
19
 Andrzej Kapiszewski (1999). Native Arab Population and Foreign Workers in the Gulf States. Universitas, 
Karakow, p.102. 
20
 Al-Moosa & McLachlan, supra note 2, p.89. 
21
 Al-Moosa & McLachlan, supra note 2, p.148. 
always seek professional or clerical occupations, while unskilled migrant laborers occupy a 
different labour market. For example, in 1985, 48 percent of non-Kuwaiti males worked in 
jobs involving production work and manual labour, while only 10 percent of Kuwaiti 
males worked in the same fields;
22
 jobs involving professional and technical work, on the 
other hand, only involved 13.7 percent of non-Kuwaiti males
23
 (See Table 2).  Kapiszewski 
identified this phenomenon as “labour aristocracy”,24 and this continued to develop as 
nationals began to regard certain manual labour jobs as disdainful. This pseudo aristocracy, 
however, was directly benefitting from the presence of foreign laborers, who were engaged 
in labour sectors rejected by nationals. In addition, as the educational levels of the 
nationals increased, they became “overqualified for occupations currently performed by 
illiterate foreign workers,”25 thus gravitating to other occupations.    
 
 
 
In 1989, Ministerial Resolution No.87 outlined the sponsorship system in terms of 
registration, issuance, and transfer of work visas. Accordingly, every migrant worker’s 
residency in the country is fixed to their labour contract. Unlike a system where migrants 
enter the country and are able to compete in the labour market with nationals and other 
migrants, the sponsorship system ties each worker to a specific job, and workers are 
prohibited from changing that job without the issuance of a new visa. In effect, the laws 
created two types of sponsorship, the first is sponsorship by state institutions, and the 
second is sponsorship by private companies and individuals. Those employed by the state, 
and its various ministries and departments, are issued with visa “No.17”, while those 
employed in the private sector are issued with visa “No. 18”. Skilled migrants, such as 
professionals and businesspeople are issued with visa “No. 19”, and finally, domestic 
workers are issued with visa “No. 20”. It is not possible for an employee to change visa 
types, or transfer a visa from one sector to another, unless the employee departs the 
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Table 2 
country and applies for a new visa. The establishment of a separate Residence Law 
applicable only to foreigners created two categories of laws in the country-one that applies 
to nationals, and one that applies to migrants. In the years since the first Aliens’ Residence 
Law was passed, there were numerous amendments to the law, none of which clearly 
explained the relationship between sponsor and employee. Hence, employers and sponsors 
were free to interpret the laws and develop their own relationship with their employees, 
eventually establishing customary laws such as passport confiscation, which was never 
mentioned in any law.  
 
1.4 National Laws and Regulations 
During 1990-1991 Gulf War and Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, many migrants, 
including Arabs were either evacuated by their governments or departed the country 
voluntarily. Many Arab workers from Iraq, Egypt and Palestine who left Kuwait during the 
conflict did not return, creating a vacuum in the labour market that nationals were unable 
to fill. Crystal states that “the government thus faced a dilemma: It could not replace 
foreign workers, nor was it wholly comfortable with their large presence in the Kuwaitis’ 
midst.”26 Following the conflict, the government was committed to reducing reliance on 
foreign workers and policies regulating the entry, employment, and residence of all 
immigrants were put in place. The government had to implement measures that balanced 
rights for migrants and the rights of nationals under a welfare state. Jureidini describes this 
as “the human rights of migrants versus the rights of states to determine the character, 
privileges and size of their citizenry.”27 As the number of foreign migrants swelled, the 
government aimed at curbing its reliance of foreign labour. This occurred in several ways, 
firstly, a system of “Kuwaitization” emerged, in which work in all civil service areas was 
given priority to Kuwaitis, often without taking into account their qualifications. By 1997, 
approximately 92 percent of employed nationals worked for the government.
28
 
Additionally, many of the higher posts and positions were given to nationals, who were 
often without the necessary experience or work ethic required for these jobs.  
The government also devised strategies for private businesses and companies in 
employing Kuwaiti citizens, such as placing limits on the amount of foreign workers 
employed, establishing minimum quotas on the number of nationals in certain fields, 
providing subsidies to the private sector in order to encourage the employment of 
nationals, and prohibiting non-nationals from some professions such as the military, and oil 
sectors. These strategies came together in the National Labour Support Act of 2000, which 
as well as outlining measures for the employment of nationals, authorized an annual tax of 
2.5 percent on the net profits of all Kuwaiti companies listed with the Kuwaiti Stock 
Exchange in order to cover the cost of training nationals in the private sector. As the 
                                                          
26
 Jill Crystal (2016). Kuwait: The Transformation of an Oil State. Routledge, New York, p.87. 
27
 Ray Jureidini (2004). Human Rights and Foreign Contract Labour: Some Implications for Management 
and Regulation in Arab Countries. In Arab Migration in a Globalized World, International Organization for 
Migration, pp.201-216, Geneva.   
28
 Kapiszewski, supra note 19, p.101. 
private sector began absorbing more nationals, it became the largest employer for migrant 
workers and remains so today.
29
  
New laws and restrictions on visas issued to unskilled foreign laborers began to 
take effect during this time. Under the sponsorship laws, job changes are forbidden without 
the original employer or sponsor’s permission. In some cases, the government utilizes 
“turnkey construction contracts,”30 in which the general contractor supplies the workers 
and the company guarantees their departure once the contract expired. At times, unskilled 
foreign laborers from certain countries, including India and the Philippines were given visa 
preference by the government due to the availability and low cost of those migrants, thus 
creating a labour hierarchy. Although these preferences are not mentioned in the labour 
laws, government officials openly acknowledge that different policies apply to migrant 
workers from different countries. In 2006, the Emirati ambassador to the United Nations 
stated that “due to differences in the nature, cultures and nationalities of expatriate 
workers, systems and regulations applied in the GCC countries for the recruitment of these 
workers are not uniform.”31 Additionally, only the most skillful, and therefore high-paid, 
laborers are allowed to be accompanied by family members, so as to ease the cost of 
dependents on the state.  All of these laws and measures are at aimed curbing the number 
of migrant workers in the country, despite the growing numbers.  
Unskilled foreign laborers may only be retained on short–term contracts, most of 
which are valid for a maximum of five years, with the requirement that once the contracts 
expire, workers must leave the country for a specified amount of time. This is in fact, a 
type of Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP), which is aimed at creating rules 
regarding the admission, residence, and employment of workers. In theory, a TFWP is 
meant to be economically beneficial for all groups involved in international migration: 
labour-importing countries benefit from increased supplies of skilled and unskilled 
workers, depending on their needs; labour-exporting countries benefit from remittances 
from nationals employed abroad; and migrant workers are granted the opportunity to earn 
better wages than are available in their home countries. In practice, however, as 
economically beneficial as TFWPs may be regarded by governments, their implementation 
does have its drawbacks. TFWPs may be used to limit the rights of migrant workers by not 
only placing limits on the amount of time an unskilled migrant worker may legally remain 
in the country, but by placing severe restrictions and conditions on workers’ contracts. This 
way, the state is allowed to reap the benefits of the efforts of laborers, without 
guaranteeing them the rights they are entitled. Although in many ways, the sponsorship 
system resembles other TFWPs, in which governments rely on short-term contracts to 
regulate the flow of migrants into a country, the sponsorship system differs in several 
ways. Onn Winckler identifies five key features of the system that differentiate it from 
other TFWPs: the difficulty, or near impossibility of migrant workers obtaining citizenship 
in the country of employment; the lack of employment stability; the lack of evidence to 
support the theory that migrants seek permanent settlement in the country of employment; 
the fact that migrant workers comprise a majority of the labour sector; and finally, the 
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availability of cheap labour from Asian countries.
32
 Additionally, and especially in the case 
of Kuwait, TFWPs have been accompanied by a division in the labour market, and the rise 
of “immigrant sectors”,33 that are dominated by migrant workers, and that are shunned by 
nationals. This only reinforces dependence on foreign workers, as it fails to address the 
problem of segmentation. According to Ruhs, problems such as these are typical of 
TFWPs, especially in the case of unskilled migrants,
34
 who are vulnerable to unfair 
treatment.    
Furthermore, the laws exist in order to discourage migrants from permanent 
immigration. As Kamrava states, the presence of foreign workers is “tied to the provision 
of their labour within a particular sector for a defined duration of time. There is no policy 
in place that allows migrants to work toward a permanent citizenship status, nor are there 
any state-driven attempts to encourage social integration.”35 Lack of social integration does 
not appear to be a concern for the Kuwaiti government, in fact, the less integrated into the 
local population migrant workers are, the easier it is to control and limit the time they 
spend working in Kuwait. Essentially, this makes migrants into contract workers with no 
hope of permanent settlement or naturalization, regardless of the amount of time spent 
living and working in the country. According to Shah, “the country has no program for the 
integration of migrants since it views them as temporary workers who are in the country on 
renewable contracts that are awarded generally for about 2 years at a time.”36 The length of 
stay for unskilled foreign workers is always restricted, so as to limit their overall presence 
within Kuwaiti society, and this is a constant reminder that they are only welcome as long 
as they fulfill a certain role. Because their immigrant status is on a contractual basis, these 
workers are never given the chance to properly assimilate into the country. It is important 
to note here that permanent settlement in Kuwait is near impossible for unskilled foreign 
workers, due to the government’s strict restrictions regarding not only residency, but 
naturalization as well.
37
   
Their temporary contracts characterize their stay in Kuwait as transient, therefore 
limiting any attachments they may develop there. As Fargues states, “decades of intense, 
but temporary, migration have resulted in citizens and non-nationals growing as two 
separate entities without a new, mixed, population emerging from their co-existence.”38 A 
particular cautiousness underlies the relationship between unskilled foreign migrants and 
the Kuwaiti government, which is perhaps the reason for the many restrictions of the 
sponsorship system.  Unskilled migrant workers fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry 
of Interior, rather than the Ministry of Labour, a designation which “contributes to the 
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securitization of migration,”39 and segregates migrants from the overall labour force. This 
segregation contributes to the temporary nature of relations between nationals and 
migrants, determined by the workers’ length of stay in the country. Kapiszewski refers to 
this as an “awareness of temporariness”,40 which contributes to migrants’ “acceptance of 
exclusion”41 within the social and legal structure of the sponsorship system. More on this 
subject will be examined in Chapter 3.   
The sponsorship system’s fault lies not so much on what the law states, as what it 
does not state. The laws’ failure to clearly outline the restrictions employers may place on 
workers, and thus limiting the power employers may wield, has placed migrant workers at 
tremendous risk of forced labour. While the law is clear on the sponsor’s role toward the 
authorities, outlining duties such as being responsible for the employee, informing the 
authorities in case of termination of contract, and so on, it neglected to outline actions that 
the sponsor was restricted from doing, thus failing to protect the employee’s basic rights. 
By placing the responsibility of the care of migrant workers in the hands of its citizens, the 
government avoids having to create an organization or department that specializes in issues 
regarding foreign laborers. Manseau states,  
In many ways, the kafala system removes responsibility for oversight from 
the government and places it squarely upon recruiters and individual 
employers, who are often motivated more by financial gain than concern 
about the working conditions and human rights of the people they import. 
Arguably these roles put private individuals in place as informal 
immigration officials, removing such burdens from the government.
42
 
In short, the sponsorship system places the responsibility on nationals to guarantee the 
legitimate status of the migrant worker. As Lori states, “this sponsorship arrangement 
effectively privatizes some of the costs of migration enforcement by directly holding 
individual citizens financially and legally accountable for each and every non-citizen”.43 
Tasked with what Shah and Fargues refer to as the “surveillance of migration”,44 national 
sponsors thus become an important part of the enforcement of migrants’ temporary stay in 
the country. Fernandez states that the sponsorship system is essentially “an effective 
decentered mechanism of social regulation by which the state externalizes and privatizes 
its surveillance function, passing on to citizens the responsibility of policing the vast force 
of immigrant labour within the country.”45 Without restrictions on the powers of the 
sponsor, and without the necessary supervision to insure adherence to the law, the 
probability of maltreatment increases. Although there are currently laws that apply to 
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unskilled foreign laborers in both the private and the public sector, those laws are not 
always observed or enforced. In addition, the temporary nature of a migrant’s employment 
in Kuwait suggest that unskilled migrant workers are viewed as disposable labour, and that 
there exists an endless supply of migrants willing to accept the current labour conditions in 
the country.  
 
1.4.1 Customary Law 
In the absence of formal rules regarding the employer-employee relationship, 
Kuwaitis have constructed their own systems and practices to supplement the sponsorship 
laws. Throughout the past thirty years or so, these practices have evolved into customary 
law. One of the practices that have become customary law in Kuwait is retaining 
employees’ passports. Although this practice is illegal, it continues to exist. For individual 
sponsors, keeping an employee’s passport was a way of insuring that the employer will not 
leave their job, or leave the country before the end of the contract. Since workers wishing 
to change sponsors in order to find better work (or working conditions), must have their 
passports, the practice of withholding passports prevents them from doing so. This practice 
is also viewed as a way to deter foreigners from criminal acts, since it is very difficult for a 
foreigner to break the law and leave the country without a passport.  
The customary practice of retaining employees’ passports has led to many incidents 
of absconding in Kuwait. Workers choose to leave their jobs, and sponsors, without their 
passports, and search for any type of illegal work, that is to say, work that is different from 
that which is specified in the contract. As Davidson notes, research on migrant workers 
suggests that “running away from legal sponsors to work illegally in the informal economy 
is a strategy by which some migrants manage to secure greater personal freedom, and to 
pay off their debts and remit money to dependents, albeit under constant threat of detection 
and deportation”.46 The only way for absconders to retrieve their passports is to turn 
themselves in to authorities, and launch an official complaint against their sponsor. In 
many cases, sometimes with embassy mediation, the sponsor returns the passport to the 
employee, who then must leave the country. The exact number of absconders in Kuwait is 
unknown, but the government is well aware of the fact that there are many illegal aliens. 
Every four or five years, the government declares a general amnesty wherein illegals may 
turn themselves in to their embassies, and leave the country legally, and each time, the 
response has been immense. Amnesties allow migrants whose residency applications were 
rejected, or whose residency permits have expired, to legalize their stay in Kuwait by 
paying any fines or penalties and obtaining a valid visa, otherwise, migrants may choose to 
depart the country, and apply for work at a later time. Migrants who ignore amnesty 
periods and remain in the country illegally risk deportation if caught, and once deported, 
migrants are forbidden from entering the country again. In 2011, a four-month amnesty 
period saw over 41,000 migrants coming forward, including 12,870 who legalized their 
status, and 28,662 who chose to leave the country.
47
 The latest amnesty, in January 2018 
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was extended to April 2018 due to the overwhelming response, and saw 78,096 illegal 
migrants come forward: 20,964 workers chose to obtain legal residency and remain in 
Kuwait, and 57,132 workers chose to return to their home countries.
48
 Without these 
amnesties, many migrant workers would find it impossible to leave the country without a 
valid passport and an exit visa. General amnesties also make it possible for authorities to 
assess the amount of illegals living and working in the country at any time.   
 
1.4.2 Restriction of Movement 
In many ways, the sponsorship system prioritizes the rights of the employers over 
the rights of workers. By making it difficult and costly for workers to change employers, 
migrants are forced to endure conditions that violate their rights. Additionally, by denying 
migrants participation in a free labour market, workers are prevented from seeking other, 
perhaps more lucrative employment. Instead, migrant workers are in competition with each 
other in their native countries for the best jobs, contending with not only other workers, but 
recruitment agents, and subagents. As the most vulnerable members of the labour market, 
unskilled foreign workers should have the right to change employers, especially in cases of 
maltreatment. According to Davidson, “the immigration policies of countries that depend 
heavily on migrant labour are often designed to deprive migrant workers of independent 
access to, and free movement within, the labour market.”49 It’s not that unskilled foreign 
laborers present a competition for national workers, as Kapiszewski’s “labour aristocracy” 
theory indicated, nationals and migrants occupy different spheres of employment, but it 
may be due to what Esim refers to as “the politics of exclusion that have allowed Kuwaitis 
to protect their rights and privileges as citizens.”50 This exclusion refers to the hierarchy 
that exists in the labour law that extends certain privileges to nationals, followed by 
residents of the GCC countries, and Arab nationals, with unskilled foreign workers 
restricted to the bottom rungs of the ladder.  
In theory, migrants have the right to quit their jobs, and with the signed permission 
of their sponsor, seek another job; however, this process is often prolonged and 
unpredictable. If quitting means returning to their country, and facing surmounting debts, 
the right to quit is meaningless and futile. Debts force migrants to remain with 
unscrupulous or abusive sponsors, which shapes a great deal of the migrant experience. 
The majority of migrants who are recruited legally, through agencies or other channels, 
tend to arrive at their destination country already heavily in debt to those agencies. In 
2014, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) conducted a study which 
estimated that migrant workers pay an average cost of $1,900 to migrate to Kuwait.
51
 This 
means that migrants will tolerate abuses in employment instead of exercising their “right” 
to quit, which, in turn, makes them even more vulnerable to abuse and coercive treatment. 
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In the case of loss of employment for whatever reason, there are limited options for 
migrants: remain in the country illegally and try to find other employment; remain in the 
country and try to gain legal employment elsewhere; or return to the country of origin. 
Failure to meet expected wage income is one of the main reasons migrants choose to 
remain in Kuwait illegally, whether or not those expectations were changed due to 
voluntary or forced circumstances. In many cases, Asian male migrants resort to begging 
as a means of supplementing their income when they are not working, although this is 
illegal. Once a rarity in Kuwait, begging is now common among unskilled foreign laborers. 
More on the subject of debt will be examined in Chapters 2 and 3. 
 
1.4.3 Deportation  
 As stated earlier, the sponsorship system as a whole is under the purview of the 
Ministry of Interior. Labour permits are applied through the Ministry of Labour, but final 
approval comes from the Ministry of Interior, which is responsible for issuing security 
clearances for all migrants. “Since the Ministry of Interior also controls the domestic 
security forces, this means that the same institution that administers residency decisions 
also has the necessary resources at its disposal for enforcing those decisions.”52 In cases 
where work permits are cancelled or revoked and the migrant worker’s residency is 
deemed illegal, it is the Ministry of Interior that is tasked with finding and deporting the 
worker. 
Deportation seems to be a method used by the government to curtail the number of 
migrants in the country. Migrants may be deported for a variety of reasons, from traffic 
violations, and demonstrations to barbeques.
53
 In 2013, for example, the government 
announced a crackdown on traffic violations, and within days deported 86 expatriates for 
offences including running a red light, driving without a valid license, and speeding.
54
 In 
contrast, any national that commits the same offences will have their car impounded for 
three months. Migrants are strictly prohibited from taking part in any strikes, 
demonstrations, or protests, regardless of how peaceful they may be. The Ministry of 
Interior repeatedly justifies these deportations by stating that the right to protest is one 
reserved for citizens.  
In 2014, Mr. Abdulrahman Al-Ghanim, head of the Kuwait Trade Union 
Federation, accused the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor of mishandling labour 
disputes involving migrants, and colluding with employers to deprive workers of their 
rights. “They deport everyone who was reported ‘absconding’, without granting them the 
right to appeal or tell their side of the story,” he stated.55 Even in the event that a worker’s 
complaints reach the court system, they are usually deported before the case is finalized, 
causing confusion about the status of the case. In March 2013, Thekra Al-Rashidi, then 
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Minister of Social Affairs and Labour, announced plans by the ministry to deport 100,000 
illegal migrants every year as part of an overall plan to curb the expatriate population.
56
  
 
1.5 Skewed Relationship 
Within the confines of the sponsorship system, workers are often treated as 
possessions rather than employees with rights. The relationship between sponsor and 
employee depends almost exclusively on the sponsor’s interpretation of the legal codes and 
laws. An ILO report states, 
Central to the kafala system is the imbalance in power relations between the 
kafeel and the migrant worker. The kafeel has the power to alter the terms 
of the employment contract and coerce the migrant worker into submitting 
to unfair working conditions.
57
 
The sponsorship system places tremendous power in the hands of nationals, power that is 
often abused. Under the sponsorship system, migrants are treated like commodities in an 
economy which relies on them without enforcing the necessary mechanisms needed to 
protect them. Sponsors have a great deal of authority over workers, including the right to 
terminate them from their job at their discretion, thus revoking their residency and work 
permit at the same time, and preventing them from finding work elsewhere. The skewed 
power dynamics, as well as the time and money that migrants have spent to obtain 
employment visas, combine to produce insecure and compliant workforces, who are at the 
mercy of their employers. This power relation is further complicated by the fact that 
unskilled foreign migrants are classified as “guest workers” or “expatriate manpower.” The 
sponsorship system’s reliance on a national’s judgment in ensuring foreign workers are 
granted their rights under the law, leaving the door open to a great deal of corruption 
among those seeking to take advantage of this power. Sponsors often employ scare tactics 
in order to maintain the upper hand, some of which include threats to withhold wages, 
imprisonment, deportation, or termination of employment. Once the employment is 
terminated, the worker has no legal right to remain in the country. In case of any disputes 
regarding wages, working hours, conditions, or any other work-related issue, employers 
may dismiss the employee, rendering their status as an illegal. In addition, due to the fees 
the employer has paid for various administrative costs and agency charges, some sponsors 
feel some entitlement towards their workers. Malit Jr. adds that, “in fact, 
employers/sponsors’ discretion to misuse or misinform workers about their contractual 
rights are shaped by their intent to reduce future labour costs or recoup the initial 
recruitment fees paid to the agencies.”58 At the same time, workers fear the retaliation of 
their employers should they attempt to discuss or report contract violations or abuses of 
any kind.  
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The constraints and regulations within the sponsorship system result in a flawed 
arrangement that gives way to a host of abuses. The concept of sponsorship entails the loss 
of liberty of the worker to his or her sponsor, who is responsible for the well-being of the 
worker, and who is, in many respects, free from any regulation or enforcement by the 
authorities. The authority that sponsors have over employees, in addition to the customary 
practice of passport confiscation, and the strict limit on migrants’ stay, are all part of a 
system that perpetuates forced labour. As McGeehan states, “the inordinate level of control 
which is exerted over migrant workers and facilitates their exploitation derives from the 
complementary effect of three powerful de facto control mechanisms: the customary 
confiscation of passports, the customary imposition of debt, and the systematic denial of 
access to domestic remedies.”59 This exploitation is due to the sponsorship system’s 
constraints, and can be described as forced labour and slavery. The ILO defines forced 
labour as “all work or services, which is extracted from any person under the menace of 
any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily.”60 Whereas 
in the past, forced labor has implied physical force, today, the term includes poverty, debt, 
and other hardships as driving forced labour. According to author Kevin Bales, “the state 
of control exercised over the slave, a control based on the potential or actual use of 
violence; a lack of any remuneration beyond subsistence; and the appropriation of the 
labour or other qualities of the slave for economic gain,”61 are all characteristics of both 
past and modern slavery. Under these criteria, slavery is an applicable term to describe the 
situation of unskilled foreign laborers in Kuwait. Moreover, Drew states, “a perusal of the 
U.N. instruments reveals that all the different forms of slavery (slavery, servitude, debt 
bondage, forced labour) which the U.N. instruments address have in common two 
elements: lack of true consent and lack of control over one’s own labour or reward for 
it.”62 These definitions match the conditions of work currently experienced by unskilled 
foreign workers, who are often underpaid, or not paid at all, live in isolated spaces, work 
under risky conditions, and are tied to their employers regardless of any disputes or 
violations. It is not within the scope of this thesis to analyze the history of slavery in the 
region, the focus is on modern-day slavery, and its factors. Unskilled migrant laborers have 
zero bargaining power over their contracts, and in many cases, are unaware of the terms of 
the contract itself. The entire process is one that is tainted with deception, beginning with 
the recruitment and fees, leading to unfair or harsh working conditions and an employer-
employee relationship that is vastly skewed in favor of the employer, and culminating in a 
system that does not offer proper protection in cases of exploitation or abuse.   
The case of Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia
63
demonstrates that any visa system that 
allows sponsors to exert undue power over workers is an indication of the lack of 
protection mechanisms for migrant workers in that country, and may lead to exploitation. 
This case involved the death of a young Russian woman recruited on an “artiste” type visa 
to Cyprus, a term meant as a reference to prostitutes. There are similarities between this 
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type of visa in Cyprus, and the visas given to unskilled foreign workers in Kuwait. Firstly, 
the women who arrive in Cyprus under this type of visa are not always aware of their 
working or living conditions, and in many cases their accommodations lack sufficient 
facilities. Secondly, their passports and personal documents are almost always retained by 
their employers, who are responsible for their legal status and deportation. Thirdly, their 
movements are severely restricted and they are under constant surveillance by their 
employers. Moreover, threats, withholding or deduction of wages, and force are often used 
to coerce workers. And lastly, they arrive already heavily indebted to recruitment agents in 
their countries of origin, and may have their wages deducted by their employers to recoup 
fees paid to recruitment agencies. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) found 
that the Cyprus was in violation of its obligations under Article 4 of the European 
Convention due to the fact that these visas “had thus failed to afford to Ms. Rantseva 
practical and effective protection against trafficking and exploitation.”64 The Court 
declared that states have a positive obligation to prevent and protect people from 
trafficking by investigating allegations of trafficking and implementing policies. Although 
Kuwait is not under the jurisdiction of the ECHR, it has ratified the UN Trafficking 
Protocol, and is bound under that protocol to protect migrant workers from exploitation. It 
is the duty of the Kuwaiti government to not only protect its nationals from exploitation, 
but all workers within its jurisdiction. Doing so would align Kuwait’s domestic law with 
its international obligations. In an article concerning migrant labour in the UAE, but that is 
perfectly applicable to Kuwait, McGeehan states that “in the United Arab Emirates and the 
surrounding region, migrant workers are not exploited despite labour laws and the 
protection afforded them by the justice system, rather they are exploited by the labour laws 
and the justice system.”65 This refers directly to the sponsorship system and its confines. 
The Rantsev case demonstrates that a sponsorship system that exercises control over 
migrants in the ways that it does in Cyprus and Kuwait violates the rights of migrants 
against the threat of trafficking and exploitation.  
 
1.6 Visa Trading and Visa Trafficking 
The sponsorship system has also led to illegal visa trading, a practice that has 
become more widespread in Kuwait in recent years. As the privilege to sponsor a migrant 
is only afforded to nationals, non-nationals wishing to sponsor workers often do so by 
seeking out citizens willing to sponsor workers for them in return for a fee. An ILO report 
explains, “GCC nationals with business licenses are given permission for work visas for a 
given number of immigrants. They may sell these visas to others, leaving the migrant 
worker undocumented. This is known as ’visa trading’”66 This practice was cited in a 2005 
Report on Human Rights Practices on Kuwait by the U.S. Department of State, which 
states, 
In this system citizen sponsors agree to sponsor (in name only) foreign 
workers in exchange for a fee in the range of $1,539 (450 dinars), to $4,104 
(1,200 dinars). Middlemen, generally non-citizens, would recruit workers 
from economically depressed source countries for a fee, take a commission, 
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and remit the balance to the nominal sponsor. Once in the country, such 
agents transferred workers to employers in the informal sector or to parties 
otherwise unable to sponsor them.
67
 
Dr. Ebtehal Al-Khateeb from Kuwait University referred to nationals who engage in 
trading visas, or iqamas in Arabic, as “merchants of iqama,”68 for whom economics takes 
precedence over law and rights. Although visa trading is strictly prohibited by law, and 
could involve imprisonment and fines for both sponsor and migrant worker, it remains a 
common practice. The practice places foreign workers in an illegal immigration status 
since the sponsor may not be changed as employer, and illegal status places migrants at 
great risk from the authorities.  
 Although there are policies aimed at ending visa trading, as with all the country’s 
laws, the difficulty lies in implementation of those laws. Visa trafficking and trading are 
very profitable “businesses” that requires little or no effort on the part of nationals. “There 
are laws aimed at curbing visa trafficking with penalties for both employers and visa 
traders; however, the government seldom enforced these laws.”69 As a result, questionable 
businesses that necessitate only a national’s signature prove too tempting for some to 
resist. Shah writes, “visa trading is a multi-million dollar industry; there are high fees for 
the initial sponsorship, followed by two-year renewal fees…despite the fact that this is 
unlawful, there is no known prosecution of GCC nationals for these activities.”70 Lack of 
government intervention and large profits fuel the demand for these types of industries 
despite the abundant supply of labour. As Mr. Shahriar Siddiky, First Secretary of Labor 
and Welfare at the Bangladeshi embassy said, “slavery is good business.”71 As long as 
benefits for both sides outweigh the costs, illegal practices will continue.  
One reason for this lax stance towards visa trading is the high level of corruption 
that exists within the Kuwaiti government. In some cases, government officials themselves 
are involved in visa trafficking and trading, which makes enforcement even more 
complicated. As Kapiszewski states, “many parliamentarians represent the interests of 
private business which are not necessarily consistent with the overall national goals.”72 In 
2014, a visa trading scandal erupted involving the Ministry of Interior and the General 
Immigration Department. It was reported in local newspapers that the Director of the 
Office of the Minister of Interior, as well as more than six members of the ruling family, 
benefitted from illegal visa transactions while in office, some receiving more than KD 
100,000 a month ($330,000).
73
 This year, it was reported that “government officials in 
Kuwait have sold work permits to illegal recruiters and migrant workers, facilitating the 
exploitation of this vulnerable group.”74 Incidents of corruption such as this are not 
uncommon, indicating that a considerable amount of money is involved in visa trading, 
and the extent of involvement of government officials.  
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 1.7 Lack of Enforcement and Corruption  
The confines of the sponsorship system give way to a variety of abuses, and it is the 
migrants that face the majority of punishments. Many unskilled foreign workers are afraid 
to take their employers to court, for fear of incurring their employer’s wrath, and losing 
their jobs. Although it is difficult for workers to seek redress in local courts due to the 
maze of bureaucracy and paperwork, those that do most often win their case. However, 
implementation is rarely enforced. In 2005, a U.S. Department of State Country Report on 
Kuwait stated,  
The courts rule in favor of employees in an estimated 90 percent of the 
labour disputes they hear; however, no legal mechanism exists to enforce 
judgments. There is no compulsion for employers to obey court rulings, and 
workers often do not receive court-ordered compensation. Employers also 
reportedly used illegal methods to pressure foreign employees to drop cases 
against them, such as withholding their passports, encouraging police 
intimidation and brutality, threatening deportation, and filing criminal 
charges against them for fabricated crimes, such as theft.
75
 
This lack of enforcement of court rulings, and national laws discourages other workers 
from reporting on incidents of abuse or maltreatment, which makes it difficult to document 
such cases. Corruption may be one possible cause of lack of enforcement. In 2017, a 
Human Rights Practices report was conducted by the U.S. Department of State that stated, 
“the law mandates criminal penalties for corruption by government officials, but the 
government did not implement the law effectively. Government observers believed 
officials engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. There were numerous reports of 
government corruption during the year.”76 Combating corruption has been one of the most 
addressed issues in the National Assembly, but so far, little progress has been made in this 
field.  
Although the government has enacted certain measures aimed at protecting the 
rights of unskilled foreign workers, such as standardized contracts, minimum wages, and 
working hours, enforcement has been very poor. This gives rise to what McGeehan refers 
to as a “culture of impunity among employers,”77 which is the “inevitable result of the 
authorities’ failure to enforce those laws which do exist to protect the rights of migrant 
workers.”78 Consequently, many violations continue to be commonplace. Due to the lack 
of proper enforcement of the laws within Kuwait’s Labour Code as well as the terms of the 
sponsorship laws, employers are able to profit from the easy access to cheap labour, but 
remain unwilling to release control over their perceived “commodities”. The failure of the 
Kuwaiti government to enforce those laws which currently exist to protect migrant workers 
demonstrates a lack of commitment to international human rights standards, thus 
culminating into a system that creates situations of forced labour and slavery.  
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In 2015, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour issued a decree dissolving the 
board of the Kuwaiti Transparency Society (KTS), a local chapter of Transparency 
International, an anti-corruption organization. The KTS had been in operation since 2006, 
promoting transparency and reform within the country.  That year, a few members of the 
National Assembly met with Mario Marcel, the World Bank’s senior director of 
governance and global practice, during which he expressed concern about Kuwait’s low 
ranking in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (the country was 
ranked 55 out of 168 countries that year).
79
 Members of the National Assembly, led by 
Youssef Al-Zalzala, accused the KTS of filing false reports meant to harm Kuwait’s 
ranking, and interfering in the country’s politics.80 As a result, the organization’s property, 
finances, and documents were seized, and its board members were asked to step down. 
This prompted strong rebukes from Transparency International’s chairman, who stated, 
“no country serious about tackling graft can afford to close down organizations such as 
Kuwait Transparency Society,”81 adding that the country is sending out the wrong signals. 
Kuwait’s laws concerning non-profit organizations are strict, in the sense that licenses are 
rarely granted to organizations, and the criteria for official recognition is lengthy. Many 
applications are rejected by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour for a variety of 
reasons. As of 2017 (most recent figures), there are 115 officially licensed non-profit 
organizations operating in the country.
82
 Many unskilled foreign workers work in excess of 
48 hours per week, with no overtime pay, no rest days, and no annual leave. Without the 
assistance and support of a union or a government monitoring agency, workers are forced 
to deal with such issues on their own. While some choose to remain silent and 
submissively accept these conditions, others decide to leave their jobs and find work 
elsewhere, well aware of the illegality and risks of doing so. 
 
1.8 MOUs 
The world economy being as it is, Kuwait has relatively easy access to cheap 
labour from economically deprived countries eager to retain their skilled workforce, but 
willing to export their less skilled workers, due to the amount of remittances that are sent 
back to the labour-exporting countries each year. Simple access to cheap labour has 
deterred nationals from acquiring the necessary skills needed to fulfill certain technical 
jobs, or jobs that require manual labour. “With the passage of time, the State has become 
tied into the cheap labour syndrome and now operates and plans its forward activities on 
the basis of the availability of cheap imported labour.”83 The abundance of cheap labour, 
and its availability for nationals, is in direct contrast to the lack of political, social, 
economic, and legal initiatives directed at replacing the sponsorship system with a 
structure that is less biased towards unskilled foreign migrants. At the same time, labour 
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exporting countries very often “lack necessary bargaining power given their economic 
dependence on migrant workers’ remittances,”84 which complicates the task of formulating 
a viable substitute for the sponsorship system. In order to remedy this, countries such as 
the Philippines and India have signed non-binding Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
with Kuwait, outlining different protections for migrant workers.  
Kuwait’s relationship with India can be traced back to its pre-oil history. The two 
countries have a long background, and Indians represent a large segment of both the 
skilled, and the unskilled labour sectors. Recent figures show that over 800,000 Indians 
now reside in Kuwait, making it the largest expatriate community in the GCC.
85
 In 2007, a 
MOU was signed between Kuwait and India that included articles on the recruitment of 
manpower, labour contracts, and the protection of workers. Although not included in the 
MOU, the Indian government also provides broad guidelines for terms that should be 
included in model contracts. These include provisions regarding accommodation, housing, 
working hours, rest days and medical expenses. In 2013, an agreement was signed between 
the two countries regarding the transfer of sentenced individuals, with the intent of 
transferring their sentences, “or any other form of punishment,” in order for them to serve 
the remaining sentence in their home country.  
The Philippines is another country with a large number of expatriate workers in 
Kuwait, a trend which began in the 1980s. As one of the world’s largest exporters of 
laborers, there are currently over 260,000 Philippine citizens currently residing in 
Kuwait.
86
 The two countries maintained close labour ties over the years, but recently there 
have been serious developments that endanger those ties. For many years, reports of abuses 
against Filipino workers, especially domestic workers by their sponsors have been widely 
circulated within the Kuwaiti media, international and national NGOs, and other 
international organizations. Efforts to lower incidents of abuse by signing MOUs, and 
introducing standardized contracts that establish minimum wage, hours of rest, and other 
labour issues proved futile as the number of abuses continued to grow. The embassy 
shelter was constantly overcrowded and short-staffed; in 2017 alone, the shelter housed 
500 migrants.
87
 In February of 2018, the remains of 29-year-old Joanna Demafelis, a 
Filipino domestic worker, was found in the freezer of an abandoned apartment belonging 
to a Lebanese couple who had fled Kuwait. The couple was arrested some time later in 
Lebanon and Syria, but it remains to be seen whether or not they will be extradited back to 
Kuwait. The death of Demafelis sparked outrage in the Philippines, and prompted 
President Duterte to order a ban on the deployment of Filipino migrant workers to Kuwait. 
A few months later, videos surfaced online of staff from the Philippine Embassy seemingly 
rescuing domestic workers from their employers’ home. The videos showed staff hastily 
bundling a domestic worker into a waiting car and transporting her to the airport. 
Infuriated, the Kuwaiti government stated that these actions were a violation of diplomatic 
standards, and in breach of the laws and sovereignty of Kuwait. In May, after the 
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Philippines issued an apology, the two countries agreed on a MOU outlining new measures 
to protect migrant workers, such as the right to retain their passports and mobile devices, as 
well as articles guaranteeing adequate food, housing, and health insurance.  
In the past, incidents of abuse or maltreatment have pushed countries with a large 
migrant population working in Kuwait to put a temporary halt on migration. It is not 
uncommon for the governments of countries such as India, Bangladesh, and the 
Philippines, to intermittently prevent their nationals from seeking work in Kuwait, and this 
is done mostly as a bargaining tool for further protections for their citizens. This may be 
effective in the short term, as countries draw up MOUs to seek better protections for their 
citizens, but as previous efforts have shown, these types of measures have little effect on 
enforcement, proving them futile. When it comes to setting terms concerning fair 
recruitment, for example, Wickramadekara and Baruah state that “Research has shown that 
bilateral agreements and MOUs often play only limited roles in fair recruitment due to the 
nonbinding nature of MOUs that carry no obligation on either the origin country or 
destination country to enforce their provisions.” As Malit Jr. and Naufal conclude, “thus, 
the labour-sending countries’ limited legal and administrative capacities to protect 
migrants, combined with the labour-receiving’s embedded autonomy to exclude domestic 
workers from the law, undermine their bilateral labour cooperation and constrain the 
possibility addressing asymmetric information.”88 Labour exporting countries would 
perhaps be more successful in guaranteeing the rights of their citizens abroad if they acted 
collectively to engage the Kuwaiti government in reforming the sponsorship system, as 
opposed to separately lobbying for protections. MOUs vary in degree of protections they 
offer migrant workers from country to country, and although they are an improvement on 
measures currently in place for the protection of migrants, they still fall short of 
international labour standards. In most cases, however, these MOUs serve as a stepping 
stone to further legal and administrative advances in the protection of migrant workers. 
 
1.9 International Laws and Conventions  
 The sponsorship system as it exists today in Kuwait is in violation of many 
international human and labour rights standards. Since Kuwait became a member of the 
United Nations in 1963, the government has signed and ratified various treaties concerning 
labour and human rights, one of the most crucial being the Trafficking Protocol. It has also 
ratified numerous conventions involving international organizations. The country’s 
relationship with the ILO, for example, dates back to 1961, when Kuwait ratified seven 
conventions: the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention; the Freedom of Association and 
Protection of the Right to Organize Convention; the Hours of Work (Industry) Convention; 
the Hours of Work (Commerce and Offices) Convention; the Holidays with Pay 
Convention; the Weekly Rest (Commerce and Offices) Convention (1957); and the Night 
Work (Women) Convention. In subsequent years, Kuwait continued to ratify other relevant 
treaties such as the Social Policy (Basic Aims and Standards) Convention, the 
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, and Convention C29-the 
Abolition of Forced Labour Convention (1930). Kuwait’s labour laws, including terms in 
the sponsorship system, contain articles that conform to these conventions, but they do not 
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contain any measures for enforcement, which is the crux of the problem. In the past, GCC 
countries have appealed to the ILO to take into consideration their reliance on foreign 
labour, and not compel them to apply all provisions of the ratified conventions at once. 
Speaking on behalf of GCC countries, the Bahraini Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, 
Abdulnabi Al-Shoala stated, “the ILO must give our countries the chance to develop their 
legislation and institutions in a way which is harmonious with the traditions, culture and 
beliefs of the people of the region…which stems from local realities and its people rather 
than importation of standard models from elsewhere.”89 As harsh as the “local realities” 
may be, eventually, GCC countries must begin adopting and applying international labour 
standards for all workers in their countries.  
 In some cases, Kuwaiti laws seem to negate some articles in international 
conventions, which lead to a confused policy. For example, the Social Policy (Basic Aims 
and Standards) Convention’s Article 11 states that “all practicable measures shall be taken 
(a) to inform the workers of their wage rights; (b) to prevent any unauthorized deductions 
from wages; and (c) to restrict the amounts deductible from wages.”90 This Article is 
pertinent for foreign migrant workers, especially unskilled migrant workers, who are 
mostly illiterate, and are therefore, vulnerable to fraudulent contracts. A possible 
impediment to applying this Article is the fact that all contracts, in order to be considered 
valid, must be in Arabic, as stated in Article 29 of the New Private Sector Labour Law 
No.6 of 2010 which states, “all contracts shall be made in [the] Arabic language and the 
translation of which in any foreign language can be added to it, but the Arabic language 
shall have preference in case of discrepancies.”91 The essence of this Convention is that 
workers are aware of their rights and entitlements under any contract, in which case, 
providing official translations, and including a provision in the Labour Law for that, would 
better fulfill the aims of the Convention. In other instances, the labour code includes 
stipulations on certain matters, which seem to contradict specific conventions. For 
example, the ILO’s Convention No.106 concerning weekly rest seems to echo Article 6 of 
the New Labour Code if not for the caveat that “if the need arises, a worker may be 
required to work on his rest day.”92 Once again, the government has delegated sponsors to 
determine whether or not employees receive weekly rest. In 1966, Kuwait ratified the 
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention. One of the core principles of 
the Convention calls on member States to “declare and pursue a national policy designed to 
promote, by methods appropriate to national conditions and practice, equality of 
opportunity and treatment in respect to employment and occupation, with a view to 
eliminating any discrimination in respect thereof”93. The sponsorship program currently in 
place presents many challenges in terms of fulfilling the intents of the Convention. Within 
both the private and public sectors, there exists a hierarchy of labour that favors certain 
nationalities over others.  
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Two of the most important conventions that Kuwait has ratified are the Convention 
C29-the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention (1930), and the Convention Concerning 
Forced or Compulsory Labour. The issue of forced labour inevitably arises in discussions 
regarding the sponsorship system, due to the fact that it discourages workers from leaving 
their jobs freely. In 2012, the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations (CEACR) released a report on Kuwait noting, “the Committee hopes 
that, in the next report, the Government will provide information on the measures adopted 
to protect migrant workers, in particular from abuses that may arise from the visa 
“sponsorship system.”94 There is a direct correlation between sources of abuse toward 
migrant workers, and the sponsorship system. More on forced labour and slavery will be 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
Another law in the New Labour Code involving unions also seems to contradict the 
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, which 
Kuwait ratified. Even though Kuwaiti law permits expatriate workers to join unions, the 
law is discriminatory toward unskilled foreign workers in a variety of ways. Expatriate 
workers are only allowed to join trade unions if they have been working in Kuwait for five 
or more years, hence ruling out unskilled foreign laborers, who are on temporary contracts. 
Very few unskilled workers remain in Kuwait for more than five years; therefore, many 
choose not to join trade unions. Migrant workers are also denied voting rights, and 
prohibited from holding leadership positions in unions, which means that their views and 
concerns are more often than not ignored. Moreover, Kuwaiti law stipulates that any union 
must have at least 100 members, fifteen of which must be nationals; in the case of the 
majority of unskilled foreign laborers who work as cleaners and street sweepers, there is no 
trade union available for them to join due to the lack of Kuwaitis working in these fields. 
Both the International Trade Union Confederation and the ILO have criticized this 
requirement as it discourages the formation of trade unions in sectors that do not employ 
many nationals, such as the construction and sanitation sectors. 
 
1.10 Alternative 
One alternative to the sponsorship system involves replacing individual 
sponsorship with state sponsorship. In 2005, the ILO formally suggested that the current 
sponsorship system be substituted for one in which the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Labour becomes the sponsor for all migrant workers in the country, on the basis that the 
current system is not supported by international conventions.
95
 In 2010, the Kuwaiti 
government announced that it was forming plans to abolish the sponsorship system by 
2011 and “replace the employer-based system with a government-administered recruitment 
authority,”96 only to backpedal a day later when a government official told Al-Jazeera 
News that the system would not be entirely cancelled, but would be amended in order to 
make it easier for migrant workers to transfer sponsors.
97
 According to Martin, the reason 
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the sponsorship system has endured is due to the “$1 billion a year in payments made to 
natives for sponsorships, the desire of governments to “control” foreigners, and the 
inability of COO [Country of Origin] governments to persuade GCC governments to 
change their policies.”98 Currently, progress on plans to replace or amend the system 
remain unclear and the Kuwaiti government’s intention to revoke the sponsorship system 
has failed to materialize as of yet.  
Transferring responsibility from nationals to a government authority would, in 
theory, more adequately protect the rights of migrants. Foreign workers should be issued 
with an employment visa, which would specify the length of stay of the migrant, without 
binding them to an individual sponsor. Moreover, workers should be able to remain in the 
country if they seek to change employers. As the ILO states, “workers must be able to 
change or terminate employment at will without losing valid immigration status and 
without having to obtain the employers permission. The employer should no longer be 
responsible for filing a case when they leave.”99 Employers should no longer be able to 
cancel a worker’s legal residency on the basis of employment termination. Instead, workers 
should be able to compete in the labour market for the best possible job in their field. 
Adequate enforcement of current laws is also necessary, whether through labour 
inspections or other mechanisms.   
 
 
1.11 Conclusion  
The Kuwaiti government and GCC governments in general, face a number of 
obstacles in attempting to reduce their dependence on foreign labour. The relatively easy 
and endless supply of manpower from mostly Asian countries, coupled with nationals’ 
attitudes towards manual work have created a labour market that simply would not 
function without unskilled foreign labour. The roles and statuses that unskilled foreign 
laborers occupy within the labour force in Kuwait are dependent on many factors, but one 
thing is certain, their presence is crucial to the country’s economic and structural 
development. Unskilled workers have filled a void in Kuwait’s labour force and by doing 
so, have enabled the country to develop large-scale projects, infrastructures, and services 
that are essential for a modern state.   
Within the confines of the sponsorship system, however, unskilled foreign workers 
are at a constant risk of abuse. By tying them to their sponsors, preventing them from 
competing in the labour market, confiscating their passports, preventing migrants from 
permanent settlement, denying them effective means for resolving labour disputes, and 
failing to enforce the laws and conventions that apply to this group of workers, the 
sponsorship system creates a system of forced labour and slavery. As McGeehan states, 
“migrant workers are not exploited despite labour laws and the protection afforded them by 
the justice system, rather they are exploited by the labour laws and the justice system. That 
is to say that their exploitation is the direct result of a system whose purpose is to deny 
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them rights.”100 The entire system is skewed in favor of the national workforce, allowing 
the government to take advantage of a vulnerable group of workers. As Martin and Malit 
state, “international organizations and NGOs have pointed to the kafala system as the key 
to keeping migrants vulnerable.”101 The sponsorship system needs to be amended, and 
proper enforcement of existing laws is necessary to ensure the rights of migrants in 
Kuwait. Despite the labour laws, the many treaties or conventions that have been ratified, 
and numerous MOUs, as long as the laws are not amended, abuse will continue. As flawed 
as the system is however, its purpose would function a great deal better if it was followed 
up with proper enforcement. Many of the laws are intended to conform to international 
standards, but enforcement mechanisms are severely lacking. Whether this is due to lack of 
motivation, or social attitudes or other factors is unclear.   
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Chapter 2 
Male Laborers 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The arrival of migrant workers in Kuwait provided the country with a labour force that 
enabled it to realize massive development and infrastructural projects, paving the way for a 
modern nation-state eager to translate its oil wealth into advancements for its local 
population. Like most migrant workers, unskilled foreign male laborers, especially from 
Asian nations, are among the most vulnerable groups in society. As a group, they are not 
afforded the same rights as nationals, and in cases where the law specifies that they are to 
be treated as equals, it is very rarely applied. Despite facing discrimination in the labour 
market, they accept any form of work, hoping for a better situation than that found in their 
home countries. This chapter focuses on unskilled foreign male laborers, mainly those 
working in construction and service sectors, including their motivations for migration to 
Kuwait, the types of labour that they are engaged in, how they live, as well as the national 
and international laws that apply to them.   
  
2.2. Background 
The presence of migrant workers in Kuwait cannot be overstated. Since the oil 
boom, large numbers of unskilled foreign laborers were required to fill gaps in the labour 
sector that the local population could not or would not fill. Therefore, their presence 
facilitated the government’s goal of providing higher standards of living and generous 
welfare services for its nationals. Like other migrants, unskilled male laborers are governed 
by the rules and regulations of the sponsorship system discussed in the previous chapter, 
whereby all foreigners wishing to work in Kuwait must do so via a citizen sponsor, who 
effectively guarantees their stay in the country. This system has “created a pool of cheap 
labour, which could be easily exploited and controlled, and deported if no longer 
required.”1 The government’s immigration policy towards foreigners and its dependence 
on the sponsorship system are in line with its view that Kuwait is not a country that is open 
to permanent settlement. As a welfare state that offers a great deal of services for its 
nationals, its economy would not cope with the extra burden of granting foreigners the 
same privileges. As Ruhs states, “immigration policy regimes are likely to be related to 
wider economic and social policies, including prevailing welfare policies, as well as to the 
overall political system and structure.”2 The type of sponsorship systems with these 
restrictions are often referred to as contract labour, or Temporary Foreign Worker 
Programs (TFWPs), and are used to set certain parameters on the admission, employment, 
and rights that are granted to migrant workers. Although the purpose of these programs is 
to fill a temporary gap in certain labour sectors, the result is often one in which these 
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programs contribute to existing divisions, whereby certain sectors are exclusively the 
domain of foreign workers. As Ruhs explains,  
TFWPs have often been accompanied by the segmentation of the host 
country’s labour market and the emergence of ‘immigrant sectors’, 
understood as sectors that employ, primarily or exclusively, foreign 
workers. The causal relationship between segmented markets and the 
employment of foreign workers appears to be two-ways, in which one re-
enforces the other. On the one hand, a segmented labour market and the 
existence of what is often perceived as ‘undesirable work’ in ‘undesirable 
sectors’, which natives no longer wish to take up, have constituted major 
reasons for the inflow and concentrated employment of foreign workers in 
these sectors. On the other hand, restrictions of the employment of foreign 
workers to certain sectors and/or occupations of the host economy has led, 
or at least contributed, to the desertion of these sectors/occupations by 
native workers, thus giving rise to, or at least exacerbating, the (further) 
segmentation of the labour market and the emergence of immigrant sectors.
3
  
By placing restrictions on the types of jobs that are available to unskilled foreign workers, 
competition between migrants and nationals becomes non-existent, thereby protecting the 
local labour force, and fulfilling the State’s promise in its Constitution to guarantee each 
citizen the right to work.  
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Table 3 
 
  
The number of migrants in Kuwait has risen steadily over the years,
4
 and in spite of 
the many risks, migrants continue to flock to the country. As of 2017, non-Kuwaitis make 
up 69% of the total population,
5
 of which more than one million are unskilled or low-
skilled workers. (See Table 3) Despite this fact, it is important to firstly note that the terms 
“migrant”, “immigrant”, or “migration” are not used by the government when referring to 
foreign workers. Instead, terms such as “expatriate”, “guest worker”, “temporary foreign 
worker”, “contract labourer”, or simply “alien”, are employed. The use of these terms 
reinforces the temporary nature of the workers’ stay in Kuwait, regardless of their large 
numbers. Additionally, in spite of the fact that the government population census collects 
data on the nationality of all residents in the country, information from the Central 
Administration of Statistics and the Public Authority for Civil Information (PACI) only 
comprises statistics for two categories: Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis. It is not only the 
terminology, but the laws themselves that exist to guarantee that once these workers have 
completed their jobs, they will return to their countries. As per the confines of the 
sponsorship system discussed in the previous chapter, there is no chance of permanent 
settlement or eventual citizenship, regardless of the time spent in the country. This is done 
deliberately in order to “avoid the social expenditure needed to maintain the dependents of 
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migrants and to prevent the integration of foreigners with local population.”6 As far back 
as 1964, Shehab noted that unskilled foreign workers have zero permanent links to the 
country. He noted that “their services will apparently continue to be in demand 
indefinitely; yet the individuals themselves are constantly changing and are regarded by 
their hosts as changeable.”7 Migrant workers’ awareness of their temporary stay in the 
country, and the unequal relationship between employee and sponsor contributes to the 
overall instability inherent in their labour migration, and may explain the reasons for their 
willingness to accept fewer rights than they are granted in their native countries. As 
Fargues and Shah noted in their study,  
On the receiving side in the Gulf, policies have been characterized for the 
last half century by a contrast between open labour markets and close 
societies: admitting the contract workers needed by ambitious development 
programs while limiting the rights of foreign nationals and avoiding their 
long-term settlement.
8
 
These restrictions placed on the length of time migrants may spend in the country, as well 
as the rights they are granted, reflect the concerns of the government in maintaining the 
national identity of the citizen population, who were until recently, a minority in their own 
country (See Table 4).
9
 Amid growing fears that their national identities are at risk of 
becoming overshadowed by the growing number of migrants in the country, the 
government has actively pursued policies aimed at restricting the permanent settlement of 
migrants, as well as the rights they are afforded. In 2004, during a meeting of GCC labour 
ministers, the Bahraini Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, Majeed Al-Alawi, stated 
that, “non-Arab foreign workers constitute a strategic threat to the region’s future.”10 
Similarly, in 2005, the GCC Secretary-General, Abdul Rahman Al Attiya, stated that 
“GCC countries need to look at the massive presence of expatriates basically as a national 
security issue, and not merely as an economic matter.”11 In addition, the president of the 
Arab American Institute, James Zogby, warned that foreign migrants were a “time bomb 
waiting to explode.”12   
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2.3 Description 
The UN International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant 
Workers and Members of their Families (1990) defines in Article 2 (1) a migrant worker as 
“a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remuneration activity 
in a State of which he or she is not a national.”13 Low or unskilled Asian migrants are 
given preference over workers from other countries for several reasons. Whereas in the 
past, Arab migrants from Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Palestine represented the 
majority of migrants in Kuwait, this has changed due to the availability of cheap labour 
from Asian countries. Furthermore, after the 1990 Gulf War, many Arab workers were 
“perceived by the nationals as disloyal to their hosts, and even as potentially dangers 
political agents who spread hostile ideas or work as a ‘fifth column’ for the benefit of 
foreign powers.”14 As mentioned earlier, Asian workers are considered more docile than 
Arabs and are less likely to demand state benefits. Not only are Asian migrants more 
willing to take up jobs that Arab migrants will not accept, but they are also less likely to 
contest unfavorable working conditions and terms. Weiner states that, “the disadvantage of 
Arab migrants is that they are inclined to demand equal rights with the local population in 
housing, education, and health facilities; they also bring to the Gulf the political ideologies 
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and cleavages that characterize other countries in the region.”15 In contrast, Asian migrants 
do not generally interact with the local population, are not politically involved, and do not 
expect to permanently settle in the country. For these reasons, Asian migrants are preferred 
over workers from other Arab countries.    
 
2.3.1 Who Are They? 
The types of unskilled Asian workers that migrate to Kuwait are what Abella refers 
to as the “richer among the poor,”16 because in order to migrate, access to resources, such 
as traveling money, are needed. Additionally, recruiting agencies charge various fees for 
their services, including fees that are to be paid to the Kuwaiti sponsor upon arrival. In 
many cases, migrants incur great debts in their efforts to gain employment to Kuwait. 
According to a 1991 study by the ILO, the debt incurred by an Indian worker in order to 
finance his or her out-migration to Kuwait averaged US $1,700.
17
 In 2016, Martin noted 
that the average amount of debt incurred by workers is $1,900,
18
 which indicates that costs 
have not increased significantly, although as Zachariah et al. have reported, wages 
remained stagnant for most of the past twenty-five years.
19
 These fees are paid to 
recruitment agents in order to cover costs for travel and obtain the visa, as well as the 
agent’s percentage. Thus, it is crucial to note that first and foremost, migration to Kuwait is 
a costly undertaking, and is a voluntary choice.  
The sponsorship system not only ties each migrant to a sponsor in order to 
guarantee a legal stay in the country, but also places certain restrictions on the types of 
unskilled male laborers that are granted entry and permission to work. Many laborers are 
recruited on the basis of their bachelor status, or their willingness to migrate 
unaccompanied by their families, so as to decrease the number of dependents the 
government must provide for. Age is another important factor in recruitment; most Asian 
male laborers are between the ages of 20-45, based on their ability to undertake physical 
work in Kuwait’s harsh weather conditions. Furthermore, the majority of workers 
employed in Kuwait are low or un-skilled migrants with little, if any, education, which 
further exacerbates their vulnerabilities. The IOM estimates that one half of migrants to 
GCC countries is either illiterate or has low reading and writing levels.
 20
 Low-skilled 
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workers comprised 73 percent of Bangladeshi migrants employed in Kuwait in 2010
 
while 
half of all Pakistani migrants were unskilled.
 21 
According to statistics published by the 
Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD), as of 2018, 
Indian migrants make up the largest percentage of workers in Kuwait, numbering 
1,157,072; the second largest group is from Bangladesh (381,669); the third largest from 
Pakistan (340,481); and finally the fourth largest is from the Philippines (197,751).
22
 Both 
Shah
23
 and Kanovsky
24
 have noted that the initial preference for workers from Asian 
countries was their perceived docile nature, a perception which continues today, as seen by 
the large numbers of workers from the region. These “preference stems”25 as Ruhs refers to 
them, enable the government to select workers based on their national origin first, followed 
by their skill level.  
 
2.3.2 Why Do They Come? 
 The main reason as to why unskilled foreign workers choose to migrate is 
economic. Their main motivation for migration to Kuwait is to find better work 
opportunities than those available in their home countries. For many, Gulf countries 
represent better prospects, and better wages. Their aim is to save as much of their wages as 
possible in order to send maximum remittances back home. Provided they are paid, high 
savings are possible due to the fact that unskilled foreign laborers in Kuwait spend very 
little money; they are provided with housing and transportation to and from work, thus 
limiting expenses on food and other personal items.   
 For most migrants, work in Kuwait presents an opportunity to earn more money 
than they were receiving in their native countries. Lured by the promise of high wages, 
they arrive in the country with a clear goal to achieve what Longva refers to as a “life 
project,”26 which consists of saving enough money either to support themselves or their 
families back home. As Abella notes, “unless constrained by state policies limiting 
admissions, migration will take place if the ‘expected wage’ at destination exceeds that in 
the origin.”27 Although higher wages are the main reason for their migration, unskilled 
workers are also influenced by other factors. Depending on the political, economic or 
social situation in their home countries, some migrants seek to escape hardships. In the 
case of Indian migrants, Chanda and Gupta found that low wages, lack of job 
opportunities, and rising poverty are among the main reasons migrants wish to work in the 
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Gulf countries.
28
 Seeking better job opportunities, a great deal of migrants are influenced 
by informal social networks (friends, relatives, acquaintances) from workers who have 
returned from jobs in the region, or are currently employed there. Shah and Menon have 
shown that “the role of social channels…from the home country is increasingly recognized 
as an important channel for encouraging additional migration.”29 Although these factors 
play a role, the main motivation for migrants is economic.     
Unlike other migration flows that are characterized by increasing skills or self-
development, unskilled migrants are attracted to Kuwait based only on the promised 
wages. Studies by Al-Moosa and McLachlan;
30
 and Birks and Sinclair
31
 show that 
migrants in the region rarely acquire new skills which result in better job opportunities 
upon their return home. They realize that their time in Kuwait is limited and want to earn 
as much money as possible during their stay. In many cases, Asian male migrants resort to 
begging as a means of supplementing their income when they are not working. Once a 
rarity in Kuwait, begging is now common among unskilled foreign workers.  
 This outlook among migrants has created an “each man for himself” philosophy. 
Their temporary contracts characterize their stay in Kuwait as transient, therefore limiting 
any attachments they may develop in Kuwait. The risk of losing their jobs proves too great 
to take any actions that might improve their situation, especially since they are aware that 
their situation is temporary. This may explain why strikes and actions that require a group 
effort are few; but more importantly, there are even fewer legal cases involving unskilled 
foreign laborers and unscrupulous sponsors. Cases such as these tend to be lengthy, and 
require a great deal of organization among the many legal and political channels in Kuwait, 
and many unskilled laborers are not prepared to enter a protracted legal battle. 
Furthermore, even in cases where the court’s decision is in favor of the migrant, there is 
never any guarantee that he will receive any benefit from it due to both the court’s inability 
to enforce its decisions, and the migrant’s temporary contract in the country.  
This awareness of their temporary situation instilled an attitude among unskilled 
foreign laborers of quiet subservience that allowed them to accept the situation they were 
in, for better or for worse. Longva elaborates more on this subservience by stating,  
It provided a rationale for the expatriates’ acceptance of exclusion and the 
structure of dominance under which they lived. Likewise, it led them to 
hold on to the status quo even though it was often blatantly in their disfavor. 
Thus the expatriates’ acceptance of the power asymmetry between 
themselves and the Kuwaitis arose neither from false consciousness nor a 
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fatalistic worldview but form the conviction that, given the temporary 
nature of their stay in Kuwait, submissiveness was the best strategy.
32
  
This subservience is somewhat deliberate due to the temporary nature of their stay in 
Kuwait. The practice of self-subordination serves as a means to perform their jobs without 
attracting unnecessary attention to themselves by engaging in any acts that may be seen as 
aggressive towards their employer. These acts include speaking out or protesting against 
work conditions.  
 
2.4. Life and Work  
There are four main areas of work for unskilled foreign laborers in Kuwait. The 
first is manual labour work for construction and manufacturing companies. The second is 
manual labour for cleaning, and waste management companies, such as garbage collectors, 
janitors, and watchmen. Others are employed in private households as drivers, chefs, or 
gardeners.
33
 Farm laborers represent another area of work for unskilled male workers. “In 
all cases labour migration is a response to increased demand for specific kinds of labour.”34 
According to Abella, migrant workers “come to the host countries where they perform the 
jobs that natives no longer want to do, that is to say the so-called ‘three Ds’ jobs (dirty, 
degrading, and dangerous).”35 Since nationals are averse to employment in these jobs, it is 
left to migrants to fill jobs in these sectors. It is important to note that the government 
restricts the issuance of work permits to certain sectors. Foreign workers are issued with an 
order from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour, listing the sectors and occupations 
for which work permits may be issued for migrant workers.
36
  
 
2.4.1 What Do They Do? 
There are more than 300 privately owned cleaning companies currently operating 
in Kuwait, servicing schools, ministries, hospitals, private companies, buildings and others. 
Mr. Saoud Al-Arfaj, Managing Director of Al-Arfaj Cleaning Company, employs 
approximately eight thousand workers, 80% of which are unskilled. The company is 
awarded contracts for cleaning various hospitals, schools, offices, and other companies. 
Al-Arfaj Cleaning Company, like most other companies of its type in Kuwait, finds 
laborers through agents who have contracts with other agents in labour-sending countries 
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such as India, Bangladesh and the Philippines. The employment of unskilled foreign 
laborers may be connected with saving money on expensive electronic cleaning equipment, 
which would require extensive training. Therefore, most cleaning companies, including Al-
Arfaj, specialize in cleaning “by hand”. Mr. Al-Arfaj explained that the company works for 
both private and government companies, but most of the problems arise from those 
contracts awarded for government jobs. When the government issues a tender, it is not the 
company that is the most qualified for the required jobs that wins, but the company 
providing the lowest price, which means companies seek laborers who are willing to work 
for the cheapest, i.e., the minimum wage. Mr. Al-Arfaj also explained that government 
tenders also specify the amount of workers that are to be utilized for the job, and that this is 
done somewhat arbitrarily, resulting in some cases where more workers than necessary are 
being hired.
37
 This may be due to the widespread corruption involved between agents and 
government officials. By insisting on the lowest price for the hiring of laborers, the country 
attracts laborers from the lowest tiers of society, such as opportunistic charlatans and petty 
thieves, who are willing to pay any cost to go to Kuwait.  
 Mr. Khaled Al-Rayes, Deputy General Manager at Al-Oul Kuwaiti Cleaning 
Company, elaborated more on the situation of unskilled foreign workers employed by his 
company, as well as others in Kuwait. Currently, Al-Oud employs 1,300 workers, mostly 
males from Bangladesh. Unlike many other cleaning companies, it does not charge 
workers for bringing them into the country, and their salaries are kept in full, except for 
fees established by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. According to Mr. Al-Rayes, 
some companies charge an average of KD 500 (approximately $1,646) for each worker 
applying for work in Kuwait, supposedly the cost of paying the various fees for licenses, 
contracts, and insurance arrangements required for the duration of their stay in the country. 
In reality, the fees that the government charges for licenses and documents are minimal. 
Mr. Al-Rayes explained Al-Oul’s breakdown of salary for each unskilled laborer, with the 
following costs taken out monthly (as specified by the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs): KD 5 (approximately $16) for social security; KD 25-30 (approximately $82-98) 
for housing; KD 10 (approximately $32) for transportation, since unskilled foreign laborers 
are not legally allowed to obtain a drivers’ licenses; and KD 5 ($16) for ticket debt 
repayment, which amounts to a total of KD 45-50 (approximately $148-164). Al-Oul’s 
monthly salary per worker is KD 90-100 (approximately $296-329), since any less than 
that would mean that workers would not be left with much after all costs are taken out 
from their salaries.
38
 However, many companies and agencies, both in Kuwait and in 
sending countries, charge exorbitant fees to earn a profit percentage from each laborer.  
 
2.4.2 Where Do They Live? How Do They Live? 
 Labour-importing countries such as Kuwait consider various costs and benefits 
when choosing potential migrant workers. Skilled workers, especially those accompanied 
by their families, are more expensive than unskilled workers in terms of living and 
employment costs, whereas unskilled workers are more likely to accept lesser conditions, 
and therefore represent less economic cost to the state. Birks and Sinclair state that, “a 
migrant workforce prepared to live under bachelor conditions might be a more economic 
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proposition than one seeking family reunification in the country of employment even if the 
productivity of the former were significantly lower.”39 Ministerial Order, No. 113 of 1995, 
aims at setting basic standards for housing of unskilled foreign laborers. It “regulates 
matters related to workers’ quarters, including number of workers per room, minimum 
space per person, minimum furnishings, and maintenance of kitchens, toilets, and 
buildings.”40 Employers are required by law to provide housing for all unskilled foreign 
laborers on government contracts, and although meals are not provided for, the housing 
facilities contain kitchens the workers may use. Despite this, many workers face poor 
living conditions, cramped quarters, and unsanitary toilets and cooking facilities. In 2006, a 
U.S. Country Report on Kuwait reported that, 
Many foreign workers were forced to live in ‘housing camps,’ which 
generally were overcrowded and lacked adequate cooking and bathroom 
facilities. Laborers were housed 10 or more to a room in squalid conditions, 
a number without access to adequate running water. These workers were 
allowed off the camp compound only on company transport by permission 
of the employer.
41
 
There is no indication of any changes being made to these conditions at the present time. 
Zachariah’s study on the housing conditions of Asian workers in Qatar found that the 
camps they were housed in, which share many similarities with camps found in Kuwait, 
had inadequate facilities for the amount of workers residing in them. Overcrowding was 
reported as a big problem with small rooms meant to accommodate two or three people 
being occupied by five to eight people.
42
 As McGeehan states, “their living conditions 
reflect those of the developing, not the developed world.”43  
Not only are unskilled male laborers excluded from certain protections under the 
Labour Law, such as free participation in the labour market, but they also face 
discrimination outside of the workplace, in the areas in which they live. Taran and 
Geronimi refer to this as “systematic discrimination,”44 where migrants have access to 
accommodations only in ghettos or outer suburbs. This discrimination “affects, conditions, 
and even prevents outright access to work and to decent working conditions for target 
groups.”45 Housed in locations away from locals and other expatriates, these laborers have 
little or no interaction with others, yet another indication of their temporary status. The 
government has allocated certain residential areas specifically for foreign laborers, such as 
Abbasiya, Jeleeb Al-Shuyouk, and Mahboula, areas relatively further from Kuwait City, 
the capital, than other residential areas. These areas are known for the abundance of 
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“bachelor apartments”, referring to the unskilled foreign laborers who occupy the 
apartments, and their inability to bring their families. This is a necessary clause in their 
short-term employment contracts and is meant to guarantee their temporary migrant status 
in Kuwait. As far back as 1982, Al-Moosa and McLachlan report that a study conducted by 
the Ministry of Planning described bachelor housing, or the housing that is offered to 
unskilled male laborers, as being “below the standards recommended by the United 
Nations Organization.”46 Unfortunately, more than thirty years later, the situation has not 
improved much. The 2017 Human Rights Report from the U.S. Department of State noted 
that “social discrimination against noncitizens…was prevalent and occurred in most areas 
of daily life, including employment, education, housing, and health care.”47 Kuwait has 
ratified the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, with a core 
principle that calls on member States to “declare and pursue a national policy designed to 
promote…equality of opportunity and treatment in respect to employment and 
occupation.”48 The sponsorship system presents challenges in terms of fulfilling the intents 
of the Convention, due to the labour hierarchy that favours certain nationalities over others. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, domestic workers from the Philippines are 
considered better educated, cleaner, more efficient, and able to speak English, while 
workers from Sri Lanka and Bangladesh are considered to be less educated, and less 
experienced with household appliances due to their rural background. Thus, preference is 
shown to those nationalities that will require less training.  
 These segregation policies have created a situation in which unskilled male laborers 
are marginalized, only compounding their feelings of exclusion. Not only are they 
excluded from involvement with nationals but from the expatriate population also. Weiner 
states that “migrants are incorporated into the economic structure but are excluded from 
the social structure. Separation, not integration or assimilation, is the goal.”49 Unskilled 
migrants have no permanent ties or allegiances to the country, simultaneously aware of the 
reliance on their labour and the temporary nature of their employment. As Birks and 
Sinclair state, “in this way, it is hoped the close and prolonged contact between indigenes 
and immigrants and the economic costs of supporting expatriates within the country of 
employment will both be minimized.”50 Unlike the times of sea trading where Kuwaitis 
interacted with, and were exposed to, different nationalities, and diverse categories of 
workers through their exchanges, today, most Kuwaitis have little or no interaction with 
the growing migrant population. This has led to feeling of intolerance towards migrant 
workers and xenophobic sentiments have begun to reveal themselves through 
parliamentary debates concerning the rights of these workers in the country. Prevented 
from bringing their families and segregated from the local population, these government 
policies have discouraged the assimilation of migrant workers into the country.   
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2.5 National Laws 
According to the labour law, all non-Kuwaiti workers are classified under the Alien 
Residence Law. Unskilled foreign workers who are employed by the government are 
issued with “No.17” visas, while those employed in the private sector are issued with 
“No.18” visas. Kuwaiti law specifies that laborers employed on government contracts 
depart the country once the job has been completed. For certain sectors such as industry 
and agriculture, work permits are transferrable only after one year of employment and with 
the approval of the original sponsor.
51
 The law provides for a brief window of time, 
approximately two to three months, where laborers are allowed to transfer their contracts to 
another employer, but the long bureaucratic process involved in this transfer proves 
difficult for most unskilled and illiterate foreign laborers, especially since all contracts are 
in Arabic.  
 Labour laws aim to protect the basic rights of all workers by setting standards for 
the workplace. The United Nations and the ILO have both outlined basic standards for the 
workplace which include health and safety, hours of work and rest, annual leave, overtime 
pay, and living conditions amongst other standards. In Kuwait however, many of these 
laws are openly flouted without any consequences. In 2010, a New Private Sector Labour 
Code (No. 6) was established in Kuwait, which is the most recent amendment to labour 
laws in the country. In addition to the laws in the Labour Code, there are also Ministerial 
Orders (MO), which are periodically issued through the ministry in order to provide 
specific orders. Ministerial Order No. 43 addresses the conditions of work that are “to be 
observed on worksites and in workplaces to ensure the protection of workers…against 
occupational hazards and health risks,”52 although mechanisms for enforcement are not 
mentioned. The 2017 U.S. State Department Report on Kuwait notes that  
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour is responsible for enforcement of 
wages, hours, overtime, and occupational safety and health regulations of 
nondomestic workers. Enforcement by the ministry was generally good, but 
there were gaps in enforcement with respect to unskilled foreign laborers. 
Several ministry officials cited inadequate numbers of inspector as the main 
reason for their inability to enforce the laws to the best of their abilities.
53
 
Lack of enforcement continues to be a major barrier for the effective implementation of 
existing laws.  
 
2.5.1 Hours of Work and Weekly Day of Rest 
The first important Article from the New Labour Code is Article 64, which states, 
“the laborer shall not be made to work for more than 8 hours a day or 48 hours a 
week…working hours during the holy month of Ramadan shall be 36 hours a week.”54 
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This is consistent with ILO Conventions concerning working hours.  Additionally, Article 
65 of the New Labour Code states, “the laborer shall not be made to work for more than 
five continuous hours per day without being followed a break period of not less than one 
hour. Break hours shall not be calculated within the working hours.”55 Article 66 discusses 
overtime pay and states, “the additional working hours shall not be more than two hours 
per day and in a maximum number of one hundred eighty (180) hours per year,”56 which 
the employer is responsible for recording in order for the workers to receive additional 
wages for that work.  
In addition to the New Labour Code, laws concerning hours of work, weekly rest 
and paid leave are addressed in various Ministerial Orders and Decrees. One example is 
MO No. 212, which entered into force in June 2011. This Order was amending a previous 
MO No. 189 of 2010, concerning outdoor working hours for workers in the construction 
sector. The new Order states, “employers are prohibited from employing workers outdoors 
between the hours of 11am and 4pm. This section is only effective during the period from 
the first of June to the 31
st
 of August.”57 It is during these months when the temperature in 
Kuwait reaches highs of over 50 degrees Celsius, and outdoor work becomes difficult. 
Since most unskilled foreign laborers are employed in menial, manual labour jobs that take 
place outdoors, there are laws aimed at protecting them from harmful conditions. In 2006, 
a U.S. State Department report stated that media sources had claimed that the government 
was responsible for falsifying official temperature readings in order for work to continue 
during hot weather. In recent years, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour has been 
conducting more inspections, and although the number of violations is decreasing, some 
companies continue to flout the law.  
Although the New Labour Law of 2010 specifies a weekly rest day, it includes the 
stipulation that if “the need arises,”58 a worker may be asked to work on their day of rest, 
in which case another day of rest will be assigned, and will receive overtime pay. The 
conditions under which a “need” may arise are very vague, and have not been specified 
within the law, which leaves the final decision to the employer to decide what the “need” 
may be. Kuwait has also ratified several ILO conventions, such as the Weekly Rest 
(Commerce and Offices) Convention (No.89), which calls for “an uninterrupted weekly 
rest period comprising not less than 24 hours in the course of each period of seven days.”59 
In order to combat some of the discrepancies between the law and lack of enforcement, 
certain foreign embassies in Kuwait have utilized their labour attaché departments to 
provide model contracts for future migrants. For example, one model contract proposed by 
the Bangladeshi government includes provisions for hours of work, which states, “the 
Employee shall be engaged in his/her work for…8 (eight) hours per day and for 6 (six) 
consecutive days in a week which deems to be normal working hours.”60 (See Appendix 1) 
These contract models aim to fill a gap in the labour law by offering protections for 
workers that may not be included in the labour law. The Indian government has also 
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proposed model contracts for their nationals that include provisions regarding labour 
disputes. (See Appendix 2) 
 
2.5.2 Wages 
 Earning wages in order to support their families back home (through remittances), 
and pay back any loans taken, are the strongest motivators for labour migration. However, 
for many unskilled male laborers, their wages are often withheld, deducted, or not paid on 
time. As mentioned previously, many migrants are coerced into signing contracts upon 
arrival in Kuwait that differ to those agreed upon in their countries of origin. In many 
cases, these new contracts not only specify less favourable terms, but also lower wages 
than those initially promised. Agunias found that in the case of migrants from Pakistan for 
example, the wages indicated in the new contract was about 8 to 10 percent lower than 
those in the contract signed in Pakistan.
61
 
The most common complaints from unskilled foreign laborers relate to unpaid 
wages. Employers seeking to take advantage of workers’ lack of knowledge of Kuwaiti 
labour laws, as well as the language barrier that prevents them from understanding 
contracts, do so by withholding wages. In the past years, as complaints relating to unpaid 
wages increased, the government instituted new measures aimed at preventing employers 
from withholding wages. One such measure, MO No.110 of 1995, states that employers in 
the private sector must open Kuwaiti bank accounts for all of employees earning KD 100 
or more (approximately $330), and must obtain a notarized copy from the bank stating the 
employee’s wages have been deposited in the accounts. This is in fact, a Wage Protection 
System (WPS) that requires employers to pay their employees using bank transfers. 
Systems such as these are implemented to counteract non-payment or late payment of 
wages by providing a record of payments that the relevant government authority may 
monitor. In turn, the government can take legal action against employers who are guilty of 
non-payment or late payment of wages for their workers. A WPS is also useful in wage 
disputes between employees and employers, as it provides a record of all payments. The 
Ministerial Order had mixed results, due to unscrupulous employers who found a way to 
circumvent the system and profit from it. One method of doing so is by confiscating 
employee bankcards and withdrawing from their accounts at will.
62
 Jureidini also mentions 
this as a shortcoming in the WPS.
63
 These factors make it much more difficult to assess the 
actual salary that an unskilled foreign worker receives. Although there are drawbacks, 
guarantees such as those promised by the WPS, are critical for migrant workers who have 
families depending on their salaries and remittances. For some, not earning the promised 
wages compels them to remain in the country for a longer period of time than their 
contracts or visas allow, in order to earn a return on their migration investment, thus 
putting them at risk of detention, arrest, or deportation.  
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 It is difficult to obtain recent figures for the exact wages unskilled migrants receive 
due to the reasons mentioned above, although Zachariah’s study found that “the wages for 
most of the unskilled, semi-skilled, and skilled categories remained stagnant during the 
second half of the 1990s.”64 At the same time, the costs of migration have increased, as the 
prices for accommodation, travel and work documents have risen, meaning that migrants 
are able to save less. In their study for KNOMAD, Abella and Martin found that on 
average, workers from India pay $1248 in expenses for their migration to Kuwait, which 
they’ve estimated to be about two and a half months of their wages,65 while workers from 
Bangladesh pay $3136, or nine months of their wages,
66
 and workers from Sri Lanka pay 
an average of $352 or about one month of their wages.
67
 Governments in labour exporting 
countries have little influence on the actual wages received by their nationals, despite 
conventions or MOUs. A recent example of this is when the government of the Philippines 
insisted on decent wages for their nationals in Qatar, the Qatari government imposed a 
recruitment ban on their workers.
68
 One reason for this is due to the availability of cheap 
labour supply from other low-income, labour exporting countries, which allows Gulf States 
to view migrants as disposable or interchangeable. On the other hand, Ruhs points out that 
if migrants were granted their economic and social rights as laid out in UN and ILO 
conventions, such as the right to equal wages with nationals, it would come at a greater 
cost to the employer, and fewer migrants will be hired. Conversely, by limiting the rights 
granted to migrant workers, employers face lower costs, and are able to hire more 
migrants. He states, “if the State stipulates a relatively high set of employment rights for 
low-skilled migrants, employer demand- and thus the number of new migrants legally 
recruited for low-skilled jobs- can be expected to be lower than what it would be if 
migrants had fewer rights.”69 Despite the costs, unskilled laborers remain willing to 
migrate to Kuwait in the hopes of earning higher wages than in their home countries.  
 
2.5.3 Unions 
Even though Kuwaiti law permits expatriate workers to join unions, the law is 
discriminatory toward unskilled foreign workers in a variety of ways. Expatriate workers 
are only allowed to join trade unions if they have been working in Kuwait for five or more 
years, hence ruling out unskilled foreign laborers, who are on short-term contracts. 
Expatriate workers are also denied voting rights and prohibited from holding leadership 
positions in unions, which means that their views and concerns are more often than not 
ignored. Moreover, Kuwaiti law stipulates that any union must have at least 100 members, 
fifteen of which must be nationals; in the case of the majority of unskilled foreign laborers 
who work as cleaners and street sweepers, there isn’t a trade union available for them to 
join due to the lack of Kuwaitis working in these fields. Organizations such as the ILO 
have criticized this requirement, and urged the Kuwait government to reduce this 
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requirement, and encourage more foreign laborers to join unions. Without any trade union 
support, unskilled migrants have limited means of redress when facing maltreatment or 
abuse. Furthermore, this requirement contradicts the ILO’s Freedom of Association and 
Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, which Kuwait ratified in 1961. Article 2 
of that Convention guarantees workers the right to join organizations “without distinction 
whatsoever.”70 The ILO Digest on Freedom of Association explains that this means 
“freedom of association…without discrimination of any kind based on occupation…[or] 
nationality…not only to workers in the private sector of the economy, but also to civil 
servants and public service employees in general.”71 Additionally, Kuwait has also ratified 
the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, which protects migrant 
workers against any union discrimination.   
Without the assistance and support of a union or a government monitoring agency, 
workers are forced to deal with such issues on their own. While some choose to remain 
silent and submissively accept these conditions, others decide to leave their jobs and find 
work elsewhere, well aware of the illegality and risks of doing so. These laws were 
designed to protect migrants and unskilled foreign workers and to ensure standard working 
and living conditions, although without sufficient enforcement, this becomes difficult. 
 
2.6 Debt 
Although there are costs involved for most jobs, whether they are at home or 
abroad, migrant workers face considerable costs to obtain jobs in Kuwait. These 
“transaction costs,”72 or migration costs, may include visa fees, agency fees, airfare, 
medical tests, transport, or accommodation, which migrants must obtain before migrating 
abroad. Depending on factors such as recruitment agency fees, and country visa policies, 
the price migrants pay varies according to their home countries. In general however, most 
migrants report that visa and recruitment fees are the main costs they face for employment 
in the GCC. (See Table 5)  
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In his report for KNOMAD in 2016, Martin states that Bangladeshis paid an 
average of $2,300 for visas and $500 for airfare, whilst Indians paid an average of $1,250, 
and Sri Lankans paid an average of $320,
73
 compared to the 2014 KNOMAD survey, these 
costs remained consistent, except in the case of Bangladesh, where the cost has decreased 
in two years. Compared to a 1995 survey of Asian migrant workers in Kuwait, when 
workers from Bangladesh paid an average of $1,727, Indian workers paid $900, while Sri 
Lankans paid $689,
74
 these figures indicate that, except in the case of Sri Lanka, migration 
costs have not changed drastically in the last twenty or so years. Moreover, Shah and 
Fargues note that many migrants report having to pay additional fees upon arrival,
75
 
compounding the total cost of migration. According to Kuwaiti law, employers are 
required to pay all visa costs, and recruitment agencies are prohibited from deducting 
wages to recoup their placement fees,
76
 although this practice is common. Jureidini states 
that “where employers pay the recruitment costs and fees, many agencies also charge 
workers, receiving payment from both.”77 More on recruitment agencies will be discussed 
in Chapter 4.   
For many migrants, the promise of high wages in oil rich nations outweighs the 
rising migration costs, so they borrow heavily to finance their migration, taking out loans 
with high interest rates, selling or mortgaging land, jewelery, or other assets in order to pay 
these costs.
78
 These incurred debts weigh heavily on the lives of migrant workers, and in 
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Table 5 
 
many cases, forcing them to accept lower wages than they were initially promised, 
delaying the time for debt repayment, and thus incurring even more costs through interest 
rates. Whether migrant workers take out loans, use their own savings or borrow from 
friends and relatives, the burden of debt is constant. Jureidini states that “the debt 
established a momentum of vulnerability and dependence upon those who are employing 
him.”79 Fearing that any complaints about their contracts or the nature of their work will 
cost them their jobs, they are willing to accept less than favorable conditions without 
protest. For many, there is tremendous shame in returning home empty-handed. “Induced 
indebtedness is a key instrument of coercion,”80 that compels workers to sign contracts that 
contain provisions that are different than those previously agreed upon. According to 
Zachariah’s study on workers in the UAE, but that is applicable to Kuwait:  
The information we collected also suggests that nearly one-fifth of the 
Indian migrants have not received the same job, wages, and non-wage 
benefits as stipulated in their work contracts. As the emigrants reached UAE 
after incurring considerable expenditure to meet the cost of migration, they 
have no option but to accept a new contract and work there.
81
 
Contract substitution refers to the practice of altering the terms of the employment which 
the worker has agreed to, whether that agreement was verbal or in writing. For many 
migrants, the original contract that they signed in their countries differs from that which 
they are coerced into signing upon arrival at their destinations. These new contracts are 
often written in Arabic and contain terms that are less favorable than the original in terms 
of working hours, wages, and rights. Workers who wish to lodge complaints or protest 
against these new contracts are often left with little option but to begin the entire 
recruitment process once again, thereby incurring more debts. Otherwise, migrants may 
either accept the new terms and fulfill their obligations, or transfer employers, in which 
case, the fees that the sponsor paid must be returned. For some, becoming illegal migrants 
or working for an employer other than the one specified on the visa entry form is the only 
option to earn enough wages to support their families and pay back mounting debts.    
In an attempt to regulate the employment of migrant workers, the government has 
called for standardized contracts, with provisions concerning the accommodation, medical 
care, transportation, and wage protections, although Castles notes that the lack of 
enforcement of these contracts has done little to protect migrants.
82
 In short, without 
adequate enforcement of laws, migrant workers remain at risk of abuse, regardless of 
protections in the law.   
 
                                                          
79
 Ray Jureidini (2014). Migrant Labour Recruitment to Qatar. Report for Qatar Foundation Migrant Worker 
Welfare Initiative. Bloomsbury Qatar Foundation Journals, p.30. [Online] Available from: 
http://www.qscience.com/userimages/ContentEditor/1404811243939/Migrant_Labour_Recruitment_to_Qata
r_Web_Final.pdf 
80
 ILO (2005). A Global Alliance Against Forced Labour. Global Report Under the Follow Up to the ILO 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. International Labour Office, pg. 2, Geneva. 
[Online] Available from:  https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
declaration/documents/publication/wcms_081882.pdf  
81
 Zachariah et al., supra note 6, p.166. 
82
 Castles, supra note 1, p.511. 
2.7 Access to Grievance Resolution 
Access to labour grievance mechanisms to address labour related disputes is a 
major problem facing unskilled migrants in Kuwait. The Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Labour has jurisdiction for all matters concerning migrant laborers, with the exclusion of 
domestic workers. Its Labour Disputes Department received over 10,821 complaints from 
workers in 2017,
83
 mostly regarding non-payment of wages, visa transfers, or other 
contract related issues. Of these cases, most were resolved in arbitration, while 3,173 cases 
were referred to the courts.
84
  
In cases of labour disputes, migrants have limited options for resolution. Lack of 
awareness of their rights, as well as language barriers, prevent many from reporting 
disputes. Under the sponsorship system, if a migrant wishes to change his employer for any 
reason, he must first obtain a release form from said employer, without which their visa 
will be cancelled. In many cases, employers refuse to consent to a change of sponsor, 
leaving migrants little choice but to abscond or tolerate the current conditions. 
Nevertheless, some migrants risk an illegal status in order to obtain better work. As Taran 
and Geronimi state, “in effect, in addition to the difficulties inherent in being a foreigner, 
such as language, knowledge of procedures and social codes, irregular status would be the 
most important barrier to access judicial institutions, due especially to fear of detention and 
expulsion.”85 As far as the authorities are concerned, an irregular or illegal status 
effectively means that a migrant has forfeited their rights under the law, and is subject to 
deportation. Additionally, the sponsorship system’s lack of enforcement mechanisms 
makes it difficult to compel employers to comply with their obligations under the law.     
 
2.8 International Treaties/Conventions 
The UN and the ILO have both outlined basic standards for the workplace which 
include health and safety, hours of work and rest, annual leave, overtime pay, and living 
conditions, among other standards. Over the years, Kuwait has ratified several important 
conventions and treaties pertaining to unskilled foreign workers. The ILO Social Policy 
(Basic Aims and Standards) Convention was ratified by Kuwait in 1963, and includes 
Article 11 concerning wage rights. It states that “necessary measures shall be taken to 
ensure the proper payment of all wages earned.”86 This article is pertinent for male 
laborers, many of whom are illiterate and unaware of their wage rights according to the 
contracts they signed. Furthermore, Article 29 of the New Private Sector Labour Law 
states that all contracts shall be in the Arabic language, with translations if available, but 
the Arabic language contract is considered official.
87
 In essence, this Convention seeks to 
ensure that workers are aware of their wage rights, in which case, Article 29 should be 
amended to include official translations for migrants. In addition, the ILO’s Declaration on 
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Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998) “commits Member States to respect 
and promote principles and rights in four categories, whether or not they have ratified the 
relevant Conventions.”88 These principles include three which are applicable to unskilled 
male laborers: “(a) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to 
collective bargaining; (b) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; (c) 
the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.”89 All ILO 
Conventions are meant to apply to all workers, irrespective of nationality, skill level, and 
in many cases, migration status.  
Kuwait has not ratified the Migration for Employment Convention of 1949 
(No.97), and amongst the major labour exporting countries mentioned in this thesis, only 
the Philippines has ratified it. This Convention, the Migrant Workers (Supplementary 
Provisions) Convention, 1975 (No.143), and their accompanying Recommendations 
embody the principles of equality between nationals and migrant workers that the ILO 
strives for, and that Member States agree to by joining the ILO. These conventions set out 
details regulating the full migration process, including contract conditions, as well as other 
measures to facilitate the integration of migrants in their country of employment. As Taran 
and Geronimi note, these Conventions,  
Provide a comprehensive ‘values-based’ definition and legal basis for 
national policy and practice regarding non-national migrant workers and 
their family members. They thus serve as tools to encourage States to 
establish or improve national legislation in harmony with international 
standards. They are not simply human rights instruments.
90
 
In ratifying these conventions, Kuwait may begin to implement a comprehensive national 
policy that offers greater protections for migrant workers than the current one.  
There are also several important UN conventions that Kuwait has ratified, such as 
the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), and 
especially Article 3 of that Convention which condemns racial segregation. The 
International Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) is also 
relevant, as it includes Article 8 which pertains to trade unions. In regards to the ICESCR, 
the Kuwaiti government stated that  
Although the Government of Kuwait endorses the worthy principles 
embodied in Article 2, paragraph 2, and Article 3 as consistent with the 
provisions of the Kuwaiti Constitution in general and of its Article 29 in 
particular, it declares that the rights to which the articles refer must be 
exercised within the limits set by Kuwaiti law.
91
  
The Kuwaiti government also declared reservations regarding the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights which it ratified in 1996, stating, 
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Interpretive Declaration regarding Article 2, paragraph 1, and Article 3: 
Although the Government of Kuwait endorses the worthy principles 
embodied in these two articles as consistent with the provisions of the 
Kuwaiti Constitution in general and of its Article 29 in particular, the rights 
to which the articles refer must be exercised within the limits set by Kuwaiti 
law.
92
 
By submitting these reservations, the government has continued to ratify treaties and 
conventions with the knowledge that they will not be enforced according to their intent.  
 
2.9 Conclusion 
 The roles and statuses that unskilled male laborers occupy within the labour force 
in Kuwait are dependent on many factors, but one thing is certain: their presence is crucial 
to the country’s economic and structural development. Unskilled workers fill a void in 
Kuwait’s labour sector and by doing so, have enabled the country to develop large-scale 
projects, infrastructures, and services that are essential for a modern nation-state. However, 
they live isolated from the local population, with no hope of assimilation. Despite the 
positive aspects of labour migration such as increased wages and better opportunities, a 
significant number of unskilled male migrants continue to face unnecessary adversity and 
abuse in Kuwait. These include low wages and subsequent debt incurrence, poor working 
and living conditions, lack of adequate legal protections, discrimination, and denial of 
certain freedoms such as the right to organize and join unions. These conditions contrast 
sharply with those of the national population, creating a disparity between the treatment of 
citizens and non-citizens, which is unacceptable under international labour standards. As 
temporary workers, they have limited legal rights and face a great deal of disadvantages, 
which contribute to their discrimination and social marginalization. Their role in the labour 
sector is unacknowledged and they are viewed as a necessary evil, as opposed to an 
essential part of the labour force. 
 Even where laws exist to protect migrant workers, in many cases, they are unaware 
of those laws due to the fact that they are not properly enforced. For example, laws 
concerning working and living conditions are rarely enforced, with the result being that 
workers are living in inadequate conditions. Also, workers are denied the freedom to 
change employers, regardless of the circumstances, are denied access to unions, have 
limited access to grievance resolutions, and are hindered by a racially based system of 
wages.  
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Chapter 3 
Domestic Workers 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Domestic workers represent a significant amount of the labour force amongst unskilled 
foreign workers in Kuwait. Tied to their employers/sponsors through the same sponsorship 
system that applies to unskilled male laborers, the domestic workers referred to in this 
thesis are live-in workers who reside in the residence of their employer/sponsor. Until 
recently, these workers were excluded from the national labour laws, essentially leaving 
sponsors to impose restrictions as they see fit. Domestic workers face wide spread 
discrimination and abuse during their recruitment, employment, and often, their return 
home. In addition, the isolated nature of their work often prevents them from seeking 
grievance resolutions in case of employment disputes of any kind. This chapter will focus 
on the lives of domestic workers in Kuwait under the current sponsorship system, and the 
ways in which that system has led to a situation of forced labour, contract slavery and debt 
bondage through poor enforcement of existing laws.  
 
3.2 Background 
The ILO defines domestic work as “work performed in or for a household or 
households,”93 and a domestic worker as “any person engaged in domestic work within an 
employment relationship.”94 Domestic labour represents the largest category of 
employment for female migrants seeking work in Kuwait. Latest figures indicate that as of 
November 2017, there are 677,000 domestic workers currently employed in Kuwait;
95
 with 
the majority coming from India, the Philippines and Sri Lanka. They are a fixture in most 
Kuwaiti households, as well in the households of many foreign residents. A report by 
Human Rights Watch compared the rise in the presence of domestic workers in past years 
and states that “in 1965…only one thousand migrant household workers worked in the 
country…By 1989, Kuwait hosted between 100,000 and 130,000 foreign domestic 
workers. By 2009, the number of domestic workers in Kuwait exceeded 660,000.”96 
Whereas in the late 1970s, only about thirteen percent of households employed a domestic 
worker,
97
 today, it is estimated that 90 percent of all Kuwaiti households employ a 
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domestic worker.
98
 As Moya states, “domestic service shifted from aristocratic privilege to 
bourgeois entitlement,”99 allowing people who previously didn’t have access to domestic 
workers to employ one or more. 
Their entry and presence into Kuwaiti households has allowed nationals, especially 
women, to increase their participation in the national workforce. This rise in the number of 
domestic workers has enabled Kuwaiti women to become more active in the workforce, 
earn higher degrees, and participate in other activities that take place outside the home 
such as entrepreneurial businesses. In 1965, there were 1,002 employed Kuwaiti women in 
the labour force;
100
 by 1985, there were 24,422 employed women,
101
 and today, there are 
216,314 employed Kuwaiti women in the labour force.
102
 The rise in the number of women 
in the labour force correlates with the increase in the number of domestic workers in the 
country, suggesting that as more women joined the labour force, they increasingly 
depended on domestic workers. Human Rights Watch states, “hiring foreign domestic 
workers to perform time-consuming chores such as cleaning and childcare has reduced the 
amount of household labour demanded from Kuwaiti women, who otherwise bear primary 
responsibility for these tasks.”103 Free from the daily chores and household responsibilities 
that previously dictated their presence in the home, Kuwaiti women were able to pursue 
higher learning degrees, and earn wages independent of their husbands, thus granting them 
a sense of freedom that had until that time been absent. On the other hand, a 2002 study by 
Shah, Chowdhury, and Shah identified other factors that may affect the reasons for the 
employment of domestic workers, as well as factors that determine the number of domestic 
workers per household. They found that “domestic workers were not being hired simply to 
replace working women but also to assist women not in the labour force,”104 as in the 
elderly or those requiring special care. Additionally, the study found that households that 
included children below the age of six, or persons aged sixty or older, increased the 
probability of employing more than one domestic worker,
105
 presumably so that household 
chores, and child care can be divided among the workers. Whereas in the past, it was the 
women’s responsibility to tend to the children and elderly relatives, this responsibility is 
now designated to domestic workers as more women enter the labour force. In this way, 
domestic workers play an important role in Kuwaiti households, and in recent years, the 
native population has come to rely on them for a variety of tasks. A 2015 study found that 
participants in their focus group studies thought that it is “a norm in Kuwaiti society to 
employ a domestic worker,”106 even describing it as a “requirement,”107 and a 
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“necessity.”108 The same study found that most respondents indicated that the size of the 
house, and the fact that both the husband and wife were employed played a role in 
determining the amount of domestic workers needed.
109
  
Although neither study found that the cost of hiring a domestic worker was either a 
deterrent or an incentive, it is important to note that these costs have changed in recent 
years. In the years before standardized contracts, the Domestic Workers Law (2016), and 
MOUs with labour-exporting countries, most domestic workers were not entitled to a 
minimum wage, although a suggested wage was determined by recruitment agencies. Thus, 
domestic workers were affordable for the majority of Kuwaiti households.
110
 In recent 
years, however, as more rights are granted to domestic workers through standardized 
contracts and minimum wages, the costs of hiring workers has increased.   
 
3.3 Description 
 According to statistics provided by the Public Authority for Civil Information, as of 
2017 there are a total of 87,379 female workers employed in the private sector who are 
from Asian countries.
111
 (See Table 6) As mentioned earlier, statistics from various 
ministries classify workers only as Kuwaiti, or non-Kuwaiti, which makes it difficult to 
determine the exact number of migrants from the three main labor-exporting Asian 
countries: India, Bangladesh and the Philippines. In a similar way to male laborers, the 
motives for domestic workers seeking employment in Kuwait are many, but center around 
earning a higher wage than they would earn in their home countries. Their need for a 
steady income, as well as a place to live, coupled with their employer’s need for relatively 
low-cost, live-in domestic help, creates a seemingly mutually beneficial arrangement.  The 
reality, however, is quite different.  
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 Domestic workers are matched with their employers in a variety of ways. 
Prospective employers in Kuwait visit the office of a recruitment agency and choose their 
employee by browsing various folders containing briefs or resumes about the worker. The 
folders are organized according to nationality and contain information including age, 
marital status, education, religion, work experience, language proficiency, and photo (see 
example in Appendix 3). While some employers prefer to hire young, single women on the 
basis that their naivety will translate to complacency, others prefer older, married women 
who won’t be tempted to enter into sexual relationships during their time in the country.112  
A standardized labour contract (applicable to all nationalities) is signed, usually containing 
a provision that states that the employer may return the domestic worker to the agency 
within a set period of time (usually ninety days) if the employer is not satisfied with the 
worker. When I visited a recruitment agency in Kuwait inquiring about the process of 
hiring a domestic worker, one of the questions I asked was regarding the amount of time it 
would take for the worker to complete all the paperwork and arrive in Kuwait. I was told 
that the process takes a few months, but there are domestic workers available who have 
been returned by their previous employer for various reasons. These “returnees” are 
available for work without any delays, and were made to wait in the agency office awaiting 
employment.    
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Table 6 
  
3.3.1 Who Are They? 
 The majority of unskilled foreign workers in Kuwait come from India, (291,000),
113
 
which is not surprising considering the close ties these two countries have shared in the 
past. The Philippines and Sri Lanka represent the other two major labour-exporting 
countries. The new Domestic Workers’ Law stipulates that the minimum age for domestic 
workers is twenty-one years, and the maximum is sixty years. Previous to this law, each 
labour-exporting country set their own minimum ages; for example, in Bangladesh, they 
must be at least twenty-five years of age, while in India, women seeking domestic work 
must be at least thirty years old. The majority of workers from South Asia are either 
unskilled, or low-skilled,
114
 while those from the Philippines are usually semi-skilled, with 
a high percentage reporting high school
115
 qualifications.
116
   
  Currently, there are (163,000)
117
 Filipino domestic workers in Kuwait. Migrant 
women from the Philippines are unique in their status as domestic workers for several 
reasons. Although the Philippines does not have a shared history with Kuwait in the way 
that India does, in the 1970s the Filipino government’s aggressive push to provide 
temporary workers to countries in need proved very successful in the Middle East, and 
Kuwait was no exception. As Tyner states, “the growth of the Philippines’ overseas 
employment program has been maintained, to a large degree, by its aggressive marketing 
strategy of its workers as a cheap and docile, but skilled labour force.”118 Domestic 
workers from the Philippines are in great demand among those living in Kuwait and 
seeking domestic help. Their English fluency, as well as the training they receive, equips 
them with certain skills that are valued by employers. According to the ex-Labour Attaché 
in the Philippine Embassy in Kuwait, Mr. Leopoldo de Jesus, prospective domestic 
servants receive training in basic house cleaning, laundry, babysitting, as well as an 
introduction to Arab culture and some basic Arabic phrases and vocabulary.
119
 Courses are 
developed by the Philippines Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), in 
cooperation with the Technical and Skills Development Authority (TESDA), to develop 
skills and enhance knowledge, as some workers come from rural areas and are applying for 
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work in more urban and technologically advanced countries. These courses offer pre-
departure orientation services (PDOS), and post-arrival orientation services (PAOS). While 
many benefit from the PDOS, not many Filipinos take advantage of the PAOS. According 
to a study conducted by Naufal and Malit in 2016, “more than 70 percent of Filipina 
domestic workers did not participate in the PAOS”120 and only visited their embassy in 
cases of labour disputes or to update passports or travel documents. Due to the great 
demand for domestic workers from the Philippines, the Filipino government has been 
successful in negotiating with the Kuwaiti government a higher minimum wage for 
domestic workers.  
Sri Lanka is one of the main labour-exporting countries to the GCC countries, 
according to a 2007 report published by Human Rights Watch, “over 125,000 Sri Lankan 
women migrate to the Middle East as domestic workers each year.”121 Many migrate in the 
hope of finding better options to support themselves and their families at home. It is 
estimated that the majority of Sri Lankan women who migrate for employment are mainly 
housewives who have not previously held employment and who hope to directly contribute 
to their family’s finances.122 In a similar program as that conducted in the Philippines, Sri 
Lankans wishing to work in the Middle East are required to attend a training course which 
offers courses on language, culture and customs of the country, as well as counselling 
services aimed at teaching coping mechanisms for different situations. In addition, all Sri 
Lankans wishing to work abroad must obtain health insurance; this insurance covers 
illness, accidents or death both at home and overseas.
123
 Since 1996, the Sri Lankan 
government has made it compulsory for nationals intending to work abroad to attend pre-
departure orientation courses.
124
 The Sri Lankan Bureau of Foreign Employment (SLBFE) 
organizes a 15-day training course in basic housekeeping and other services aimed at 
women seeking work in the domestic labour sector, especially those seeking work in GCC 
countries. Training courses such as these are crucial to prepare Sri Lankan domestic 
workers for the work they will be expected to perform in Kuwaiti households. It is 
important to note however, that only a few hours of the 15-day training course are devoted 
to the rights of domestic servants abroad, which is just as crucial to their experience as the 
acquisition of household skills. In general, however, migrants who attended these pre-
departure orientation programs faced fewer difficulties upon employment in Kuwait, than 
those who did not attend. According to Thimothy and Sasikumar, those who did not 
participate in these courses had “virtually no knowledge of the country to which they had 
migrated, no idea about the customs or manners of that society, and no specific skills or 
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training in performing jobs in affluent homes having modern household appliances.”125 
Training courses have the potential to prepare migrants for the work they are about to 
embark on, thus equipping them with the necessary tools to aid them in their jobs abroad. 
These training courses are valuable and not only prepare workers for domestic labour, but 
also make them more sought-after. Fernandez reports that orientation sessions for 
Ethiopian domestic workers emphasize “obedience and subservience to employers,”126 and 
offer guidance on good practices. They encourage the domestic worker to “obey her 
employers, maintain personal hygiene, perform her duties diligently, respect the religious 
observances of her employers, and caution her against stealing, lying or exposing her body 
to the view of male members of her employer’s family.”127 By instilling values such as 
these, orientation courses function to promote the concept of an exemplary worker who 
will serve as an example of the type of workers labour-sending countries are capable of 
providing. The skills that migrant workers acquire during orientation courses make them 
more sought after in the labour market of labour-receiving countries. Harzig states that, 
“employment agencies make use of this system of stereotypes to cater to the needs of the 
market and to target their clientele. Providing special profiles arguably makes better 
‘matches’.”128 A hierarchy of nationalities exists wherein wages are set according to 
citizenship. This hierarchy comes about from a variety of reasons, mainly due to each 
government’s ability to leverage a certain minimum wage concerning domestic workers. 
The Domestic Workers Law (2016) does not specify a minimum wage amount, so 
governments of labour-sending countries set those amounts in the standardized contracts 
each sponsor must sign.  Presently, the minimum wage for domestic workers from the 
Philippines is set at KD 121 ($400) per month,
129
 for those from India, the minimum wage 
is set at KD 55 (approximately $181)
130
 and for workers from Bangladesh it is set a KD 50 
(approximately $164). Essim and Smith reported in 2004 that, in general, workers from 
Bangladesh earned less than other migrant workers in Kuwait.
131
   
As in the case of male laborers, domestic workers spend a great deal on acquiring 
visas for work in Kuwait. In 2004, Essim and Smith estimated that, on average, domestic 
workers spent $400 on expenses related to employment in Kuwait.
132
 In 2016, KNOMAD 
data indicates that migrants pay an average of $1,900 in costs, with workers from 
Bangladesh paying the highest costs, on average of $3,100, Indians paying $1,250, and Sri 
Lankans paying the lowest costs, an average of $320.
133
 These costs include travel 
expenses, recruitment agency (and in some cases sub-agents) fees, and visa or other 
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administrative services costs. Similarly to male laborers, domestic workers often resort to 
selling assets, borrowing money from friends, relatives, or moneylenders, taking out 
mortgages or other means in order to procure employment visas, which means that they too 
enter into employment already heavily in debt.  
   
3.3.2 Why Do They Come? 
 Typically, women who migrate for domestic service do so in the hope of a better 
life. In this way, they are like male unskilled workers and their life-project that was 
discussed in Chapter 2. They are motivated by job opportunities and wages higher than 
those that are available in their home countries, so that they are able to provide a better 
living for their families, such as purchasing a home, providing care for elderly relatives, or 
higher education for their children. The decision to migrate is most often their own, 
optimistically hoping to learn new skills and earn enough to fulfill their life projects or 
goals. This may include higher learning for their children as mentioned above, buying or 
building a home for their family, caring for sick or elderly relatives, or simply supporting 
themselves independent of their families. As Harzig states, “women migrate into domestic 
service because they see the need and the opportunity to financially provide for the family. 
More often than not, they are in control over the decision to move and are supported by 
family members.”134 The inability of these women to earn enough in their native countries 
in order to provide for their families is the primary reason for migration. In the case of Sri 
Lankan domestic workers for example, the wages promised to them for work abroad, 
especially in the Middle East, are far greater than any salary they could hope to obtain in 
Sri Lanka.
135
 This income disparity plays an important role in the lives of migrants, and is 
a large part of the reason that however abusive or unbearable their work conditions may be, 
they will endure them for the sake of providing for themselves and their families. On the 
other hand, Jureidini and Moukarbel have noted that an unstable family or marital life 
plays an important part in the decision to migrate. They state that “25 percent of the 
women who travelled for work [outside Sri Lanka] were pushed by the poor lifestyle at 
home and the abuse of a drunken husband,”136 an indication that migration is also seen as a 
way to escape maltreatment. 
Most domestic workers migrating to Kuwait do so through recruitment agencies. 
As most of the large recruitment agencies are located in large towns and cities, sub-agents 
are relied upon to recruit workers who live in rural areas.
137
 More often than not, they are 
given incorrect or misleading information regarding the nature of their employment, and 
are charged excessive fees from both receiving and sending recruitment agencies, as in the 
case of male laborers. Not only does this lead to debt incurrence, but also makes them 
vulnerable to employers who wish to recoup the fees they paid recruitment agencies by 
deducting them from the worker’s wages, a practice that is illegal, but not uncommon in 
Kuwait. More importantly, the contract substitution discussed in the earlier chapter gives 
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way to contract slavery, where contracts cease to be binding and employers feel free to set 
the terms themselves. Bales defines contract slavery by stating,  
Contract Slavery shows how modern labour relations are used to hide the 
new slavery. Contracts are offered that guarantee employment…but when 
the workers are taken to their place of work they find themselves enslaved. 
The contract is used as an enticement to trick an individual into slavery, as 
well as a way of making the slavery look legitimate.
138
  
These non-enforceable contracts provide a cover for unscrupulous agencies and employers 
to lure workers with promises of high wages and guaranteed rights, but in reality, their lack 
of enforcement renders them ineffective.  
 
3.4. Life and Work 
As domestic workers are on short-term working contracts, they are barred from 
migrating with their families. Often, domestic workers leave behind young children who 
are left in the care of relatives. Before the Domestic Workers Law (2016) clearly stated 
that domestic workers are to be granted an annual leave for each year of their employment, 
many sponsors denied workers this right, with the consequence that some domestic 
workers did not visit their families for years. As Bennhold notes, “if the benefits of female 
migration are under documented, so are its hidden costs. In the Philippines, migration is 
known as the ‘Filipino divorce’.”139 The personal cost to their families is great, with many 
children growing up without their mothers. For many though, this is the only choice they 
have in order to support themselves and their families.  
 
3.4.1 How Do They Live? 
 For domestic workers, the employer’s residence is not only the workplace, but is 
also their home. There are no guidelines in place that set specific standards on the quality 
of a domestic worker’s room or living quarters, the law states only that accommodations 
must be “adequate”. Most of the women I interviewed were assigned either their own room 
or a room shared with another female domestic worker, and a separate bathroom, but some 
women were only given a bed or mattress in a small designated area.
140
 Upon arriving at 
their employer’s home, it is up to the employer to decide whether to abide by the contract 
previously signed in regards to working hours, hours and days of rest, and other 
stipulations. A report from Anti-Slavery International states that: 
Live-in domestic migrant workers are purely seen as coming to the family 
to serve them, and their servile position is non-negotiable. The employers 
often see the worker as an economic commodity on which they have spent a 
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lot of money. Therefore, the employer ‘owns’ the domestic worker and her 
working conditions are set accordingly.
141
   
Conditions differ according to households and throughout my research and interviews, I 
have found it difficult to find a pattern that determines how domestic workers are treated 
based on their employer’s age, sex, educational level, marital status, household size, 
geographical location within Kuwait, or average household income. The common factor is 
that in an employer’s home, domestic workers spend most of their hours isolated from not 
only their families, but any social connections they may have. As Shah states, “they work 
in an environment of relative isolation and lower level of social support networks resulting 
in psychological isolation.”142 Restriction of movement is common, and most domestic 
workers are forbidden from leaving their employer’s home unless permission is granted. 
For those given a day off, they are permitted to leave the home for a few hours to attend 
church and socialize, but almost always, a curfew is set.
143
 In some cases, employers not 
only forbid domestic workers from leaving the residence, but lock them in to prevent them 
from escaping. Domestic workers reported feeling trapped and worried in case of fire or 
other emergencies.
144
 Conditions such as these further contribute to feelings of physical 
and psychological isolation.   
 Essim and Smith’s study shows that the majority of domestic workers included in 
their research worked in households with four or more inhabitants, working an average of 
78-100 hours per week, with only one or two days of rest per month.
145
 Although they are 
classified as unskilled laborers, domestic workers are expected to have a variety of skills 
ranging from childcare, caring for the elderly and administering medications, to cooking, 
cleaning and ironing. Despite this, there are no job descriptions for domestic workers 
specifying the tasks that the worker is expected to perform. Even in cases where the 
domestic worker thinks she has signed a contract for a specific job, she may learn that 
upon arrival she is expected to sign a new contract with different terms.      
  
3.4.2 What Do They Do? 
 Besides the physical isolation and lack of privacy, there are a host of other issues 
that negatively affect the mental and physical health of domestic workers. Their duties and 
chores differ from one household to another, but for the majority, the sheer amount of 
work required of them is excessive. A report by Human Rights Watch describes this work 
in greater detail: 
A domestic worker’s daily workload often involves work without break or 
limit, including cleaning her employer’s house or houses inside and out, 
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including sweeping, vacuuming, mopping, dusting, cleaning multiple 
bathrooms, washing the exterior of the house, cleaning the yard, and 
washing windows; cooking three meals a day; preparing snacks for family 
members on demand; washing and ironing the entire household’s laundry; 
caring for multiple children, including providing care for infants, escorting 
children to and from school, feeding them, bathing them, and putting them 
to sleep; caring for elderly, sick, or disabled family members; and washing 
family cars. 
146
  
Schedules such as this leave little room for rest, and although these tasks are not a 
requirement in every household, it sheds light on the range of duties domestic workers are 
expected to perform.  
Whilst most domestic workers are expected to be on call twenty-four hours a day, 
some of the domestic workers I interviewed have a schedule in which they have at least 
two to three hours of rest in the afternoon, and a certain time during the night when they 
retire.
147
 Others were forced to work from dawn until night without rest, while others were 
expected to spend nights looking after babies or elderly employers. Essim and Smith 
indicate that the majority of domestic workers work an average of 101 hours per week, 
suffer from sleep deprivation, and do not receive a day of rest.
148
 These conditions fit the 
criteria of slavery, or forced labour, as domestic workers have little choice in determining 
their working hours or conditions. As Bales states, “the value of slaves lies not so much in 
the particular products they make as in their sweat, in the volume of work squeezed out of 
them.”149 Once again, the lack of knowledge of their rights, or the terms of the contract 
they signed, places domestic workers in a very fragile position, completely at the mercy of 
their employers. 
  In some households, domestic workers endure a constant threat of violence in the 
shape of physical or verbal harassment. They are subjected to criticism, belittlement, 
yelling, and other aggressive behaviour. Without a passport or the means to escape, many 
domestic workers tolerate appalling situations in order to earn a salary. Unlike 
conventional workplaces, which are more easily monitored for legal violations, work that 
takes place in the home is difficult to oversee or inspect. As Tyner writes, “explanations 
for the predominance of female abuse and exploitation revolve around migrant work sites. 
Women, ceteris paribus, are employed predominantly in isolated sites, such as live-in 
domestic work.”150  Many times in the case of domestic workers, a national’s right to 
privacy, especially in the home, takes precedence over the rights of domestic workers, who 
are in many cases foreign. As Manuela Tomei, the Director of the ILO’s Labour Protection 
Department, states, “verifying compliance with the law in private households is therefore 
more difficult than in a factory or another more conventional workplace. A great deal of 
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innovation and creativity is required.”151  As of yet, Kuwait has no mechanisms in place to 
facilitate monitoring of any kind for domestic workers.  
 
3.5 National Laws 
Legally, domestic workers in Kuwait and in the Gulf states in general, share several 
important characteristics. They are all governed by the sponsorship system, which means 
that they are unable to change employers for whatever reasons, and they are unable to 
enforce contracts as they are either unaware of the terms or coerced into contract 
substitution, as discussed in the previous chapter. Furthermore, they are unable to organize 
or join unions, are highly dependent on the attitudes of employers and authorities, and are 
subject to a variety of abuses. As Hamill states, “even in the best of cases, the ‘sponsorship 
system’ still cultivates a master/servant relationship between employers and workers since 
the personal relationship between two individuals and their capricious moods serves as the 
basis for a migrant domestic worker’s legal status in the country.”152 Domestic workers are 
not seen as employees, in the sense that their work takes place in the sanctity of the home, 
instead of a traditional workplace or office, blurring the employer-employee relationship. 
For these reasons, it is very difficult to enforce laws or preform labour inspections as in the 
case of unskilled male laborers.  
 
3.5.1 New Domestic Workers Labour Law 2015 
Before the Domestic Workers Law of 2016, standardized contracts were the only 
legal rule that applied to domestic workers. As in the case of unskilled male laborers, 
embassies issued their own versions of standardized contracts. (See Appendix 8-11) The 
standardized contract was first implemented in 2005 by a decree from the Ministry of 
Interior, which required all licensed domestic labour agencies to present a standardized 
contract prior to recruitment. The contract contains provisions requiring anyone wishing to 
sponsor a domestic worker, to provide the following: 
 Payment of all agency fees (Article 4) 
 Payment of all medical costs (Article 9) 
 Rest periods of one hour for every three hours of work (Article 22)  
 One month of paid leave per year (Article 22) 
 
 
The contract period is usually between two to five years, after which, workers must apply 
for an extension, or depart the country. The standardized contract must be signed by the 
domestic worker, the employer, and the recruitment agent in Kuwait. It prohibits 
employers from seeking reimbursement from the employee for any of the expenses the 
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employer has paid to the recruitment agency, which includes the withholding or deduction 
of salaries. As per the regulations of the sponsorship system, the standardized contract is 
only valid with the sponsoring employer, and transfer of employment is forbidden. If a 
domestic worker wishes to transfer her sponsorship and seek a different employer, she will 
have to leave Kuwait and apply for another work visa. If the worker leaves or is fired by 
the employer, she will be deported.  In some instances, recruitment agents allow an 
employer a one hundred days trial period with the domestic, with full money back if the 
employer is not satisfied. If the worker is not satisfied, their choices are either to return to 
the agency if the employer agrees to end their trial period early, otherwise, they can 
abscond to the embassy if the employer refuses to return her to the agency. Due to the fact 
that the majority of employers still retain the passports of domestic servants even though it 
is illegal to do so, workers have little or no option but to abscond. The contract also sets the 
minimum wage at KD 40 (US $139), which is significantly lower than the KD 60 (US 
$207) minimum wage that was instituted for private sector workers in the Labour Law of 
2010. This discrepancy is yet another example of the discrimination that domestic workers 
face within the Kuwait legal system. Furthermore, the lack of enforcement of these 
contracts gave employers complete discretion involving salaries. Whether or not they 
choose to pay the minimum set forth in the contract is up to them, and whether or not the 
domestic worker chooses to accept the terms set by her employer, regardless if those terms 
match those in the signed contract, is also up to them; there were no provisions for the 
monitoring of contracts, or penalties for breach of contract. Without enforcement, these 
contracts offered little protection for domestic workers. Bales refers to these types of 
contracts as being “legal fictions”,153 due to the fact that it is very difficult to ensure that 
employers are actually adhering to the terms in the contract. As Jureidini and Moukarbel 
state, “that contracts do exist is more or less irrelevant if they are not supportable in law or 
if the legal system and agents of law prevent real access to legal remedies for breach of 
contracts and violations of human rights.”154 At the time though, these standardized 
contracts offered domestic workers protections that were non-existent in the labour law.     
 In 2016, the Domestic Workers Law entered into force, essentially transferring all 
the stipulations found in the standardized contracts into a separate law. Recruitment 
agencies are prohibited from charging domestic workers any fees, or housing any workers 
in their offices, which were often used as holding areas for workers who were returned by 
their employers within the allotted trial period. As well as providing suitable 
accommodation, food, and medical treatment when necessary, employers are prohibited 
from deducting any portion of a worker’s wages or retaining her passport. Passport 
retention has been a customary practice in Kuwait for a long time. In 1997, Longva 
reported that “the keeping of passports by the employer was a common practice, which, 
although not based on any written legal requirement, was explicitly recommended by the 
Ministry of Interior.”155 A Human Rights Watch report states that, although a 2007 decree 
by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour prohibited the confiscation of passports, it did 
not apply to domestic workers.
156
 As mentioned in the previous chapter, it became 
customary practice for employers in Kuwait to hold their employee’s passports, and in the 
case of domestic workers, many times this is done with the intention of keeping the 
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passport safe. However, according to a 2015 study by the ILO, some employers have other 
motives for confiscating workers’ passports. The study found that,  
Withholding of the passports of domestic workers was perceived as the 
norm; there was consensus among respondents that this must be the 
practice. The reasons expressed for withholding passports varied from the 
belief that it was not their right to hold their own passport, to making sure 
that they did not commit a crime.
157
  
Without their passports, domestic workers would presumably be deterred from committing 
crimes since they would not be able to depart the country.   
The inclusion of domestic workers within the labour law is an improvement on the 
dependence of contracts to ensure the protection of this group of workers. With clear 
stipulations on penalties for contract infringements, both employers and domestic workers 
are aware of their responsibilities as spelled out in the law, not as they may see fit.  For 
example, under the new law, domestic workers must not be made to work more than 
twelve hours a day, are entitled to one day of weekly rest and paid annual leave. All 
employment contracts must be in the worker’s national language, as well as Arabic and 
English translations and must be signed by the employer and employee. Additionally, a 
provision is included for overtime work, stating that domestic workers have the right to 
submit a complaint against an employer who fails to compensate for any additional hours 
worked. Part two of the law includes penalties for employers who fail to pay wages in a 
timely way, with workers entitled to KD 10 ($32) in addition to their wages for every 
month that they are not paid.
158
 Most importantly, the law fails to mention any mechanisms 
that will monitor the enforcement of these regulations, such as labour inspections.       
Perhaps one of the reasons that the law silent on the subject of enforcement, is that 
any specific provisions would require monitoring and supervision from the government or 
designated inspectors, which directly conflicts with laws guaranteeing citizens the right to 
privacy within their homes. Allowing government inspectors to enter their homes would 
recognize private homes as workplaces, a provision that elicits a great deal of opposition 
from nationals, who value the sanctity and privacy in their homes. The law, and the 
sponsorship system as a whole, necessitates that employers be directly responsible for their 
staff (and their immigration status), and in the case of domestic workers, whose employers 
are civilians (as opposed to organizations or companies), and whose workplace is the 
employer’s home, any type of monitoring becomes difficult. Anti-Slavery International’s 
report states, “as domestic workers are not considered ‘real’ workers, and are working for 
private people who are not considered employers (and the household is not considered a 
workplace), the inspection is outside the scope of the competencies of labour 
inspectors.”159 Until the government can determine a way to monitor conditions inside the 
homes where domestic workers are employed, implementation of the terms set in the 
standardized labour contracts, and the law itself, will continue to be ignored. As 
Muhammad Al-Ajmi, head of the Domestic Labour Directorate stated, “Without regular 
inspection, how can the ministry be sure that employers are following the new 
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regulations?”160 In general, the law does mark an improvement in the inclusion of domestic 
workers within the larger framework of the labour legal system, and the establishment of 
minimum standards for them, but its lack of enforcement mechanisms is a major 
shortcoming. 
  Enactment of the Domestic Workers Law (2016) is a significant improvement in 
the standardization of laws applicable to domestic workers in Kuwait, but it still falls 
shorts of many basic protections afforded to workers in both the private and public sector. 
As mentioned earlier, monitoring the actual application of the law is difficult and 
unscrupulous agents and employers continue to find ways to take advantage of the 
vulnerability of domestic workers. In fact, many workers don’t fully understand the terms 
of their contracts and are unable to oblige employers to enforce the basic requirements. 
Even though the contract states that employers are not permitted to demand 
reimbursements from workers, many employers and agents continue to do so.  
Additionally, even though the law states that domestic workers are entitled to one day of 
rest per week, the contract is vague on how that day may be spent. It is almost impossible 
to monitor conditions such as these. The only possible course is to identify possible cases 
of abuse, and implement monitoring and inspection mechanisms. It is clear that the 
government needs to take more initiative regarding the monitoring of domestic workers in 
order to safeguard their rights.  
 
 3.6 Violations 
Employed in the privacy of households, without adequate monitoring from 
government agencies, abuse is rife in domestic service. As mentioned earlier, complaints 
range from withholding salaries, long working hours, lack of hours or days of rest, 
belittlement, shouting and aggressive speech or behaviour, to more serious maltreatment 
such as verbal abuse or rape. It is not within the scope of this thesis to list the many cases 
of abuse inflicted on domestic workers, only to examine the ways in which those abuses 
occur under the confines of the sponsorship system and despite the laws enacted to protect 
these workers.   
For as long as Kuwait has imported domestic workers, there have been incidents of 
abuse. In the 1990s, Human Rights Watch reported that “nearly two thousand women 
domestic servants…have fled the homes of abusive Kuwaiti employers and sought refuge 
in their embassies.”161 Within the privacy of their households, employers are shielded from 
scrutiny and are free to treat domestic workers as they please. Halabi states, “most workers 
have reported suffering from more than one type of violence during the course of their 
employment, and many are so traumatized by the experience that it even negatively affects 
their ability to reintegrate into society upon returning home.
162
 In 2009, for example, HRW 
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reported that “embassies of labour-sending countries in Kuwait City received more than 
10,000 complaints from domestic workers about non-payment of wages, excessively long 
working hours without rest, and physical, sexual, and psychological abuse.”163 During the 
month of November of that same year, Migrant-Rights reported that there were thirteen 
reported cases of suicide or suicide attempts by migrant workers.
164
 In 2009, it was 
reported that an average of 2,000 women have absconded from their sponsors’ homes 
every year since 1991.
165
 In addition, HRW reported that migrant workers have committed 
or attempted to commit suicide every week during the years 2009 and 2010.
166
 The Nepali 
embassy in Kuwait reports that 2,247 domestic workers have required rescue since 2010.
167
 
Today, reports on abuse of domestic workers occur daily and can be found in any local 
newspaper. In fact, local newspapers prove to be a valuable resource for lawyers such as 
Salah Al-Hashem, who works with embassies and migrant workers. He states that through 
the press, they discover incidents involving workers and with the aid of the victims, they 
can act.
168
 As Manseau writes, “reports of foreign workers…being mistreated, denied their 
wages or sexually abused have become so routine that they rarely attract attention. It is 
only some of the most gruesome and shocking cases that receive any attention from the 
media and authorities.”169 Unfortunately, the incidents of abuse or death have become so 
common that newspaper readers are rarely shocked by them.  
Many of the abuses reported involve suicide, rape and torture. Beasley states that, 
“there exists a significant and pervasive pattern of rape, physical assault and mistreatment 
of Asian maids that takes place largely with impunity.”170 In 2004, Essim and Smith 
reported that “the most frequently cited concern by the majority of women migrant 
domestic workers interviewed (over 50%) in Kuwait was the presence of physical 
(including sexual), psychological and verbal abuse.”171 Many workers report feeling 
vulnerable to these types of abuses by their male employers or their employer’s relatives. 
The isolation of their “workplace”, the excessive working hours and demands, and the 
financial pressures they feel all contribute to psychological problems. Human Rights 
Watch reported that many Sri Lankan domestic workers returning home required 
counselling upon their return.
172
  
 Domestic workers in Kuwait who try to escape abusive employers face risk of 
criminal charges for absconding. When a worker is reported as absconding, her residency 
visa is cancelled, she is classified as illegal and an order for her arrest is issued. Considered 
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runaways, some employers publish “bounty ads” in local newspapers, similar to those 
found during the American slavery era.
173
 This is done in order to publicize their illegal 
status and warn future employers, who may also face charges for hiring an illegal worker. 
This further emphasizes many employers’ view that workers are personal properties. In 
many cases, workers are deported even if they have been abused or unpaid, and seek 
redress. The employer must notify authorities when workers abscond in order to release 
themselves from any possible future liability. The new Domestic Workers Law (2016) 
contains a provision meant to remedy this situation, it states that “the Director of the 
Department of Domestic Labour is to issue an order to temporarily extend the residence 
permit of the domestic worker until a final decision is made on the complaint and until the 
worker is paid all due entitlements.”174  As mentioned above, the number of complaints is 
staggering, especially considering how many abuses are unreported each year. This is 
understandable given the shame and stigma that follows abuse, but there is also a fear of 
the consequences of reporting abuses against employers in a foreign country. Loss of 
employment, isolation and possible deportation are obstacles domestic workers may face 
when subjected to abuse. Domestic workers often endure exploitation due to the 
exponential debts they need to repay and the financial pressures they face in their home 
countries. For these reasons, workers find it difficult to report abuses. 
Some domestic workers who flee their employers due to abuse report to a local 
police station. While this is necessary in order to avoid absconding charges, in reality, 
police stations are ill-equipped to deal with issues regarding domestic workers. There is a 
lack of an organized set of criteria that police officers must follow in cases of disputes 
concerning domestic workers. Domestic workers report a range of responses and actions 
when they registered complaints at police stations. The responses differed depending on 
the police officer. While some officers are helpful, others simply usher the workers home 
and refuse to register the complaint, or detain workers and either contact the embassy or 
the employer. Consequently, domestic workers who seek assistance at police stations are 
uncertain whether they will be helped or punished. In January 2010, Kuwaiti newspapers 
reported two separate incidents in which policemen or immigration officers admitted to 
raping domestic workers in their custody.
175
 These unfortunate incidents only highlight the 
need for stricter laws concerning the treatment and rights of domestic workers in police 
detention. 
In cases where a domestic worker has been raped or physically abused, the relevant 
embassy personnel are contacted. The worker must remain in the country until the case is 
resolved, and is banned from seeking work. Some women remain in this limbo state for 
months at a time. In many cases, they face counter-charges by the employer, or may be 
found guilty of adultery in cases of rape. Furthermore, the outcome of any dispute depends 
on the employer’s choice as to how much they will participate or contribute toward any 
type of resolution or negotiation. This puts employers at an advantage and places the 
burden on the domestic worker to prove her innocence. Due to their tenuous immigration 
status, the cost of filing charges against employers in cases of abuse or maltreatment 
remains a last resort for domestic workers.   
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 Although the Domestic Workers Law (2016) contains provisions for the protection 
of the rights of workers, it does not contain specific guidelines. For example, that law 
states that “the employer is required to provide the domestic worker with food, clothing, 
medicine and medical treatment, and housing,”176 it does not address complaints from 
workers who claim that many employers place restrictions on food and cooking. Most 
domestic workers complain of not being able to cook their own food, and not being given 
separate food they are able to prepare for themselves. They are expected to eat leftovers 
from family meals or hand-outs, regardless of whether or not they enjoy the food. There 
have been incidents where employers have placed locks on refrigerators to prevent 
domestic workers from accessing food.
177
 In addition, it has become customary to restrict 
the movement of domestic workers, even on their days off, mostly to discourage 
absconding or socializing with other migrants. While the law allows for one day of rest, it 
does not specify if that day must be spent in the employer’s home (or the domestic 
worker’s place of employment) or if it may be spent outside the home.  
 Several attitudinal characteristics in the way employers interact with domestic 
workers define the experience of these workers in Kuwait. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, words such as “migrant” or “immigrant” are not used in the government’s lexicon. 
In fact, for many people, domestic workers are not considered workers at all, but servants. 
In 2012, Mr. Al-Sulaimi, a delegate representing Kuwait at a meeting of the Committee on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination stated that, “use of the term ‘migrant workers’ to 
describe foreign workers in Kuwait was in fact inappropriate; all foreign worker in Kuwait 
were temporary workers, employed for a specific task and duration. The term ‘contractual 
workers’ would therefore be more appropriate.”178 This only reinforces the attitude that all 
migrant workers are temporary in the country, and justifies the discrepancy of rights that 
exist between them and nationals. The sponsorship system’s structure is one in which 
sponsors are legally responsible for their employees, a responsibility some sponsors take to 
extremes by exerting a sense of ownership over workers. Mr. Kumar, ex-labour attaché at 
the Indian embassy in Kuwait refers to an “Arab mentality,”179 which causes employers to 
feel entitled treating workers as they please. Having paid all the fees required for her 
recruitment and employment, and provided her with accommodation, food and clothing, 
some sponsors view this as fulfilling their responsibilities as employers, when in actual 
fact, there is more to the employer-employee relationship than merely basic needs. The 
lack of respect afforded to domestic workers based on the type of work they do leads to 
discrimination and abuse. Many domestic workers work under an atmosphere of anxiety, 
fearing a wrong move could provoke the anger of the employer. “Attitudes can translate 
into practices that can discriminate and exploit a domestic worker. These practices can then 
become deeply embedded in society and remain unquestioned.”180 Seen as maids, helpers, 
or servants, as opposed to workers who are afforded protections under the law, many 
workers continue to face maltreatment in Kuwait. As a result of the inequality of the 
relationship between sponsor and employee, many domestic workers fear speaking out or 
complaining, and will tolerate unacceptable conditions. As Hamill states, “domestic 
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workers are at a serious disadvantage when it comes to engaging in dialogue with their 
employers, negotiating the terms of their working conditions, or terminating their 
employment contracts early- let alone demanding their rights.”181 Although not all 
employers take advantage of their employees, the sponsorship system itself is inherently 
flawed. Furthermore, debts play an important role in their decision to tolerate 
maltreatment, as the alternative -being terminated from their jobs- will deprive them of the 
chance to repay their debts.  “Given the large debts that workers incur…this means that 
workers who have been cheated are unable immediately to withdraw their labour: they are, 
in effect, trapped until they have earned enough money to pay off their debts.”182 Without 
the freedom to change employment in cases of abuse or mistreatment, domestic workers 
will continue to be at risk of abuse.  
Lacking protective mechanisms, domestic workers are exposed to a personal and 
work experience that becomes highly taxing. The lack of care regarding their emotional, 
physical, and mental well-being eventually takes its toll. Each of the women I interviewed, 
both currently employed and unemployed, shed tears recounting their stories. Even those 
domestic workers who were content with their jobs and employers, told of the hardships 
that come with migration, and the many adjustments that need to be made in order to cope 
with life in Kuwait.
183
 In many ways, the fact that they are foreign works both in their 
favor and against. Due to the fact that there are zero nationals who are available for 
employment as domestic workers, foreign women are not only readily available for 
employment, but would still be cheaper to hire than a national. At the same time, it is 
precisely their foreignness which causes clashes of personality and culture among most 
domestic workers and their employers.  
 
3.7 Access to Grievance Mechanisms  
Embassies play an important role in aiding domestic workers with complaints and 
abuses.  They provide a vital link between the worker and government officials. Unlike 
male migrant workers who operate under the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour, 
domestic workers fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior. In 1993, the 
Ministry established a Domestic Workers Department which is responsible for the 
monitoring and inspection of all labour agencies, as well as hearing complaints from 
embassies concerning individual cases. The aim of the Department is resolution through 
arbitration, despite the presence of the employer not being compulsory. Lacking the 
authority to compel the sponsor or employer to attend meetings with their worker, the 
Department’s influence is limited during dispute resolutions.  As HRW concludes, 
“Kuwait’s Domestic Workers’ Department provides little more than a governmental nod to 
due diligence as required by international law.”184 Although the Department’s creation is a 
positive step, it remains to be seen whether or not it will become more effective in aiding 
domestic workers.   
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 As mentioned earlier, in cases of abuse, if domestic workers manage to escape to 
Kuwaiti police authorities, they are detained as runaways and their employer is contacted. 
Afterwards, they face several obstacles including, first and foremost, the difficulty in 
substantiating their claims of abuse whether those include the withholding of wages, verbal 
or physical abuse. The lack of evidence or witness testimony makes it hard to establish a 
case that would convince a court to rule in favour of the domestic worker. Additionally, 
embassies that provide legal assistance to domestic workers are limited in the financial 
services and shelter space they are able to provide; therefore, lack of resources is another 
barrier. Moreover, the procedures that are necessary to file a charge against an employer 
are lengthy and protracted, during which time the domestic worker spends either in jail, the 
embassy shelter or the government shelter.  
The official government shelter for domestic workers accommodates 500 people,
185
 
although the exact number housed at the shelter on any given day is unknown. A U.S. 
Department of State Report stated that in April 2018, the shelter housed 450 residents.
186
 
Due to the fact that it is government-operated, access to the shelter for research or news 
purposes is prohibited, and any detailed information about it is scarce. In 2010, a Human 
Rights Watch report on Kuwait stated that, 
Instead of providing emergency refuge, shelter policy requires that women 
be referred by their local embassies, which can send a quota of twenty 
domestic workers to stay there for a maximum of two weeks before 
repatriation. The major labour-sending countries send groups of workers to 
the shelter on a rotating schedule, meaning once a particular embassy has 
sent a group of workers to the shelter, they cannot do so again for several 
weeks, after the rest have taken their turns. 
187
 
The shelter operates under a strict policy regarding which domestic workers are allowed to 
stay. Workers who have absconding charges against them, or any charges at all, are not 
permitted in the shelter. Also, runaway domestic workers must be referred by the embassy, 
and may not seek refuge in the shelter. Embassies also provide shelters for their citizens 
where food, healthcare and legal advice are offered, but they are operating over capacity 
and have far fewer resources than the local government. When discussing Indian domestic 
workers who seek shelter at the embassy, Mr. Ganapathi, ex-ambassador to Kuwait from 
India stated, “the main goal is to repatriate them because by the time they arrive, they are 
already traumatized.”188 Many of these workers have no choice but to remain in the 
embassy shelter for as long as their cases are pending, sometimes weeks or months.
189
 
Traumatic experiences may prevent some domestic workers from seeking justice in court, 
as this process is unpredictable and may prolong their stay in the shelter even further. 
Thus, negotiation efforts by embassies and the Domestic Workers Department with 
employers usually result in a compensation payment for the victim. “Thus, the sponsor-
employer usually escapes with the least damage and perhaps only makes a pecuniary 
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compensation payment.”190 In fact, some employers demand a payment for the release of a 
withheld passport or compensation for absconding.    
When domestic workers flee abusive employers, they have the choice of going to 
the police authorities or their embassies. In cases where they choose to flee to the embassy 
shelter and the employer reports them missing, they are classified as absconders. After 
being notified by the employer that a domestic worker has absconded, the police begin 
procedures to cancel their residency visas.  A report is issued to the Ministry of Interior to 
cancel the domestic worker’s residency visa and if she is found, she will be arrested then 
deported. The various paperwork and bureaucratic maze of legal authorities make the 
process of legal recourse difficult. Absconding is treated as a serious violation of 
immigration laws and according to the Aliens’ Residency Law, police have a right to issue 
deportation papers for a broad range of reasons, including cases where the migrant has no 
“visible means of livelihood,”191 in other words, no job. Once deported, migrants are 
prohibited from returning to Kuwait without obtaining special permission from the police 
department. For these reasons, many domestic workers fear leaving their employers, and as 
a result tolerate abusive or problematic work environments. Workers who are owed back 
wages and who are seeking to reimburse those wages stand almost no chance of recovering 
their money if they return to their countries; however, many workers still resort to this 
option when they feel defeated against the legal system in Kuwait.  
At the same time, some employers take advantage of the gravity of an absconding 
charge, and make false accusations in order to invalidate their contracts with domestic 
workers. A disgruntled employer may dismiss a domestic worker before her contract is due 
to end, withholding any wages owed to her. Unable to seek other employment, she goes to 
the embassy and is eventually charged with absconding and faces deportation. HRW states 
that “absconding regulations, in combination with workers’ poor access to labour 
complaint mechanisms, allowed employers to send workers home and to terminate their 
sponsorship, even in cases where they owed a worker wages.”192 In 2008, a company based 
in Kuwait stopped paying the salaries of hundreds of Bangladeshi laborers, who resorted to 
begging, stealing, and other illegal activities to support themselves. Eventually, they 
sought help from St. Paul’s Anglican Church. Reverend Andy Thompson, chaplain of the 
church at the time, wrote an appeal in the local English newspaper, the Arab Times which 
appeared on the front page of the paper. In the article, Reverend Thompson addresses the 
situation of unskilled foreign laborers in Kuwait and the use of deportation as a tool for 
unscrupulous employers to recuse themselves from paying wages. He states, 
The reality is that the charge of absconding has become the standard ploy 
whenever an employer decides that they have had enough of their workers. 
The police are unable to make a distinction between a genuine grievance 
and an employer who simply marches into a station and hands his 
employees over for arrest. 
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The government relies on deportation as a means of dealing with any grievances between 
domestic workers and their employers, instead of finding other, more effective means of 
settling disputes. If a domestic worker violates the terms of her contract by leaving her 
employer before the two-year period stipulated in the contract, she will face deportation 
charges regardless of the reasons. Although many migrant workers are aware of the fact 
that certain visa infractions will result in deportation, in recent years, many workers have 
been deported for minor infractions, such as driving without a license, barbequing in a 
public space,
194
 and minor traffic violations. It has become a way for the government to 
manage migrant workers quickly, without having to deal with arbitration, or other legal 
measures. “Absconding regulations, in combination with workers’ poor access to labour 
complaint mechanisms, allowed employers to send workers home and to terminate their 
sponsorship, even in cases where they owed a worker wages.”195 Absconding charges also 
prevent workers from finding work elsewhere, even in cases where their contract had not 
yet expired. The lack of administrative mechanisms to handle complaints against domestic 
workers or their employers leads to unnecessary deportations of many migrant workers 
every year in Kuwait. In 2016, for example, the Ministry of Interior reported that 29,000 
migrants had been deported that year.
196
 Many are deported without fully understanding 
the reasons or the charges, which violates their right to be informed of any charges against 
them.  This also deprives them of their right to obtain legal counsel to challenge any 
accusations their employer has levelled against them. In most cases, domestic workers are 
prepared to remain in the country if they were able to change their employer. Remaining in 
Kuwait while searching for another employer is much more economical for them, rather 
than returning to their own countries and beginning the overseas employment process 
anew.   
 
 3.8 International Treaties and Conventions 
 The reliance on deportation to quickly solve the problem of unemployed domestic 
workers is in breach of international conventions and treaties. The Ministry of Interior’s 
power to issue deportation papers against any foreigner with no visible means of financial 
income (no job), in direct contradiction of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as 
well as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which Kuwait 
has ratified. Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “no one 
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.”197 The right to a fair hearing is 
enshrined in international human rights, and Kuwait has a responsibility to uphold those 
rights for migrant workers. In 1968, Kuwait signed the Declaration on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which calls on States party to the Convention not to 
discriminate on the basis of race or national origin and to provide non-nationals with the 
mechanisms to challenge deportation orders. Domestic workers have a right to challenge 
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criminal charges against them and defend themselves against these charges, which 
deportation deprives them of. In her 1992 report Punishing the Victim: Rape and 
Mistreatment of Asian Maids in Kuwait, Beasley found that the government “made no 
systematic effort to document abused women’s criminal complaints or civil claims,”198 
opting instead to deport the women rather than registering and resolving their complaints. 
She states, “deportation seems to have allowed the Kuwaiti government to wash its hands 
of the maids’ problems without addressing the underlying causes of their abuse.”199 
Deportation should not be used as a remedy against domestic workers with pending 
charges without first exploring other forms of resolution. 
Kuwait ratified the ICCPR in 1996 and it declares that all States have a 
responsibility “to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to 
its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any 
kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status.” 200 Whether or not those under a State’s 
jurisdiction are citizens or not, they require equal protection under the law. Therefore, 
domestic workers should be offered the same protections under the law as nationals. 
Kuwait has also signed the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) in 1996, which is another international agreement that contains articles 
on labour rights. Article 7 of the Covenant declares, “State Parties to the present Covenant 
recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of 
work.”201 According to the ICESCR, “favourable conditions of work” include “fair wages 
and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in 
particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by 
men, with equal pay for equal work.”202 Although a similar provision in the Domestic 
Workers Law (2016) contains conditions regarding rest and holidays, the government 
continues to rely on citizens to uphold the law, without any means of enforcement.  
 While there are many conventions and treaties that have been ratified by Kuwait 
concerning unskilled foreign workers, there are a few that are especially pertinent to 
domestic workers that have not been ratified yet. The ILO and the United Nations are the 
two major sources for conventions concerning domestic labour. The ILO’s Domestic 
Workers Convention No.189 is one of the most important conventions undertaken to 
protect the rights of domestic workers, but has only been ratified by the Philippines. This 
convention recognizes domestic work as a legitimate labour, and calls for workers to be 
offered “protection against all forms of abuse, harassment, and violence.”203 It also 
guarantees domestic workers freedom of association, a right they are deprived of due to the 
fact that they, like male laborers, are prohibited from joining unions. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, the regulations governing unions in Kuwait are strict, and must include 
nationals, who are non-existent in the domestic labour sector. The Kuwait Trade Union 
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Federation (KTUF) is the only licensed federation in the country and has long advocated 
for the rights of unskilled foreign workers in the country. It is a member of the Arab 
Network on Migrant Workers’ Rights, and in 1993 the KTUF established the Expatriate 
Employment Office, devoted to migrant workers’ issues. The ILO reports that domestic 
workers are permitted to join KTUF committees,
204
 though it remains to be seen whether 
this allows domestic workers to become more vocal regarding their rights and encourages 
more workers to participate.  By ratifying this Convention, Kuwait would begin the 
process of implementing greater measures to ensure the protection of all domestic workers 
currently employed in the country. In addition, the ILO Convention on the Protection of 
Wages (No.95) is an important Convention ratified by both Sri Lanka, and the Philippines, 
but not Kuwait. Ratifying this Convention would legally prevent employers from 
deducting salaries based on any reimbursement or debt. Regardless of whether Kuwait has 
ratified all of the ILO conventions relevant to migrant workers, the government has a duty 
to uphold the principles enshrined in the ILO Declaration.  
 The ILO Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 1975 (No.143) 
and the Migrant Workers Recommendation, 1975 (No.151), embody important principles 
that apply to domestic workers. Although neither Kuwait nor any labour-exporting county 
except the Philippines have ratified this convention, it remains pertinent, as it specifically 
contains articles regarding loss of employment. Paragraph 31 of the Migrant Workers 
Recommendation states migrant workers who have lost their jobs should be granted 
“sufficient time to find alternative employment…the authorization of residence should be 
extended accordingly.”205 Furthermore, Article 8 of the Migrant Workers Convention 
states that “on condition that he has resided legally in the territory for the purpose of 
employment, the migrant worker shall not be regarded as in an illegal or irregular situation 
by the mere fact of the loss of his employment, which shall not in itself imply the 
withdrawal of the authorization of residence or, as the case may be, work permit.”206 
Essentially, this convention prohibits the deportation of migrant workers who are no longer 
employed with their original sponsors, a method that the Kuwaiti government uses in order 
to ensure that workers are tied to their sponsors.    
 Granting unskilled migrants further rights under the law requires that the 
government commit itself to ratifying these conventions and implementing measures to 
ensure their application. Although this may raise the costs of migrant labour, it will 
nevertheless provide higher standards and better conditions for those workers on whom the 
country depends. As many domestic workers arrive to the country already vulnerable to 
exploitative conditions it is crucial that such conventions are ratified.  
 
3.9 Conclusion  
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 Domestic workers face a great deal of obstacles working in Kuwait, more so than 
any other migrant workers. The pervasive attitudes of discrimination; poor enforcement of 
contracts and the labour law; the lack of supervision over agents and employers; and the 
sponsorship system in general, all contribute to a work environment that does not meet 
international human rights and labour standards. The number and range of abuses 
involving domestic workers in Kuwait need to be addressed, and steps toward their 
resolution need to be made. Even in cases where domestic workers are not victims of 
physical or verbal abuse, the customary norms that dominate their treatment are 
unacceptable. In order to receive equal protection under the law, like other foreign 
workers, the entire sponsorship system governing them must be overhauled.   
The Domestic Workers Law (2016) is an important advancement of the rights of 
domestic workers in Kuwait however, without effective enforcement mechanisms, the law 
becomes ineffective. There are obstacles to overcome in terms of guaranteeing the rights of 
this group of workers, in terms of societal discrimination and long-standing attitudes. 
There continues to be resistance from employers, labour agencies and government officials 
who fear rising costs, falling profits, and an increased migrant presence in the country. 
Often unpaid or underpaid; exposed to physical, sexual and verbal abuse; subject to long 
working hours, heavy workloads, and inadequate rest; prevented from proper grievance 
methods or membership in unions; and confined to their workplace without access to their 
passports, domestic workers in Kuwait face unacceptable living and working conditions.  
Without concrete enforcement methods to protect domestic workers or sufficient 
support from the local government, domestic workers are left unprotected in a foreign 
country, with customs and traditions different to their own and their situation can be 
classified as slavery and forced labour. The lack of government mechanisms to enforce and 
monitor compliance with existing laws has led to a situation where sponsors operate with 
impunity, regardless of the law. Generally, domestic workers are not considered employees 
at all, but rather maids, servants or slaves. Years of exclusion from the national law has 
shaped national attitudes and reinforced the belief that as nationals, Kuwaitis have the 
power to determine the working and living conditions of their employees. Consequently, 
domestic workers remain vulnerable to abuse, forced labour and slavery despite laws, 
conventions, treaties and other agreements that Kuwait has ratified.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
Recruitment and Remittances 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Recruitment agencies play an important role in the migration of domestic workers. Their 
existence aims to aid employers in the selection of suitable workers, which entails filing 
the necessary paperwork and obtaining the relevant documents. Recruitment agencies in 
different countries operate in various ways, depending on the laws of that particular 
country. In Kuwait, recruitment agencies are overseen by the Ministry of Interior, and 
specifically, their Domestic Workers Department. As mentioned earlier, for domestic 
workers, the Standardized Labour Contracts and the Domestic Workers Law (2016) 
discussed in Chapter 3 are the legal codes by which recruitment agencies operate. In this 
chapter, the role of recruitment agencies is examined in terms of the services they offer 
migrant workers. Violations ranging from deception to forced labour and trafficking are 
also analyzed. The recurring theme of debt is also explored in this chapter, especially in 
terms of recruitment fees and costs. Finally, international laws and conventions that pertain 
to recruitment agencies are examined in the context of Kuwait. 
 
4.2 Background 
While both labour-exporting and labour-importing countries have made great 
strides in establishing legal, economic, and social mechanisms aimed at protecting migrant 
laborers, there are still steps that can be taken to ensure fair recruitment. Recruitment refers 
to the means by which employers enlist employees for various jobs. Annex I of the ILO 
Migration for Employment Convention No.97 defines recruitment as:  
(i) the engagement of a person in one territory on behalf of an employer in 
another territory, or (ii) the giving of an undertaking to a person in one 
territory to provide him with employment in another territory, together with 
the making of any arrangements in connection with the operations 
mentioned in (i) and (ii) including the seeking for and selection of emigrants 
and the preparation for departure of the emigrants.
1
  
In general, there are four types of recruitment that migrant workers utilize. The first is 
recruitment directly from the employer; the second is recruitment through government 
employment agencies; the third recruitment is through individual brokers (who may be 
friends or relatives); and finally, there is recruitment through private recruitment agencies. 
Recruitment allows the government to monitor the number of migrant workers in the 
country, safeguarding the country’s strict migration policies. Every unskilled migrant 
worker has a sponsor, whether that sponsor is a government entity or an individual 
employer and is therefore legally accounted for. Hence, recruitment is used as a method of 
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controlling the types and amounts of foreign workers in the country. The ILO defines fair 
recruitment as “recruitment carried out within the law and with respect for human rights, 
without discrimination and protecting workers from abusive situations.”2 The restrictions 
of the sponsorship system and the labour laws concerning unskilled foreign migrants in 
Kuwait, prohibit workers from seeking work upon arrival in the country. Instead, all 
migrants must be recruited for specific jobs and obtain a valid contract before entering the 
country.  
For most migrant workers, the quality of their job experience in Kuwait depends in 
large part on their choice of recruitment agency. These are the agencies that serve as 
liaisons between employers and potential employees. Recruitment agencies in both labour 
exporting and labour importing countries work together to provide employers with an array 
of potential recruits. In Kuwait, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour acts as a type of 
public recruitment agency, in charge of providing labour to governmental institutions or 
projects. There are also private recruitment agencies owned, but not always operated, by 
citizens.
3
 The ILO’s Private Employment Agencies Convention (No.181), defines private 
employment agencies as:  
Any natural or legal person, independent of the public authorities, which 
provides one or more of the following labour market services: (a) services 
for matching offers of and applications for employment, without the private 
employment agency becoming a party to the employment relationships 
which may arise therefrom; (b) services consisting of employing workers 
with a view to making them available to a third party, who may be a natural 
or legal person…which assigns their tasks and supervises the execution of 
these tasks; (c) other services relating to jobseeking, determined by the 
competent authority after consulting the most representative employers and 
workers organizations, such as the provision of information, that do not set 
out to match specific offers of and applications for employment.
4
 
In 2010, a Human Rights Watch reported that there were over seven hundred licensed 
recruitment agencies in Kuwait,
5
 and in 2013, Fernandez reported that there were the same 
number of private recruitment agencies operating in Kuwait, which mainly recruited 
unskilled migrants.
6
 In both labour-exporting and labour-importing countries, these 
agencies vary in size from relatively small and only working with a few hundred workers, 
to larger offices that work with thousands of workers. According to Tyner, “an 
international labour migration ‘industry’ has evolved to facilitate the recruitment and 
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deployment of workers from locations of labour surplus to locations of labour shortage.”7 
Whether public or private, these agencies are responsible for supplying the necessary 
information regarding available job placements for workers. This is especially true for 
those living in rural areas where job information is scarce, even in the major labour-
exporting countries.
8
 As mentioned in previous chapters, migration to Kuwait is a costly 
endeavor, and the entire process would be even more complicated for workers who attempt 
to migrate without the assistance of recruitment agencies. The sponsorship system and the 
labour laws governing migrant workers are designed to ensure the temporary migration of 
workers, and have very strict requirements regarding the entrance of foreign workers. 
Recruitment agents in labour-exporting countries work with subagents to scout potential 
workers according to different qualifications and availability. With the cooperation of 
governments, recruitment agencies aid migrants in obtaining all the necessary paperwork 
required for work visas, in order to simplify the migration process as much as possible. 
Fernandez states, “the need for intermediaries is…a response to the high barriers to 
immigration constructed in wealthy countries, which makes it exceedingly complex for 
prospective migrants to cross international borders independently.”9 Recruitment agencies 
are an integral component of labour migration, and governments of labour-sending and 
labour-exporting countries rely on them to facilitate the migration process for workers. As 
Abella states, “the demand for a recruiter’s services is inseparable from the job the worker 
is being recruited to fill.”10 Most labour exporting countries rely on government and 
private recruitment agencies to disseminate information regarding migration so that 
migrants are fully aware of their obligations.  
In the case of unskilled male laborers in the sanitation or construction sectors, 
licenses for contracts are issued according to bids from various Kuwaiti companies 
regarding the amount of workers required for specific projects. Companies then issue 
“demand letters” for workers to a licensed government recruitment agency in Kuwait, 
which contain information regarding the nature of the work required, and the number of 
workers needed. Recruitment agencies must be licensed by the government in both Kuwait 
and in labour-sending countries, and often, workers are supplied through a partner agency 
in the labour-sending country. For domestic workers, recruitment agencies are prohibited 
from hiring workers without a recruitment contract issued by the Department of Domestic 
Labour at the Ministry of Interior.
11
 All workers must fulfill certain requirements before a 
visa is issued. For example, the Ministry of Interior demands a Police Clearance Certificate 
(PCC), certified by the government of the labour-sending country, to verify that the worker 
has no previous convictions. This is in addition to the requirements mentioned in previous 
chapters regarding age and the medical tests migrants are required to undertake.  
The recruitment agencies are legally responsible for migrant workers until they are 
placed with their new employers. In the past, agencies would offer a trial period (usually 
one hundred days) for domestic workers, where employers are allowed to return workers 
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they are not satisfied with. Many workers did not receive a salary during this trial period 
with various provisional employers, with some reportedly spending a year working under 
these circumstances.
12
 These workers were usually housed in temporary apartment 
accommodations until their employment commences, although interviews with domestic 
workers indicate that these accommodations are often inadequate.
13
 The recent Domestic 
Workers Law (2016), however, extends the trial period to almost twice the current time, 
stating that agencies must “guarantee the continuous employment of the domestic worker 
for a period of six months.”14 The law also states that workers may not be housed in 
recruitment offices, perhaps implying that this practice was not uncommon. In one 
instance, a domestic worker I interviewed reported spending three days in the recruitment 
agency office with only one piece of bread for sustenance.
15
 Another reported living in the 
recruitment agency office for one month before finding employment.
16
 Furthermore, two 
of the domestic workers I interviewed reported having their passports confiscated by 
recruitment agents.
17
 Unaware of their rights according to the labor laws, domestic workers 
remain vulnerable to such practices by unscrupulous recruitment agencies.   
 
4.3 Role of Recruitment Agencies, Agents and Sub-Agents 
Unskilled foreign laborers and domestic workers must deal with two recruitment 
agencies throughout their employment. Workers are recruited in their home countries by 
agents or subagents employed by recruitment agencies, depending on where they reside. 
Working in association with local agencies, recruiters in labour-sending countries match 
employees with potential employers in Kuwait. Kuwaiti agencies operate under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Interior, which is responsible for granting licenses. 
Ministerial Decision No.1182 of 2010 and the Domestic Workers Law (2016) includes 
conditions on the issuing and withdrawing of licenses for recruitment agencies. According 
to Ministerial Decision No.1182, recruitment agencies must deposit KD 20,000 
(approximately $66,000) with the Ministry of Interior as surety in case of any dispute 
involving either the owner or the employees of the agency.
18
 Larger recruitment agencies 
manage contracts for both laborers and domestic workers. Laborers are recruited in groups 
for companies or state bodies to work as construction crew, street sweepers, janitors and 
other jobs, while domestic workers are recruited individually to work in private homes. 
Residents seeking a domestic worker visit recruitment agencies where workers are 
classified by nationality, due to the labour hierarchy discussed previously. As mentioned 
earlier, files are available for employers to browse that contain information on workers 
such as age, marital status, religion, past experience, as well as a photo. After selecting a 
worker, the employer signs a contract with the agency and pays the necessary fees that 
include processing and medical costs, plus airfare for a return trip home. The money 
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generated by these offices comes from the various fees they charge in exchange for 
providing work in Kuwait. Currently, the law prohibits agencies from charging workers for 
recruitment fees, placing the full cost of recruitment upon the employer. In the past 
however, recruitment agency costs represented a large portion of the total costs paid by 
workers for migration, which varied according to nationality. In 2004, Abella found that on 
average, workers from Bangladesh paid the most fees even though they were employed in 
the same unskilled jobs as other migrants, while those from Sri Lanka paid the least.
19
 
Unfortunately, in some cases, migrant workers are of the view that the more they pay in 
recruitment costs, the better their chances of securing job placement in Kuwait.
20
 The cost 
of recruitment fees has continued to rise in recent years, which in turn, has led to a rise in 
the cost of hiring domestic workers. However, far from being a deterrent, the inflated fees 
have given sponsors a sense of ownership over workers, as stated in Chapter 3.  
 Recruitment agencies operate using a variety of resources, with heavy reliance on 
subagents to recruit workers living in rural areas of labour-sending countries. Subagents 
act as intermediaries between workers and recruitment agencies. Whereas governments 
require recruitment agencies to hold valid licenses, subagents are unlicensed and therefore, 
unmonitored by the government. Jureidini states that “sub-agents operate illegally and are 
often the original source of deception, false promises and financial exploitation.”21  Due to 
this, many subagents charge workers inflated fees for connecting them with agencies who, 
in turn, charge inflated fees themselves. Throughout the process, subagents are paid by 
both workers and agencies. Subagents do not require any qualifications other than their 
knowledge of rural areas and their connection to a recruitment agency but many times, 
they are trusted religious or political leaders in rural towns and villages. In some cases, 
migrants from rural areas are more likely to trust local subagents rather than large urban 
recruitment agencies,
22
 even though the latter may offer more protection. In the case of Sri 
Lanka, it was reported in 2007, that “there are over 580 registered agencies in Sri Lanka, 
and informed observers estimate there are 10,000-20,000 subagents operating throughout 
the island to link migrant workers with these agencies. One licensed labour agent estimated 
that “75 to 80 percent of maids are channeling through subagents.”23 Today, the number of 
unlicensed subagents in other countries is unknown. As previously mentioned in Chapters 
2 and 3, most workers must take out loans or sell their possessions in order to pay 
subagents and agents. The number of recruitment agencies in labour-importing and labour-
exporting countries continues to grow to meet demand, and with that growth, the race to 
provide competitive prices increases.  
Subagents are important to recruitment agencies, and are able to provide services 
that agencies are dependent on, such as the ability to reach groups who reside far from the 
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larger cities or towns where recruitment agencies are usually located. Working on behalf of 
agencies, subagents also act as guides, making sure workers have the relevant paperwork 
and, in many cases, accompanying workers to medical checks and government bureaus. 
“Subcontracting diffuses costs, risk and legal liability down the supply chain,”24 which is 
partially why they are so useful to recruitment agencies, and while there are a limited 
number of licensed recruitment agencies, there is a large supply of subagents. Although 
they may diffuse costs for the agency, they impose higher costs to the workers. As 
Breeding states, “subagents create an additional principal between the recruitment agency 
and job candidates. This is where many candidates end up facing fees exceeding the 
maximum charge set by the…government.”25 In addition to all the costs of the recruitment 
agency, the additional fee of the subagent places an additional burden for workers, many of 
whom incur significant debt as a result of high recruitment costs. Even though the current 
law in Kuwait prohibits agencies from extracting direct or indirect fees from workers, 
reports indicate that many workers continue to be charged.
26
 Attempts to restrict the role of 
subagents have failed mostly due to the lack of law enforcement mechanisms that are 
needed to supervise the operations of recruitment agencies. Some countries, such as Sri 
Lanka, have attempted to persuade licensed recruitment agencies to open branches in rural 
areas in order to minimize the role of subagents, however it remains to be seen if this 
attempt is successful. According to one skeptical ILO official, “you can’t say that just by 
opening up [licensed recruitment agency] offices in districts will help, because they will 
probably just get the subagents to run their offices.”27 Additionally, government regulators 
are hesitant to impose too many restrictions on subagents for fear of driving them 
underground, further endangering potential recruits. It is probable that recruitment agencies 
will continue to rely on subagents, especially in countries where the laws are vague and 
monitoring is weak.  
 
4.4 Violations and Problems 
 As the business of labour recruitment agencies has grown and become more 
competitive within the world-wide labour market, incidents of abuse have also increased. 
Many recruitment agencies operate as businesses, where the bottom line is profit, and the 
welfare of workers is secondary, if it is a priority at all. In general, they “prove poor 
guardians of domestic workers’ safety,”28 and depend on the naivety of workers in order to 
make a profit. Recruitment agencies often operate under vague and ambiguous laws, which 
lead to abuses, misrepresentations, or deceptions between migrant workers and agencies. 
Many migrant workers claim that subagents and agents misled them about the terms of 
their contracts, such as the type of company or employer they will work for, the work 
hours, wages and their job responsibilities. More importantly, many agents fail to inform 
workers of their rights, or which actions to take in case of maltreatment or abuse.  A HRW 
report on Sri Lankan domestic workers in Kuwait found that “labour recruiters often falsify 
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workers’ passports in order to meet age requirements for jobs abroad and often alter 
passports to bear Muslim names and religious designations because of many employers’ 
preference for Muslim domestic workers.”29 Oftentimes, workers are unaware of any 
changes that subagents have made to documents in order to cater to the tastes of Arab 
employers, which only increases their vulnerability. In cases of abuse or maltreatment, 
false documents may at best, prolong legal proceedings and at worst, serve as grounds for 
dismissal of a case. The Philippines is one of the few countries that holds recruitment 
agencies financially liable if any wage discrepancies are found between the amount that 
was promised to the worker and the amount that the worker actually received.
30
   
Laborers and domestic workers need to be better informed about the terms of their 
contracts and especially the work environment where they will be employed. Residents 
wishing to hire a domestic worker are presented with resume-like documents about the 
worker, listing facts such as nationality, age, marital status, height, weight, level of 
education, language proficiency, and previous work experience. Comparatively, domestic 
workers are given very few facts about their employer, the duties expected of them, the 
number of household members, their ages (important because childcare or care for the 
elderly usually involves heavier workloads), the location or the preferred language of 
communication in the workplace. It is important for workers to have knowledge of this 
information so that they are better prepared and equipped to handle their jobs. It is also 
useful for recruitment agencies to make better matches between employers and workers, 
but unfortunately, most agencies place the needs of the employer higher than those of the 
worker and work on an availability basis.  
The growing number of recruitment agencies in labour-exporting as well as labour-
importing countries, along with the nebulous network of subagents, has made 
governmental supervision difficult. Subagents operate without licenses, and are often 
unknown to government authorities, which makes it difficult to monitor them. Many 
subagents work with registered recruitment agencies and recruit workers on their behalf, 
with Breeding reporting that registered agencies in India openly admitted to working with 
subagents.
31
 Thimothy and Sasikumar state that “less educated women are prone to using 
irregular channels of migration because of their limited access to information,”32 which 
only adds to their vulnerability.  Many subagents take advantage of this situation by 
seeking potential candidates in rural areas where workers tend to be illiterate and gullible, 
a process referred to as “fishing”.33 They paint a picture of Gulf countries as lands of 
opportunities, high wages and comfortable living. There are many reported incidents of 
deception between migrants and subagents, mainly consisting of false assurances of high 
salaries and promising jobs, as well as inflated costs for recruitment fees. HRW states that, 
“labour agents pay a commission to subagents for performing necessary tasks…Subagents’ 
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practice of illegally overcharging prospective migrants for these services is well-known.”34 
Subagents may operate out of their own homes, travel agencies or coffee shops, further 
complicating governmental supervision. In India, Breeding reported that “one subagent I 
interviewed, doubling as a travel agent in Goa, noted that he prefers to call himself a 
consultant so that he does not encounter hassle by the ministry…Others were less worried 
because they perceive very little regulation on the part of the ministry.”35 In addition to the 
subagents, recruitment agencies themselves are guilty of overcharging migrants. In 2016, 
Breeding reported that her research found only one recruitment agency in India that did not 
charge workers beyond the maximum limit the Indian government had set. She states, 
“with the one exception of the government recruitment agency I interviewed, job 
candidates applying to other agencies always end up paying between four and five times 
more than the maximum a recruitment agent can charge.”36 Recruitment agencies must 
compete with each other in offering the best prices for labour, and it is this competition 
which fuels their business models. In order to offer cut-rate costs for supplying employers 
with workers, recruitment agencies compensate by overcharging both parties in order to 
earn a profit. In a HRW report on Sri Lankan domestic workers, a labour agent 
acknowledged the practice of charging too much for services by stating, “this is a business. 
We have to supply according to [the Middle Eastern employers’] expectations…In their 
country [employers] can do whatever they want.”37 By pointing the finger at market forces 
in order to justify inflated fees, labour agents attempt to excuse their poor treatment of 
workers. Their profit comes at the cost of migrant workers who remain haunted by debt 
throughout their migration experience.  
 There are a number of complaints and grievances reported by migrant workers 
against recruitment agencies, some of which were mentioned in previous chapters. Besides 
the inflated fees they charge workers, many recruitment agents are guilty of coercing 
workers into remaining with their employers in order for the agencies to recoup the cost of 
the fees. In cases where workers have been abused or maltreated and demand to be 
returned to their home country, many agents persuade them to remain with the employer so 
that the agency does not have to reimburse the employer’s fee. According to Michele 
Gamburd, an anthropologist who has studied the Sri Lankan labour recruitment industry, 
“if several domestic workers were to return to Sri Lanka in a short period, the cost of 
reimbursing employers could bankrupt a small labour agency.”38 This creates a conflict of 
interest between recruitment agencies profits, and the rights of labour migrants, which has 
led to many agencies treating workers as commodities to be purchased and sold. Reports 
indicate that some recruitment agencies overlook abuses reported by migrant workers, 
concentrating instead on recruiting the largest numbers of workers at the lowest cost.
39
 
Agencies that place profits at the expense of the welfare of their workers and are 
dismissive of claims of abuse or maltreatment, place workers in situations which are 
potentially dangerous. In recent years, governments have attempted to hold recruitment 
agencies accountable for the welfare of workers by requiring them to produce a security 
bond or bank guarantee that will be used in cases of disputes with workers. In Bangladesh 
                                                          
34
 Exported and Exposed, supra note 23. 
35
 Breeding, supra note 31. 
36
 Ibid 
37
 Ibid 
38
 Quoted in Exported and Exposed, supra note 23. 
39
 Recruitment “Fees”, supra note 20, p.5-6. 
for example, recruitment agencies are required to submit a bond of approximately U.S. 
$20,000 to the government that will be used to compensate workers for contract 
substitution or other fraudulent practices.
40
 In India, the bond is set at approximately U.S. 
$320,000 which will be seized by the government if recruitment agencies commit 
infractions against the law.
41
  
Although many governments require recruitment agencies hold licenses, incidents 
of abuse, visa trading and trafficking are not uncommon. The ILO states that “widespread 
evidence exists that the migration recruitment industry is responsible for numerous abuses 
that erode the benefits of migration for workers.”42 Additionally, the ILO committee of 
Experts in its 2016 general survey of migrant worker instruments stated, “in recent years, it 
has become increasingly clear that governance of recruitment practices has an essential 
role to play in preventing migrant workers from experiencing abusive and fraudulent 
conditions, including trafficking in persons and forced labour.”43 Furthermore, the UN 
Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants stated “the practices of unethical 
recruiters and their subagents sit on a complex spectrum of human rights violations. Such 
recruiters commonly exploit migrants, directly or indirectly, at every stage of the migratory 
process.”44 In many cases, recruitment agencies are guilty of “asymmetry of information” 
whereby agents withhold certain pertinent information from workers, or deceive workers in 
any way regarding the nature of the employment contract. This may lead to other 
violations such as contract substitution and trafficking. Most unskilled migrant workers 
have a limited education or are illiterate, which limits their access to reliable information 
regarding their contracts or their rights in the country of employment. In the case of India, 
Breeding reports that, 
Findings highlight three informal practices common in contract brokering 
for India-Gulf Migration. These informal practices potentially undermine 
formal institutions and allow for abuses of contract brokering. They include: 
recruitment agencies working with subagents; fishing for candidates in rural 
areas; and information asymmetries between recruiters and job candidates 
regarding wages.
45
 
Unaware of any mechanisms for redress, they are reluctant to contest the terms of the 
contract or report instances of abuse or maltreatment. Even when they report instances of 
maltreatment to recruitment agents, some workers are forced by these agents to return to 
their employers and endure the maltreatment so that the agency does not incur the cost of 
re-employment or repatriation. HRW reported cases in Kuwait where recruitment agencies 
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were responsible for coercive practices against domestic workers who reported abusive 
conditions at their place of employment.
46
 
Recruitment has become a highly profitable business, and unscrupulous agencies 
often place profits above the welfare of workers. As Fernandez notes, “the information 
asymmetry inherent in the structure of migration control and border regimes has produced 
a highly profitable and diverse market for services facilitating the movement of people 
across international borders.”47 Referred to by Martin48 and Kuptsch49 as “merchants of 
labour,” today, recruitment agencies are estimated as being a multibillion dollar industry,50 
assisting in the labour migration of millions of people. However, management of these 
agencies has proved difficult for both labour-exporting and labour-importing countries. In 
recent years, attempts have been made for greater cooperation between countries regarding 
migration, one of which is the Abu Dhabi Dialogue, which was established in 2008. All 
GCC countries are members, as well as major labour-exporting countries such as the 
Philippines, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and India. Although such partnerships are 
important, it remains to be seen whether or not any concrete reforms applicable to all 
Member States will take place.  
 
4.5 Trafficking and Forced Labour 
 Trafficking and forced labour are two of the extreme consequences that stem from 
the lack of monitoring of recruitment agencies in both labour-sending and labour-receiving 
countries. The UN Trafficking Protocol defines trafficking in persons as  
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by 
means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, 
of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability 
or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent 
of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of 
exploitation.
51
 
Deception by recruitment agencies takes place in a variety of ways, such as excessive fees, 
or the overcharging of fees; and misrepresentation of the working conditions or the nature 
of the job. “The trafficking cycle most often begins with the recruitment of a person by 
means of deception, coercion and/or persuasion.”52 Contract substitution, illegal 
                                                          
46
 Exported and Exposed, supra note 23, p.86.  
47
 Fernandez, supra note 3, p.815. 
48
 Philip Martin (2005). Merchants of Labour: Agents of the Evolving Migration Structure. Decent Work 
Research Program, Discussion Paper 158, International Labour Organization. [Online] Available from: 
http://www.oit.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---inst/documents/publication/wcms_193617.pdf  
49 Christiane Kuptsch (ed.) (2006). Merchants of Labour. International Labour Organization. [Online] 
Available from: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---
migrant/documents/publication/wcms_208712.pdf 
50
 Fernandez, supra note 3, p.815. 
51
 UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, 
Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000, Article 3. 
[Online] Available from: 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/protocoltraffickinginpersons.aspx  
52
 ILO, Human Trafficking and Forced Labour Exploitation – Guidance for Legislation and Law 
Enforcement, 2005, p.31. [Online] Available from: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/--
-declaration/documents/publication/wcms_081999.pdf  
recruitment fees, coercion, and misinformation or deception concerning the nature of work 
are all indicators of forced labour and trafficking. By using deception to mislead workers 
regarding the nature of jobs, workers are denied their choice of employment, a clear 
indication of trafficking. In many cases, workers are not versed in the local labour laws, 
and are unable or are too intimidated to report instances of deception for fear of 
deportation, with a possibility of never recovering the fees already paid to the agency. 
Although workers have voluntarily made themselves available for recruitment abroad and 
signed a contract accordingly, it does not make them immune to trafficking, as the 
deception and coercion associated with trafficking may reveal itself only later. The ILO 
states that, “legislatures have to take into account that the initial recruitment can be 
voluntary and that the coercive mechanisms to keep a person in an exploitative situation 
may come into play at a later stage.”53 The initial voluntary offer of employment was not 
based on all the facts and therefore, the freedom of choice was removed. In this sense, 
trafficking does not always have to include the use of physical force, it may also refer to 
mental coercion or deception. Drew states, “any factor which deprives a person of a choice 
of alternatives and compels him to adopt a particular course may properly be regarded as 
‘force’.”54 Migrants must have access to all information regarding their future employment 
in order to make an informed, voluntary decision on whether or not they will accept the 
employment.  
 Trafficking also occurs in Kuwait through the transportation of workers to other 
countries, mainly Iraq. Many workers are recruited based on the understanding that they 
will be working in Kuwait when in actuality, employers transport them to Iraq, to 
situations which are often life threatening. Furthermore, most labour-exporting countries 
such as India and the Philippines prohibit their citizens from migrating to Iraq for 
employment. In 2005, John Owen was employed by the First Kuwaiti Trading and 
Contracting, a Lebanese-owned, Kuwait-based company, as lead builder in charge of the 
construction of the new American embassy in Baghdad. Six months later, he quit his job 
and reported the company to the U.S. State Department for trafficking. He claimed that 
workers hired from the Philippines and India had arrived to Kuwait for employment, but 
had been transported to Baghdad to work on the embassy under appalling conditions.
55
 In 
2007, the U.S. Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report reported on this 
practice, stating that “Kuwait reportedly is also a transit country for South and East Asian 
workers recruited by Kuwaiti labour recruitment agencies for low-skilled work in Iraq; 
some of these workers are deceived as to the true location and nature of this work.”56 Cases 
such as this are extreme examples of trafficking and although they may not be as common 
as other forms such as deception and coercion, they are indicative of the extent of 
trafficking in Kuwait.  
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In 2011, the U.S. State Department TIP Report stated that the Kuwaiti government 
is “reluctant to prosecute Kuwaiti citizens for trafficking offenses despite allegations that 
trafficking in Kuwait largely involved Kuwaiti employers.”57  Fernandez echoes this by 
stating that labour violations involving trafficking are treated as civil rather than criminal 
offences, requiring employers who have been found guilty to pay fines as opposed to 
serving prison sentences.
58
 This may be due to corruption involving government officials 
in both labour-receiving and labour-sending countries, as Jamie and Tsega have reported.
59
 
The government does not publish statistics on crimes involving trafficking, so it is difficult 
to know the extent of its prevalence in the country, but according to a 2018 U.S. State 
Department TIP Report, Kuwait is currently classified as Tier 2.
60
 This classification 
indicates that Kuwait has not met the minimum standards of the U.S. government’s 
Trafficking of Victims Protection Act, but is making significant attempts to meet those 
requirements. The onus is on the government to demonstrate a positive obligation to 
protect migrant workers against trafficking. The case of C.N. v. the United Kingdom is an 
example of the ECHR ruling that states have a positive obligation to identify and protect 
potential victims of trafficking. In this case a Ugandan national arrived to the U.K., and 
began working for an elderly couple whom she had found with help from a cousin. She 
complained to the Metropolitan Police that she was working long hours without proper 
compensation, that her cousin had confiscated her passport and that she had been 
threatened with deportation. The Metropolitan Police Human Trafficking Team 
investigated and found that the circumstances of her case did not constitute trafficking for 
the purpose of exploitation. The ECHR found that a violation had been committed due to 
the fact that an offence of domestic servitude was not investigated and the focus of the 
investigation had been on charges of trafficking. This reinforces the court’s emphasis on 
the positive obligation of states, in this case, that the burden is on authorities to identify 
circumstances that may identify workers as being at risk of servitude. In the case of 
Kuwait, it is the responsibility of the proper authorities to take measures to ensure that 
workers are not at risk of servitude. Certain mechanism must be in place in order for 
authorities to be aware of and identify workers who may be at risk. Fernandez states that 
Kuwait’s low TIP rating is “explicitly linked to the exploitation of migrant domestic 
workers,”61 although it is clear that all migrant workers need protection. Without effective 
monitoring mechanisms to ensure that recruitment agencies are not participating in the 
trafficking of workers, migrants will continue to be at risk. Likewise, the existence of 
subagents outside the legal framework governing recruitment agencies adds to the 
difficulty in the enforcement of laws protecting migrant workers.  
 
4.6 Debt 
The inflated fees that workers have to pay agents and subagents lead many to take 
out loans that haunt them throughout their migration experience. Unemployment in their 
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home countries makes it difficult for many workers to obtain fair loans, which leads them 
to deal with unscrupulous loan sharks who charge outrageous interests. “Borrowing money 
from usurious money-lenders is commonplace, and there are often links between the sub-
agents who recruit migrants at the village level and the moneylenders who also profit from 
labour migration.”62 Abella and Martin’s 2014 study regarding migrant workers reveals 
that 74 percent of Indian workers have borrowed money to fund their migration costs, 
while for Bangladeshi workers, that figure is 65 percent, and for Sri Lankan workers it is 
52 percent.
63
 For the majority of migrants who borrow money, the debt they must repay 
compels them to tolerate maltreatment or to accept conditions different from those in the 
contracts. This further exacerbates their vulnerability and puts them at risk of forced 
labour. Jureidini states,  
Those workers who take out loans to pay for recruitment charges…are 
vulnerable to debt bondage, forced labour, and trafficking. For example, 
many construction workers interviewed did not get the salary and/or food 
allowances they were promised prior to their departure. When they 
complained to the company after their arrival, they were told that if they did 
not accept the situation, they could return to their home country, at their 
own expense. The companies are well aware that the worker may be in debt, 
having paid for the recruitment costs, and that he will not have enough 
money to pay for the return airfare and will be reluctant to shamefully 
return home without providing the financial support for his family. Thus, 
the worker must accept what is offered and that it will take him longer to 
repay the loan.
64
  
Migrant workers are also vulnerable to threats, coercion and even violence when loans are 
not paid in full and on time. Under these conditions, workers are trapped in contract 
slavery, and forced to work under restrictions they did not originally agree to before 
departure. Furthermore, even though this is illegal, many migrants are forced to repay 
employers for the various fees required to obtain an employment visa. Payments for 
airfares, work and residency permits, as well as recruitment agency fees are sometimes 
deducted from migrants’ wages in order to reimburse employers for these costs. In these 
cases, a migrant worker is viewed as “an investment or debt that requires protection,”65 
which may explain why some employers prevent workers from free movement. Along with 
the recruitment fees and debts they must pay, migrants are at risk of misrepresentation 
from recruitment agencies regarding the nature of the job and the working conditions, 
which may lead to their exploitation. The use of deception regarding working conditions 
and contracts, together with the transportation of workers to different countries where they 
may not be aware of their rights, puts workers at risk of trafficking and forced labour, and 
prevents them from seeking redress.  
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Furthermore, many migrants are forced to prolong their stay in the country of 
employment in order to repay debts. Although their contracts stipulate the amount of time 
they are permitted to work in the country, many workers choose to remain in the country 
under an illegal status so as to earn enough money to repay their debts. Agunias states, “the 
high costs of migration also can result in non-return or overstay as the migrant must 
continue to work irrespective of legal status or conditions in order to meet financial 
obligations made all the more onerous by high recruitment fees.”66 If found guilty of 
remaining in the country after the expiration of their contracts, or of working for a sponsor 
other than the one named on the visa, migrant workers are at risk of deportation and 
possible imprisonment. In order to achieve their life-project goals discussed in Chapter 2, 
many migrants report postponing their departure in order to earn a salary, despite being 
aware of the risks of doing so.
67
 The burden of debt, along with deceptive recruitment 
agencies and vague contracts places workers in a weak position, especially if they find 
themselves in a job that mistreats them. In those situations, workers are better off 
approaching their respective embassies for aid, rather than the recruitment agency, which 
will most likely urge the worker to remain with the employer. A report by Anti-Slavery 
International states, “agencies usually do not represent the interests of the workers in 
negotiations with employers. It is rather the other way around. Many agents punish the 
worker if she causes any difficulties.”68 Powerless to negotiate better terms for themselves 
in their contracts, workers often tolerate any type of employment for the sake of a salary.  
As shown in Chapters 2 and 3, migrants from major labour-exporting countries pay 
different amounts in fees depending on which labour-importing country they choose. In 
2014, Abella and Martin found that workers paid larger sums to work in Kuwait, relative to 
other GCC countries. They reported that on average, Bangladeshi workers paid costs of 
$3,136, Indian workers paid $1,285 in costs, while Sri Lankan workers paid the least, an 
average of $352 in costs.
69
 A 2017 ILO study found that workers from Bangladesh paid an 
additional $1,229 more than other workers from labour-exporting countries for work in the 
Gulf States.
70
 Conversely, high-skilled migrants pay less for higher paying jobs, and do not 
acquire debts, as their employers cover the full costs of migration.
71
 It may take several 
years for unskilled foreign workers to repay the debts they accumulate throughout their 
labour migration, in spite of the high rates of remittances.
72
 For unskilled workers, the fees 
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paid to recruitment agencies do not always translate to higher earnings.
73
 These costs pay 
for various services that the agency provides, such as aiding workers in obtaining a 
passport and informing them of the necessary medical tests required for employment visas. 
In 2016, Martin reported that, on average, workers paid $1,900 in migration costs to work 
in Kuwait; Bangladeshis paid $3,100, Indians paid $1,1250, and Sri Lankans paid $320.
74
 
There has not been a significant change in these costs, regardless of the laws that have 
entered into force, such as the Domestic Workers Law (2016) which prohibits recruitment 
agencies from collecting fees from workers. Abella and Martin also found that recruitment 
agencies were grossly exaggerating their fees, as a breakdown of all the services did not 
match the fees set by agencies. For example, they found that, on average, the total cost of 
medical tests, passport, as well as transportation was $61 for Indians, $43 for 
Bangladeshis, and $23 for Sri Lankans.
75
 Additionally, Siddiqui reported that a number of 
recruitment agencies in Bangladesh work with corrupt diagnostic centers that conduct 
health checks that are necessary for migrants to obtain before departure overseas. He states 
these centers “cheat the potential migrants by conducting unnecessary health checkups. 
They also manipulate results and create situation for treatment and further tests.”76 Many 
migrants paid one lump sum payment, and were not fully aware what the recruitment costs 
covered,
77
 with some believing that the higher the costs, the better their chances will be of 
obtaining work. “There are usually many more low-skilled workers than available jobs in 
occupations such as domestic service and construction labour, and many are willing to pay 
recruiters to put them at the front of the queue.”78 In fact, Abella refers to recruitment fees 
as “bribes”; he states, “what the recruiter gets is not a fee for recruitment services per se, 
but a bribe for the jobs that he or she offers.
79
 This “bribe” is dependent on supply and 
demand in both labour-importing as well as labour-exporting countries, which dictates the 
amount of workers recruitment agencies will work with.  
The Domestic Workers Law (2016), enacted two years ago, prohibits recruitment 
agencies from charging workers fees, and all costs be covered by the sponsor, however this 
is not the case for unskilled male laborers. As most unskilled male laborers are hired in 
large numbers for certain construction or sanitation projects, the government relies on 
recruitment agencies for aid in the processing of applications and contracts. Unskilled male 
laborers have reported many abuses against unscrupulous recruitment agencies over the 
years, yet the law has not changed. Eliminating fees for these workers would help reduce 
the accumulated debts of migrants, as well as aid in the elimination of excessive fees and 
other corrupt practices. On the other hand, Abella notes that a limit on fees does not 
necessarily deter workers from paying for the services of recruitment agencies. He states 
that limits on fees “have been widely disregarded, often with the cooperation of the 
workers. Private recruiters are generally more effective in finding positions than 
                                                          
73
 Martin, supra note 71, p.20. 
74
 Martin, supra note 71, p.3. 
75
 Abella & Martin, supra note 63, p.9. 
76
 Tasneem Siddiqui (2006). ‘Protection of Bangladeshi Migrants Through Good Governance,’ In: Merchants 
of Labour, (ed.) Christiane Kuptsch, International Labour Organization. [Online] Available from: 
https://www.ilo.org/global/publications/ilo-bookstore/order-
online/books/WCMS_PUBL_9290147806_EN/lang--en/index.htm  
77
 Martin, supra note 71, p.6. 
78
 Abella & Martin, supra note 63, p.10. 
79
 Manolo Abella (2004). The Role of Recruiters in Labour Migration. In International Migration: Prospects 
and Policies in a Global Market. Massey, D.M. and Taylor, J.E. (eds). Oxford University Press, p.203. 
government agencies, and migrants prefer them despite the greater costs and risks.”80 
Nevertheless, eliminating recruitment fees would lessen the debt most migrants are forced 
to incur in order to pay migration costs.  
 
4.7 International Laws, Treaties and Conventions 
 Recruitment agencies are subject to international laws, government regulations in 
both labour-exporting and labour-importing countries, as well as other rules by 
international organizations, although today, there are many agencies that do not adhere to 
these rules and regulations, putting migrant workers at risk of maltreatment. In 2016, the 
ILO Committee of Experts general survey of migrant worker conventions and 
recommendations stated that “in recent years, it has become increasingly clear that 
governance of recruitment practices has an essential role to play in preventing migrant 
workers from experiencing abusive and fraudulent conditions, including trafficking in 
persons and forced labour.”81 The UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of 
Migrants added, “the practices of unethical recruiters and their subagents sit on a complex 
spectrum of human rights violations…such recruiters commonly exploit migrants, directly 
or indirectly, at every stage of the migratory process.”82 Furthermore, an ILO reported that 
in 2017, “widespread evidence exists that the migration recruitment industry is responsible 
for numerous abuses that erode the benefits of migration for workers.”83 For example, 
although international labour law is very clear in placing limits to the amount of fees 
recruitment agencies may charge, many agencies continue to impose them. There are two 
ILO Conventions that directly apply to recruitment agencies. The first, Protection of 
Wages Convention No.95, states in Article 9 that “any deduction from wages with a view 
to ensuring a direct or indirect payment for the purpose of obtaining or retaining 
employment, made by a worker to an employer or his representative or to any intermediary 
(such as a labor contractor or recruiter), shall be prohibited.”84 This Convention is 
important as it prohibits the deduction of wages for the described purposes, which is a 
common practice among recruitment agencies in Kuwait. The Philippines and Sri Lanka 
have both ratified this convention, but Kuwait has not. The second ILO convention 
applicable to recruitment agencies is the Fee-Charging Employment Agencies Convention 
No.96, which states that fee-charging employment agencies “shall only charge fees and 
expenses on a scale submitted to and approved by the competent authority or fixed by the 
said authority.”85 Both Sri Lanka and Bangladesh have ratified this Convention. However, 
Kuwait has not, which makes it difficult to enforce the provisions of the Convention. 
Although Kuwait has eliminated fees paid by domestic workers through the recent labour 
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law, the same should be applied to unskilled male laborers. In addition, the IOM launched 
its International Recruitment Integrity System (IRIS) in 2014 to promote fair recruitment 
for workers, agencies, and employers. The ILO also launched a similar program, the Fair 
Recruitment Initiative in 2015, which aims to develop and adopt recruitment principles that 
protect the rights of migrant workers. Both of these programs work on developing an 
accreditation system for recruitment agencies that is approved by both labour-exporting 
and labour-importing countries to ensure that migrants are protected throughout their 
employment.    
Kuwait has not ratified the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children (Trafficking Protocol), an 
important legal instrument with the aim of providing guidelines for States to enact 
measures for the prevention and punishment of trafficking. In 2012, during a meeting 
between Kuwaiti government officials and members of the Committee on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination (Kuwait ratified the Convention in 1968), the subject of 
trafficking was discussed. In response to questions as to why the government has yet to 
ratify the Trafficking Protocol, the delegate for the Kuwaiti government noted that 
provisions against trafficking were found in the Criminal Code, and thus, eliminated the 
need for ratification of the Convention. He stated, “various mechanisms were provided for 
under the Criminal Code (Act No.16) of 1960 and its amendments to prevent trafficking in 
persons and protect victims of trafficking.”86 The government denied the existence of 
trafficking in the country, with the official stating that, “in Kuwait there was no trafficking 
in slaves as such, according to the internationally recognized definition; however, there had 
been individual cases in which workers had been exploited for financial gain.”87 Since 
Kuwait has yet to ratify the Trafficking Protocol, it is clear that the government’s views 
have not changed. In their view, the exploitation of migrant workers in Kuwait does not 
correlate to trafficking, thus removing the need to ratify the convention. In regards to 
forced labour, the official noted that an article criminalizing forced labour is included in 
the law, stating, “Article 49 of Act No.31 of 1970, amending the Criminal Code, 
criminalized all forms of forced labour and exploitation of persons.”88 According to the 
government, the inclusion of this Article in the Criminal Code cancels the need to ratify the 
Abolition of Forced Labour Convention.  
As far as bilateral agreements, Kuwait has signed MOUs with the governments of 
India and the Philippines in regards to unskilled migrant workers. These MOUs are useful 
where national laws are lacking, and together with international treaties and conventions, 
they are important steps in aligning national laws with international labour standards. As 
long as recruitment agencies play an integral role in labour migration, countries need to 
cooperate in order to safeguard those rights, whether through MOUs or international 
conventions. It is not the responsibility of any one government to ensure recruitment 
agencies are abiding by laws and standards, but for all governments that are involved.  
An important case that relates to recruitment is found in the UK Employment 
Tribunal (ET), in the case of Tirkey v. Chandok.
89
 In this case, Ms. Tirkey, an Indian 
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national, was recruited in India to work as a domestic worker for an Indian couple residing 
in the UK. The ET found that her employers were guilty of a number of violations 
including not paying the worker a minimum wage, retaining her passport, not allowing her 
adequate rest time or annual leave and failing to provide her with proper terms and 
conditions of her contract. Furthermore, the judge noted that the employers wanted to hire 
someone who would not fully understand their rights under UK law, which is why they 
chose to hire from India, and not within the UK. The ET ruled in favor of the worker, 
stating she was brought to the country under deception. Unlike the case of trafficking 
involving migrant workers being taken to Iraq, in this case, trafficking did not apply as the 
worker knew she was going to be working in the UK. However, this case highlights the 
fact that migrant workers from Asia are at risk of deception by recruitment agents, as well 
as employers. Similar to Mrs Tirkey’s case, many unskilled foreign workers in Kuwait 
experience the same type of treatment. Most unskilled Asian workers in Kuwait have 
backgrounds that make them vulnerable. They are discriminated against due to their 
ethnicity in an environment where there is a clear labour hierarchy. They are recruited and 
hired based on their servile or docile nature, and are often harassed and taken advantage of 
in both labour-sending and labour-receiving countries. Their wages are often withheld, and 
their movements are restricted. In many ways, Mrs. Tirkey’s plight represents the case of 
unskilled workers in Kuwait.    
Another case that is applicable here is Ranstsev v. Cyprus and Russia, mentioned in 
Chapter 1. In this case, the ECHR found that Cyprus was in violation of its obligation 
under Article 4 of the European Convention of Human Rights to protect migrant workers 
from slavery, servitude and forced labour. Despite reports from NGOs and human rights 
organizations describing the presence of trafficking in the country, its immigration policies 
were effectively encouraging the trafficking of women. The Court declared that states have 
a positive obligation to protect all workers from trafficking. In this case, the Court ruled 
that the obligation to identify, investigate, and prevent trafficking lies with the state. 
Hence, the state is obliged to adopt laws and establish policies to combat trafficking. This 
applies to recruitment and labour laws to protect not only nationals, but all migrant 
workers. Migrants like Ms. Tirkey and Ms. Rantseva are often given false information 
regarding their employment abroad, are severely unprepared and are unaware of their 
rights under the employment contract. Being illiterate and unskilled, as many migrants are, 
puts them at a severe disadvantage when it comes to understanding their rights. It is the 
responsibility of the labour-sending governments, through licensed recruitment agencies to 
make sure that workers are aware of the nature and conditions of their employment, as well 
as their rights under local laws.   
 
4.8 Remittances 
 Migrant workers play a large role in both of the economies of labour-exporting and 
labour-importing countries. Their contributions to the labour sector in Kuwait have 
allowed the country to implement and maintain large-scale projects and infrastructures, 
necessary for its development. They also support the economies of their native countries 
with remittances, or the money they send home to their families. The IOM defines migrant 
remittances as “personal monetary transfers that a migrant worker makes to his/her 
relatives back in their country of origin.”90 For many labour-exporting countries, 
remittances constitute a substantial part of their GDP and are relied upon to support 
families of migrants. As Rahman states, “there is no doubt that remittances are the most 
tangible benefit of labour migration.”91 Labour-exporting countries “are faced with the 
dilemma between ‘promoting’ and ‘protecting’ labour migrants,”92 as much as they would 
like to like to increase the amount of labour they export, they are increasingly faced with 
reports of abuses and violations against their nationals overseas.   
 For many migrants, there are many incentives to save and send a part of their salary 
to their families back home, either for general support, or toward specific goals such as 
purchasing a home, educating children, contributing to medical costs of family members or 
other entrepreneurial activities. This is especially true for unskilled migrants in the GCC, 
who send a majority of their earnings home, even though they earn less than skilled 
workers.
93
 The motivation to save their salaries is increased further due to their temporary 
contracts. In addition, remittances serve as security against possible future unemployment 
or unforeseen circumstances. In this way, labour migration generates a source of income 
for migrants’ family members, thus improving their household conditions and protecting 
them against poverty or vulnerability. In cases where migrant workers are the sole 
providers for their families, remittances are the lifeline of many poor households that 
depend on the salaries of their migrant family members to sustain them while the 
breadwinner is abroad.  
 According to the World Bank, worldwide remittances were estimated to be more 
than $613 billion in 2017,
94
 of which “developing countries are estimated to receive about 
$441 billion, nearly three times the amount of official development assistance.”95 (See 
Table 7) In 2015, the ILO estimated that “about 30% of all remittances flowing to Asia 
originated from the GCC countries.”96 The Philippines is one of the top five recipient 
countries of remittances in the world, receiving $32,808 billion in 2017,
97
 while Kuwait is 
one of the top six immigration destination countries, relative to population.
98
 Today, 
remittances represent a high percentage of GDP for many labour exporting countries such 
as Bangladesh, India, the Philippines and Sri Lanka. As of 2017, the latest year for which 
statistics are available, Bangladesh received $13,469 million in remittances, India received 
the largest number at $68,968 million, the Philippines received $32,808 million and Sri 
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Lanka received $7,190 million.
99
 The total remittance outflow from migrants employed in 
Kuwait was $15,288 million as of 2017,
100
 with the main recipient countries of remittances 
include Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka and the Philippines.
101
 These remittances contribute a 
great deal to the local economy of labour-exporting countries, as well as the GDP. As one 
of the top remittance receiving countries in the world, India received over US $68 billion 
in 2017,
102
 comprising 2.6% of its total GDP.
103
 The Philippines is also one of the world’s 
top remittance receiving countries, with US $32 billion
104
 received in 2017, or 10.4% of its 
total GDP.
105
 Remittances are also important to smaller countries, such as Sri Lanka and 
Bangladesh. In 2017, Sri Lanka received over US $7 billion in 2017,
106
 or 8.2% of its total 
GDP;
107
 while Bangladesh received US $13 billion,
108
 or 5.4% of its total GDP.
109
  These 
figures do not include the informal channels through which some migrants choose to 
transport their earnings, either through friends or relatives. Also, unskilled migrant workers 
are in direct competition with other workers from labour-exporting countries, which tends 
to keep wages low, which may also affect remittances in some cases.
110
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Migration not only reduces unemployment in the labour-exporting countries, but 
through remittances, migration represents a significant portion of each country’s economy. 
By raising national earning figures and lessening the financial burden on poor countries 
that already receive international assistance, remittances represent a lifeline for migrants 
and their countries. In the case of Bangladesh for example, the World Bank estimated that 
remittances have helped to lower poverty by 6 percent,
111
 a strong advantage for the 
promotion of migration. For Sri Lanka, it is estimated that approximately 70 percent of its 
US $3.37 billion trade deficit are financed by remittances from workers; this amounts to 
“almost twice the amount Sri Lanka receives in foreign aid and more than two-and-a-half 
times the amount it receives in foreign direct investment.”112 In this way, remittances serve 
as a vital component of labour-exporting countries’ economies.  
Remittances may be sent either by formal or informal channels. Formal channels 
include money transfers by banks or other financial institutions (such as Western Union), 
and informal channels may include cash payments delivered personally by family 
members, friends, or colleagues. Calculating the amount of remittances transferred through 
informal channels is near impossible, although organizations such as the IOM estimate that 
if these types of remittances were included in worldwide figures, the total amount of 
remittances would be as much as fifty percent higher.
113
 Typically, remittances are 
transferred either by cash, check, or money order delivered through an agent such as a 
bank or other financial organization to the beneficiary in the receiving country. Some 
financial agents charge a fee for these transactions, which international labour 
organizations have called an end to, as these fees further increase migration costs. (See 
Table 8) 
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4.9 Conclusion 
The labour recruitment system, combined with the sponsorship system in Kuwait, 
and the lack of enforcement of current laws or ratified conventions and treaties, “form a 
labour marketplace in which employers have both financial incentives and the freedom to 
exploit domestic workers with little fear of accountability, while workers exercise little 
control over the circumstances of their employment.”114 This demonstrates that in the case 
of migrant workers, often exploitation begins in their own countries, at the hands of corrupt 
recruitment agencies.  
Migrants from different labour-exporting nations pay different recruitment costs 
according to laws, or lack thereof in their native countries, as well as the countries of 
employment. Lowering recruitment fees as well as standardizing costs so that all workers 
pay the same amount would encourage fair recruitment. By prohibiting recruitment 
agencies from charging domestic workers fees, the Kuwaiti government has made a 
significant step in aligning its laws with its international obligations. Zero-fee recruitment 
is important to guarantee that migrants are not burdened with debts throughout their 
employment which can, in turn, jeopardize their legal status in Kuwait. This should apply 
not only to recruitment agents, but sub-agents as well. One way to ensure this is to clearly 
define what is meant by “recruitment fees”, and what recruitment agencies are expected to 
provide workers. Fair Hiring Inc., a recruitment agency in the Philippines, proposed a 
definition that considered all pre-departure costs be paid by the worker, while post-arrival 
costs should be paid by the employer. This means that the cost for all training courses, 
medical exams and relevant documents are paid by migrants, while costs such as airfare, 
recruitment fees, food and accommodation are paid by the employer. It is imperative that 
migrants arrive debt-free to their country of employment, so as to not feel pressured to 
remain in situations of abuse or maltreatment. Additionally, governments have an 
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obligation to make sure that recruitment agencies are licensed and properly monitored, so 
as to reduce the risk of corrupt practices. Bilateral cooperation, in the form of MOUs, 
should include licensed agencies that are approved and accredited by both countries, with 
guarantees that only those agencies will be permitted to provide workers.  
Essentially, recruitment agencies exist to provide a service that matches workers to 
jobs. In order for this service to be mutually beneficial to both employers and employees, 
certain provisions must be made to ensure fair recruitment. Ideally, workers would be fully 
aware of the nature and conditions of their employment, arrive debt free to their country of 
destination, earn the expected wage, and return home with a positive migration experience. 
In reality, recruitment agencies are not always transparent in the costs or conditions of the 
work that is offered, resulting in the exploitation of workers, which many have to tolerate 
due to debt incurrence. Additional monitoring and enforcement mechanisms need to be put 
in place in both sending and receiving countries.  Without strict rules regarding fair 
recruitment, migrants are at risk of forced labour, slavery and trafficking.  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
Present Context 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Throughout the world, slavery has been identified as the worst violation of a person’s 
freedom, however it continues to exist in various forms in many countries to this day. The 
situation of unskilled foreign laborers in Kuwait can be accurately described as slavery 
according to definitions by academics and international organizations. The sponsorship 
system does not offer acceptable protections for this group of workers, yet it is still 
enforced, despite recommendations by international human rights and labour organizations 
to reform the system, and despite government promises to establish another plan. The 
number of reported abuses, complaints and deaths that involve unskilled foreign workers in 
Kuwait continue to multiply, and many remain legally unresolved. Despite the laws that 
are in place to guard against maltreatment, enforcement of those laws is poor due to 
corruption and inadequate implementation measures. Taking into account the recruitment 
process, the lack of legal protections, the absence of effective enforcement mechanisms for 
existing laws and the overall environment in which unskilled foreign migrants work, their 
circumstances correspond with many of the characteristics of forced labour and slavery. In 
this chapter, the definitions of slavery will be examined as they apply to Kuwait. The 
effects of the sponsorship system in relation to different methods of deception and 
restrictions are examined in the context of the definitions of slavery. This chapter will also 
analyze the concept of rentierism, and rentierist state theory as they apply to Kuwait and 
how they may be used to explain the presence of slavery in the country. In addition, this 
chapter will also investigate how citizenship plays a role in the ways in which migrant 
workers are managed and treated in the country. Finally, this chapter will discuss Kuwait’s 
compliance or non-compliance with treaties, conventions and other agreements, and the 
ways in which the country’s monetary contributions have shaped the ratification of these 
treaties.    
 
5.2 Slavery 
 GCC countries have benefitted greatly from the labour of unskilled foreign 
migrants in their development from desert towns to major cities, although this has come at 
a cost. Reports of maltreatment, abuse and trafficking of foreign workers have become 
common in recent years, signaling a need for change. The sponsorship system that is 
implemented in GCC countries restricts the freedoms of migrant workers and has come to 
represent a system akin to slavery. Migrant workers make many sacrifices by leaving their 
home countries and seeking better wages for themselves and their families. For many, it is 
the first time they travel outside of their villages and towns and the prospect of 
employment in oil-rich GCC countries such as Kuwait represents opportunities for a better 
future. Although there are many migrants whose lives have been enriched by their 
employment to Kuwait and there are Kuwaiti sponsors who treat their employees fairly, 
these prove to be the exceptions rather than the rule. Modern day slavery is an issue which 
needs to be addressed in terms of the treatment of unskilled foreign workers in Kuwait 
today.  
    
5.2.1 Definitions 
 Throughout this thesis, several definitions of slavery and forced labour have been 
examined as they apply to the situation of unskilled migrant workers in Kuwait. The UN 
for example, defines slavery as “the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of 
the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised.”1 Bales identifies violence as 
the defining characteristic of slavery, the threat of which is central to its meaning. 
According to his definition, “slavery is a social and economic relationship in which a 
person is controlled through violence or its threat, paid nothing, and economically 
exploited.”2 Therefore, the power of ownership, as well as the threat or the infliction of 
violence are the defining traits of slavery. The ECHR relies on the definition of slavery as 
it appears in the UN Slavery Convention (1926), which links ownership to coercion, while 
servitude refers to a situation in which the victim is unable to change employment and 
perceives the situation to be permanent. It defines servitude as “an obligation to provide 
services under duress and that it must be in connection with the notion of slavery.”3     
In the case of most workers discussed here, migration is a voluntary choice, but it is 
violence or the threat of violence that keeps them in that situation. In addition, Degorge 
states that modern day slavery “refers to the situation of people who out of economic 
necessity enter into work relationships that either limit their freedom of choice or their 
mobility.”4 Regarding forced labour, according to the ILO’s Forced Labour Convention, it 
is defined as “all work or services, which is extracted from any person under the menace of 
any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily.”5 As 
discussed earlier, “menace of any penalty” may include threats of violence, which becomes 
a common theme when discussing slavery and forced labour. In addition to threats, there 
are other factors that indicate forced labour, such as restriction of movement, passport 
confiscation, withholding or deducting of wages and debt bondage.
6
 All of these factors 
describe the experience of many unskilled foreign laborers in Kuwait. Whether it is 
slavery, servitude, forced labour or debt bondage, the common factors are the absence of 
consent and control. Even in situations where migrants fulfill all their pre-departure 
obligations and sign a contract, they may be faced with an employment situation different 
to that which they had originally consented, leaving them vulnerable to abuse. As Bales 
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states, “’willing’ participation, token ‘payments’, the apparent acquiescence in a ‘contract’, 
and any number of other layers of meaning, rationalization, or explanation can be used as 
part of the societal or community discourse explaining and rationalizing the 
slave/slaveholder relationship.”7 Contract substitution, visa trading, and wage deductions 
are all methods used by unscrupulous employers as ways to circumvent the existing laws. 
The incidents of abuse that are reported by embassies, NGOs, and international 
organizations, as well as from migrants themselves, are indications that the situation of 
unskilled workers in Kuwait amounts to forced labour and slavery. 
 In addition, two ECHR cases present definitions of slavery, servitude and forced 
labour that are applicable here. The first is the case of C.N. and V. v. France, concerning 
two French sisters who were born in Burundi and moved to France to live with their aunt, 
who had been appointed their official guardian. While living with their aunt they carried 
out domestic chores for the entire household-the aunt, her husband and their seven 
children. One of the sisters was subjected to more work than the other but feared reporting 
her situation to the local authorities in the belief that her immigration status was illegal and 
that she would face deportation. The court found that she had been subjected to forced or 
compulsory labour and servitude due to the fact that she did not offer herself voluntarily 
for such duties and that she was performing the work under duress. In this case, forced 
labour was distinguished from servitude based on the victim’s belief that she was trapped 
and that her situation was permanent. The court also defined the parameters of the word 
‘penalty’ within the context of Article 4 and stated that the notion of penalty may be 
psychological, in the form of threats or intimidation, such as those used by the victim’s 
aunt to threaten her with deportation. In the case of Siliadin v. France, a Tongolese 
national was brought to France by a relative who upon arrival confiscated her passport and 
made her work as a domestic worker without pay. She did not have her own 
accommodations and was working in excess of fifteen hours per day doing housework and 
looking after four young children. The court found that her relative was in violation of 
Article 4 and that the victim was subjected to forced labour and servitude but not slavery in 
the sense that her relative did not exercise a right of ownership over her. Once again, this 
case is an example of the court distinguishing between servitude, slavery and forced 
labour. In this case, servitude was applicable due to the victim’s belief that her situation is 
unlikely to change.   
 The enforced temporariness of migrant workers in Kuwait further exacerbates the 
risk of slavery and forced labour. Whereas in the past, slavery spanned a worker’s lifetime, 
today, it may take place over the span of a few months or years. Unskilled workers are 
considered disposable, with an unlimited pool of labour available from major labour-
exporting countries. A recent ILO study estimated that there were “a total of 520 thousand 
victims of modern slavery in the Arab States on any given day in 2016,”8 probably a 
conservative estimate considering the amount of undocumented cases. The report also 
states that “the largest share of those in modern slavery were victims of forced labour. 
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About two-thirds (67 percent) of the total were victims of forced labour.”9 One form of 
forced labour includes debt bondage, where workers are trapped into employment due to 
the debt they have incurred in the migration process, whether by employers, recruitment 
agencies, or moneylenders in their own countries. The same ILO reports that 51 percent of 
the workers studied were victims of debt bondage, with women being especially 
susceptible, reporting that 89 percent were victims, the highest percentage in the world.
10
  
Today, slavery is a lucrative business, and recruitment agencies as well as the 
sponsorship system itself, present advantageous benefits for employers and companies. 
The many controls inherent in the sponsorship system limit their rights. As Kapstein states, 
“what all slaves have in common is that they are forced to work.”11 Whether the force is 
imposed through contracts, threats of violence or debt bondage, their productive capacity is 
exploited for the profit or benefit of the employer. Many recruitment agencies prioritize 
profits over the rights and welfare of migrant workers, and profit a great deal in doing so. 
They view themselves as business people taking advantage of a system with lax 
monitoring and poor enforcement of existing laws. The ECHR has directly associated the 
recruitment process of some countries with trafficking as in the case of Chowdury and 
Others v. Greece. This case involved forty-two Bangladeshi nationals who were working 
in Greece as seasonal agricultural workers. Their living accommodations were substandard 
and they worked long hours under the supervision of armed guards. After several months 
of unpaid wages, the Bangladeshi workers held strikes and guards opened fire, injuring 
some of the workers. The workers complained that they were trafficked but the Greek 
court dismissed the trafficking charge on the grounds that the workers had voluntarily 
entered into the employment. The ECHR found that the Greek government to be in 
violation and awarded a compensation sum to the workers. The court stated that “the 
victim’s prior consent was insufficient to preclude employment being classified as ‘forced 
labour’. Where an employer abused his or her power or took advantage of workers’ 
situation of vulnerability in order to exploit them the latter were not offering their labour 
voluntarily.”12 The court recognized that the recruitment process is included in trafficking 
and the fact that workers freely accept employment positions does not preclude them from 
becoming victims of trafficking. Chowdury and Others v. Greece directly ties trafficking to 
recruitment and thus, forced labour. As in Greece, many migrants in Kuwait are recruited 
by agents or subagents who lure them with false promises and contracts, in this way, 
migrants are subjected to trafficking and forced labour. Unfortunately, as long as wage 
wedges exist between labour-exporting and labour-importing countries, migrant workers 
will continue to seek work abroad, despite the debts, and deception they face.    
 
5.2.2 The Sponsorship System and Standardized Contracts 
The labour laws and sponsorship system that apply to unskilled foreign migrants in 
Kuwait are inherently flawed systems that are conducive to forced labour. To begin with, 
the sponsorship system places tremendous power in the hands of the nationals, power that 
                                                          
9
 Regional Brief for the Arab States, supra note 8, p.6.  
10
 Regional Brief for the Arab States, supra note 8, p.7.  
11
 Ethan Kapstein (2006). The New Global Slave Trade. In: Foreign Affairs, 85, p.106. 
12
 European Court of Human Rights. Chowdury and Others v. Greece, Case 21884/15, 9 June 2017. 
is often abused. By entrusting individual sponsors to uphold the terms of the contracts they 
signed with migrant workers as the sponsorship system does, the government has 
essentially removed itself from the responsibility of protecting the rights of these workers. 
The ILO notes that, “the power that the kafala system delegates to the sponsor over the 
migrant worker, has been likened to a contemporary form of slavery.”13 The power given 
to the employer in the sponsorship system is especially detrimental for domestic workers, 
as their work revolves around the home, a confined and private domain, out of the reach of 
government supervision. In cases where the household is abusive, domestic workers have 
little room for recourse.  
The labour law in Kuwait is based on a hierarchy that clearly distinguishes between 
nationals, Arabs, non-Arabs, and Asians. This is especially true in the case of unskilled 
migrants, whose productive capacity, or the “value” of their labour, is measured according 
to nationality, age, and gender. In turn, these patterns are also evident in the societal 
structure of Kuwait, where unskilled Asian migrants are seen as one-dimensional workers, 
and little, if any socialization between migrants and nationals exists. Discrepancies within 
the labour laws as they apply to nationals and Asian migrants are justified by the 
government in order to ensure the temporary settlement of migrant workers.  
The sponsorship system, including standardized contracts, do not offer sufficient 
protections to migrant workers. In the case of unskilled Asian laborers, the biggest problem 
lies in their lack of knowledge regarding their rights as per the contract they signed. Upon 
recruitment in their native countries, these laborers sign a contract with a local agency, 
usually written in English, outlining terms and conditions of the job in Kuwait. Once they 
arrive in Kuwait however, workers are often asked to sign another contract, this time in 
Arabic, and told that it is this Arabic contract that would be acknowledged by the Ministry 
of Social Affairs and Labour. Although local embassies try their hardest to be available to 
provide translators for workers, they are often understaffed, and are unable to 
accommodate all laborers. This gives rise to incidents in which employers coerce workers 
to sign new contracts with different provisions than those originally agreed upon. 
Especially in the private sector, many employers take advantage of this situation and 
institute new provisions that include longer working hours, minimal overtime pay and 
fewer holidays. The Domestic Workers Law (2016) prohibits many of these practices, but 
many male laborers continue to be at risk of contract substitution. Other times, employers 
deducted amounts from workers’ salaries under the guise of various fees and costs that the 
employer paid on behalf of the worker upon signing the employment contract. For 
unskilled laborers, there is little choice but to sign the new contract, otherwise, the money 
paid to obtain the working permit would be lost, and the worker would have to return to 
their country to obtain a new visa. Relying on employment agencies and subagents to 
provide them with honest work, migrant workers not only place tremendous faith in the 
contracts they sign, but in the knowledge that their employers will adhere to the terms of 
the contracts. Otherwise, abuse or non-compliance with the contracts may lead to incidents 
of contract slavery, where workers are economically exploited, their physical movements 
restricted, and they work under threats of violence.  
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Both domestic workers and male laborers are restricted in their movements while 
employed in Kuwait. While domestic workers are confined to their employer’s home, male 
laborers reside in camps, distanced from the city and residential areas. They are prohibited 
from leaving their residences or camps without express permission from their employers 
and even when they’re not, the choice of places they are allowed to visit is limited. As 
previously mentioned, some employers go to great lengths to ensure that their domestic 
workers do not run away, either by withholding their passport, or by locking them inside 
the home. This confinement meets the ILO’s definition of labour provided under 
conditions of threat or violence. It states that, “a common means by which labour is 
extracted by duress from workers is through their confinement.”14 Additionally, most 
migrant workers’ passports are confiscated by their employers, a practice that is illegal, 
although still common in Kuwait. Without their passports, they risk deportation or false 
charges against them if they attempt to flee their employer. 
The withholding of wages or the reduction of wages to pay back the fees the 
employer has paid are common occurrences for migrant workers in Kuwait. Laborers 
regularly have ambiguous “fees” deducted from their wages each month, in spite of the 
Ministry’s best efforts to regulate the salaries of laborers by implementing WPS systems, 
which instruct companies to provide bank statements indicating that each worker’s account 
has been deposited with a salary each month. As discussed previously, domestic workers 
regularly complain that employers withhold wages in order for workers to repay the 
various recruitment fees, which is considered debt bondage. Although illegal, this has 
become a common practice in Kuwait, with employers withholding salaries in order to 
reimburse the fees that were paid to recruitment agencies. Due to this practice, and taking 
into consideration the fees that were paid to recruitment agents in their home countries, 
migrants are plagued with debts and loans that dominate their work experience. As a result, 
many workers tolerate horrendous working conditions and abuse due to the amount of debt 
they have to repay.  
Debt bondage has been classified by the ILO as a “slavery-like” practice, and is 
prohibited by the ILO’s Convention on the Abolition of Forced Labour. In 2007, a report 
on Sri Lankan domestic workers in Kuwait, HRW reported twenty-three cases “in which 
the range of abuses alleged-forced confinement, restricted communication, confiscation of 
passports, withholding of salary, abuse, high debts, and work under threat of detention or 
deportation- amounted to forced labour.”15 According to the ILO, the “menace of penalty” 
included in the definition of forced labour, includes, “physical violence against a 
worker…physical confinement, financial penalties, denunciation to the authorities (police, 
immigration) and deportation, dismissal from current employment, and exclusion form 
future employment, and denial of rights and privileges.”16 Once again, all these 
characteristics define the experience of unskilled foreign migrants in Kuwait. In cases of 
forced labour, a combination of factors come together to form “menace of penalty”, such 
as the confiscation of passport, restriction of movement, withholding wages, threats of 
deportation or violence, and contract substitution. Employers and recruitment agencies 
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deceive migrants into signing different contracts, threatening them with fines if they refuse, 
then withholding or deducting wages to recover recruitment fees, and threatening workers 
with deportation if they do not complete their contracts. Although not every migrant is 
subjected to actual violence, the threat of violence or prosecution remains a valid concern. 
As Bales states, “In contemporary slavery, the core attributes of slavery remain the same as 
they have always been…the state of control exercised over the slave, a control based on the 
potential or actual use of violence.”17 As long as the threat of violence or legal 
repercussion dominates the employer-employee relationship, migrants will continue to be 
at risk of forced labour and slavery.  
Together, these factors prevent workers from seeking better working conditions for 
themselves, hence forcing them either to tolerate their present employment, or abscond, 
jeopardizing their legal status in the country. Not being able to change employers denies 
workers an inalienable right according to the ILO, which states that, “a restriction on 
leaving a job, even when the worker freely agreed to enter it, can be considered forced 
labour.”18 This type of deception endangers workers because it forces them to remain with 
employers in order to fulfill the terms of the contract and earn a salary. In cases where the 
contracts signed by migrant workers do not reflect the actuality of their employment or in 
cases where the recruitment agencies used deception to obtain a worker’s consent, 
migrants should have the right to withdraw their labour. As stated earlier, burdensome 
debts are the main reason workers remain with employers, further leading to situations of 
debt bondage. More supervision is needed from the government to make sure that contracts 
are respected for both laborers and domestic workers, and mechanisms need to be put in 
place to identify and punish employers who violate contract terms.  
Modern slavery occurs in many guises. Debt bondage and contract slavery are only 
two examples used in Kuwait but they both need to be defined in the larger context of 
forced labour. Although the term slavery is not mentioned in the Constitution, Article 29 
guarantees “personal liberty,”19 presumably alluding to slavery. Nevertheless, forced 
labour is prohibited under Article 42 of Constitution, although the practice is legitimized 
through the use of unfair contracts that lack proper enforcement. This lack of enforcement 
in itself is a clear violation of migrant rights, as the government’s lax application of the 
laws gives way to corruption and exploitation. Migrants in Kuwait face constant threats of 
violence, and often live in fear of any retaliation by their employer due to the unbalanced 
relationship that exists between them. In 1999, Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad, Kuwait’s foreign 
minister at the time, and currently the country’s emir, delivered a speech before parliament 
regarding riots by Egyptian workers who protested living and working conditions in the 
country. He blamed the incident on “traders in residence permits who have grown rich over 
freighting in and exploiting foreign labour,”20 and used the word slavery in describing the 
treatment to which some migrant workers are subjected to in Kuwait. Unfortunately, the 
term is still applicable and change has been slow. 
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The sponsorship system gives employers direct control over the immigration status 
of their employees, and thus, the power balance in the relationship rests with the sponsor. 
As Bales asserts, violence or the threat of violence, is inherent to slavery, but that violence 
would not take place without freedom to operate outside of the law.  He states, “this ability 
to use violence to enforce the condition of enslavement requires that the slaveholder can 
avoid interference from the state or community.”21 Most sponsors of domestic workers 
operate without interference from any type of governmental monitoring group when it 
comes to application of the standardized work contract. As a result, even though unskilled 
laborers are protected under the law, their working hours and living conditions are never 
inspected and the camps that they are housed in are often squalid and in disrepair. Labour-
exporting countries have attempted to remedy these conditions by entering into bilateral 
agreements and MOUs with the Kuwaiti government to ensure protections for their 
citizens.  
 
5.3 Treaty Compliance 
Throughout history, sovereign States created contracts with each other as a way of 
expressing allegiance, purpose, or future goals, and intents. The Vienna Convention 
defines a treaty, as “an international agreement concluded between States in written form 
and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or 
more related instruments, and whatever its particular designation.”22 Whether they are 
referred to as conventions, agreements, contracts, or treaties, these instruments all have one 
thing in common- they establish commitments and duties to which the signing parties 
agree to be held accountable. The importance of treaties in international law cannot be 
understated. Treaties involving States and international organizations have supplemented 
and enhanced current laws and regulations concerning diverse subjects such as economics, 
labour, human rights and migration. Throughout Kuwait’s history, treaties have served to 
solidify its place among the international community and in many cases, state its intent 
towards the application of international standards.  The international community 
encourages States to participate in conventions and treaties, in order to align themselves to 
a codified international standard. According to Kelsen, “it is especially the creation of 
international law by treaties that clearly reveals the States as organs of the international 
community. International treaties are, in the opinion of many authors, the only method by 
which international law can be created.”23 They have established international norms and 
standards that are necessary in protecting global and political unity. 
Apart from serving as sources of international law, treaties can also have a more 
proactive effect in the sense that they set rules and standards for party States. As Dixon 
states, “treaties can also be seen to have a legislative role in that, like some General 
Assembly resolutions, treaties impose binding rules on States that create rights and 
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obligations.”24  By imposing rules and obligations on States, treaties serve to establish 
norms in international law. The most basic criterion of treaties is pacta sunt servanda, 
which states that all treaties must be made in good faith. Additionally, Alston and 
Goodman state that, “for there to be any significant legal regulation of the international 
community, the principle of pacta sunt servanda is required.”25 States may demonstrate 
good faith in numerous ways. The most important way is not to engage in any activities or 
agreements that violate a signed treaty. Another way is to institute the necessary 
mechanisms to enforce the terms of the treaty. By signing the treaty, a State is signaling its 
intent to hold itself accountable for upholding the agreement as well as enforcing it. This is 
also true for conventions signed with international organizations. Although the Vienna 
Convention’s definition of treaties excludes agreements made between States and 
international organizations, according to Malanczuk, this was done mainly to avoid 
complications. He states, “the only reason why they are not regarded as treaties-for the 
purposes of the Convention- is that the rules of international law governing them differ in a 
few respects from the rules governing written treaties between states.”26  In 1986, the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations 
or between International Organizations was submitted; Article 2 of that Convention defines 
an international organization as “an intergovernmental organization.”27 International 
organizations possess a legal personality that has played a significant role in international 
law. These functions allow international organizations to be more involved in the creation 
of international law and norms.    
For countries that entered into the arena of international law in the post WWII era, 
such as Kuwait, international standards were a novel concept. Certain rights and duties had 
already been defined, established, and relied upon in international law. Inevitably, the 
international community exerted pressure on these newly sovereign States to incorporate 
these established systems into their constitutions and agendas. For example, in 1961, the 
year of Kuwait’s official independence, the government ratified six ILO conventions, 
mostly involving conditions of work, which considering Kuwait’s diminutive labour force, 
is quite ambitious. Ratification of treaties may signal a country’s intent on implementing 
human rights standards, but that intent does not always translate to actual results. 
According to Hathaway, ratification of treaties does not always correlate to less human 
rights violations.  Her study in 2002 led her to assert that “treaty ratification is not 
infrequently associated with worse, rather than better, human rights ratings than would 
otherwise be expected.”28 Therefore, States with worse human rights ratings seem to ratify 
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treaties more frequently than those with better ratings. She states that, in general, the more 
democratic a country is, the more effect treaty ratification will have on that country’s laws 
and behaviours. Neumayer’s study confirms Hathaway’s assertion that treaty ratification is 
more effective the more democratic a country is, supplementing democracy with an active 
civil society that is also necessary in effective implementation of treaties. In addition, 
Keith’s study on the impact of ratification of the UN’s International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, finds that treaties with weak implementation measures such as this, 
ratification does not correlate with a change in behavior.
29
 Hathaway suggests that some 
countries view the ratification or signing of treaties as an indication of their commitment to 
international standards of human rights, which she refers to as “position-taking.”30 
Ratification does not cost a country anything, while the benefits of inclusion within the 
wider international community hold more advantages. Hathaway states, “governments may 
see a treaty as a relatively costless means of spreading their ideals and principles to other 
nations.”31 In her view, ratification of treaties also means less pressure on States from 
international organizations, including NGOs. In this way, “countries can and do take 
positions to which they do not subsequently conform and benefit from doing so.”32 This 
may be true, but, as Goodman and Jinks contend, Hathaway’s focus on ratification as “the 
‘magic moment’ of acceptance of human rights norms”33 is problematic. They, like many 
others, argue that ratification is the first step to acceptance of international standards, and is 
a necessary procedure to long term and eventual incorporation. They state, “broad 
ratification of human rights treaties plays an important role in the process of building 
national human rights cultures (and a transnational human rights culture).”34 When States 
ratify treaties, they are indicating their acceptance of international standards, which will 
eventually lead to the legitimacy of those standards within the international community. 
They may be ambitious at the time of signing, but they serve as indicators of future goals 
or standards. As Chayes and Chayes state, “it is a mistake to call these treaties merely 
‘aspirational’ or ‘hortatory.’ To be sure, they embody ‘ideals’ of the international system, 
but like other regulatory treaties, they were designed to initiate a process that over time, 
perhaps a long time, would bring behavior into greater congruence with those ideals.”35 
This process is achievable with the contribution of NGOs, and a strong civil society, both 
of which Neumayer finds are necessary for effective treaty ratification. He states, “for 
treaty ratifications to work, there must be conditions…for civil society to persuade, 
convince, and perhaps pressure governments into translating the formal premise of better 
human rights protection into actual reality.”36 In a sense, this is true for Kuwait, where 
ratification of ILO conventions and UN treaties have enabled it to construct a law that 
protects many aspects of their citizens’ human and labour rights. Although unskilled 
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migrant workers were excluded from these laws, or not offered the same protections, the 
recent Domestic Workers Law (2016) is more consistent with international standards. 
When countries enter into treaties or agreements, they become a part of the international 
community, and are therefore, upheld to a certain standard. With the help of that 
community, those standards may eventually become part of their framework, that is, they 
will comply with those standards.   
When the Kuwaiti government signs, or ratifies any international agreement or 
treaty, it is essentially agreeing to introduce the mechanisms and systems required to 
ensure effective application of the treaty. The importance of incorporating an international 
norm or treaty into national domestic law cannot be minimized. By ratifying or signing 
treaties and conventions, States accept certain obligations and are required by international 
law to fulfil these commitments by conforming their national laws to the standards that 
these conventions require.  This demonstrates good faith. As Anzilotti notes, “international 
rules are only possible to the extent that they can rely on national rules.”37 Without the 
necessary domestic law to enforce the terms or norms of the treaty, the agreement loses its 
efficacy and intent. International rules require the reinforcement of national laws in order 
to become established norms. Together, international and national laws converge into a 
wider, more universal standard. Failure to implement the necessary measures required to 
adhere to the principles enshrined in international treaties demonstrates a betrayal of those 
principles. Furthermore, the presence of corruption makes it impossible for governments to 
effectively implement treaties and laws, thus rendering them ineffective.  
One of the ways in which a treaty violation occurs is when a State fails to 
implement the necessary processes that fulfilment of the treaty requires. In the past, the 
State of Kuwait has invoked the issue of new statehood as an explanation for its sluggish 
policies concerning international treaty implementation. It is true that Kuwait’s judicial 
system is relatively new, though this does not preclude it from implementing and enforcing 
its obligations under ratified international treaties. To be sure, there are certain provisions 
in the Constitution and labour laws that only offer protections for nationals, and the 
country’s Constitution always takes precedence over any international or regional 
agreement. In terms of the treaties that Kuwait has not ratified, there may be several 
reasons for this, including, firstly, that the provisions contained in the treaties do not 
conform to the country’s values. Secondly, a reason often cited by the Kuwaiti government 
for non-ratification is that certain standards are already included in the Constitution and 
therefore, redundant. However, one unstated reason may be that, for certain matters, States 
do not wish to expose themselves to international attention or scrutiny. Goodman and Jinks 
note that “for many governments, the decision to ratify suggests a willingness to increase 
access to information on, and dialogue about, domestic human rights practices.”38 If this is 
true, then the ratification of treaties should be encouraged, even if application may not be 
immediately effective.  
 
In an increasingly complex world, treaties, conventions, MOUs, and other 
agreements, whether multi-lateral, or bi-lateral, have become a way for States to engage 
with one another, as well as the international community. Wanting to be perceived and 
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treated as responsible member of the international community, Kuwait has become a 
member of many international organizations, and signed many international agreements 
and conventions. However, effective implementation is still lacking and a clear 
understanding of the conventions that have been signed and ratified has not been translated 
into law. In past years, the Kuwaiti government has created several departments and 
centres in an attempt to address and implement labour treaties and conventions it has 
signed. The Higher Advisory Committee for Labour Affairs, for example, was set up to 
advise the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour. Councils such as this are usually 
comprised of specialists who are appointed by the Amir and who work closely with 
international organizations in the region.  
 
5.4 Why Slavery?  
In the past, several factors, mainly economic, were used to predict a country’s 
potential for the existence of slavery within its borders. According to the Human 
Development Index, the more economically prosperous a country is, the less chance there 
is of the presence of slavery. The ability of a government to deliver such services such as 
education and health services, as well as a relatively democratic voting system, has been an 
indicator of a free labour system. In Kuwait, this is not always true. As the country has 
grown more prosperous, its reliance on foreign labour has increased, leading the 
government to implement policies to protect its nationals, while at the same time, denying 
migrants certain rights. 
Kuwait proves to be an exception to the traditional model, due to its high GDP per 
capita, small population, and health and education services. In theory, slavery, or forced 
labour should not exist in Kuwait, but there are other factors that need to be addressed. 
Corruption and lack of government enforcement are two major reasons for the 
maltreatment of migrant laborers in Kuwait. In 2017, Kuwait was given a score of 39 out 
of 100 on the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index,
39
 which ranks 
countries according to the degree which corruption is perceived in the public sector, and 
among public officials and politicians. By contrast, New Zealand
40
 was given a score of 89 
out of 100, ranking it as the country with the lowest corruption index. In most cases, 
existent Kuwaiti laws aim at protecting unskilled foreign workers from abuses and 
maltreatment however, widespread corruption restricts fair compensation and reparations. 
Although corruption is present in every country to some degree, it is especially prevalent in 
Kuwait. When corruption is widespread, even the best, most well-intentioned laws and 
treaties cease to have an impact. Without proper application of the law, these sets of rules 
become ineffective. 
 
5.4.1 Rentierism 
The concept of rentierism has been used to designate those nations that export their 
resources, mainly oil and gas, to foreign markets; it has been used to describe developing 
Gulf countries, and their relationship to the West. Central to the idea of rentierism and 
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rentier states is the concept of rent itself. According to economist Alfred Marshall, rent is 
any “income derived from the free gifts of nature,”41 essentially, natural resources. In the 
case of Kuwait, rent refers to income obtained from natural oil and gas resources. Before 
the discovery of oil, rent in Kuwait referred to “locational rent”, which involved entering 
into protection or loyalty agreements with other countries, but mainly Great Britain. This 
rent was paid in return for the use of certain areas for landing of British aircrafts on their 
way to and from India.
42
 Locational rent was beneficial for both countries, and paved the 
way for strong British-Gulf ties, which remain intact today. After the discovery of oil, 
petroleum resources were relied upon to provide Kuwait with rent. Most of the rent came 
courtesy of Great Britain, which had the closest ties with Kuwait and was given full reign 
over the country’s oil and gas concessions, often with exclusivity clauses attached.  
In the years after the independence of Kuwait, the Al-Sabah ruling family came 
under a great deal of pressure from Kuwaiti citizens to nationalize the Kuwait Oil 
Company - a British backed company that had won the first concession to oil discoveries 
in 1938. In the 1970s, the British concession was terminated, and the Kuwaiti government 
gained full control of the Kuwait Oil Company. The rents accrued from oil, locational and 
strategic concessions allowed the Kuwaiti government to distribute wealth to its citizens 
through various welfare measures. Davidson states, “received directly by the ruling 
families and their governments, the rents were in turn used to distribute some wealth to 
their populations rather than having to rely on taxation from merchants.”43 These rents 
have allowed Kuwait’s ruling family to not only forge close ties with Great Britain, but to 
install itself as a benevolent distributer of wealth for its citizens.  
For Kuwait, the transition from a nation dependent on agriculture and pearl exports 
to an oil-rich nation occurred at a speed faster than the population could adjust. Mahdavy 
writes, “since the external rent is paid to the government, it is tempting for the government 
to reward its employees and supporters with regular salary increases, fringe benefits or 
lucrative contracts, etc. In the long-run, this distortion in the valuation of product may have 
the effect of shifting manpower, talent and organizational ability from agriculture and 
industry into services.”44 In Kuwait, nationals’ aversion to certain types of jobs has created 
a dependence on temporary migrant workers imported to fill the void that exists in the 
labour market. The government’s tendency to reward its citizens with extensive welfare 
benefits has created a distorted sense of social and economic entitlement. Rent derived 
from natural resources creates a rentier state, or a state that receives considerable rents 
from foreign countries, organizations, or individuals.  As previously mentioned, for 
Kuwait, rents refer to oil and gas exports, as well as strategic rents such as military bases 
and cooperation agreements. Mahdavy writes, “rentier states are defined…as those 
countries that receive on a regular basis substantial amounts of external rents. External 
rents are in turn defined as rentals paid by foreign individuals, concerns or governments to 
individuals, concerns or governments of a given country.”45 According to him, the effects 
                                                          
41
 Alfred Marshall (1920).  Principles of Economics, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, p.368. 
42
 Christopher M. Davidson (2012). After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies. C. 
Hurst & Co., London, p.24. 
43
 Davidson, supra note 42, p.25. 
44
 Hossein Mahdavy (1970). The Patterns and problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The 
Case of Iran. In: Studies in Economic history of the Middle East, M.A. Cook (ed), Oxford University Press, 
London, p.447. 
45
 Mahdavy, supra note 44, p.428. 
of petroleum development and the sizeable amounts of foreign currency (whether in the 
form of rents or investment) that follow, lead to the creation of a modern rentier class, 
composed of elite rulers or governments.  
The concept of rentier states gave way to rentier state theory (RST), which explains 
a great deal about the nation-character of Gulf States, including Kuwait. Gray describes 
rentier state theory as “a political economy theory that seeks to explain state-society 
relations in states that generate a large proportion of their income from rents, or externally-
derived, unproductively-earned payments.”46 This theory is in line with what is often 
referred to as a “resource curse”, where high levels of natural resources are contrasted with 
low levels of development. Both of these concepts “suggest a difference between ‘earned’ 
income and effortless ‘accrued’ rent,”47 with the latter often looked down upon by 
economists and social scientists. 
Essentially, rentier state theory maintains that as the State receives rent from 
natural resources and distributes it to its nationals, the need for taxes is eliminated. Lack of 
taxation is an important characteristic of rentier states. The substantial wealth gained by the 
export of natural oil and gas resources diminishes the need for taxation, and thus allows the 
government to allocate the nation’s wealth to its citizens. In turn, this wealth distribution is 
viewed by citizens as their share of the nation’s prosperity. In the case of Kuwait, oil and 
gas resources have provided the government with vast wealth that in turn has created a 
welfare state, whose citizens have become dependent on the state to provide economic 
support. As Crystal states, “oil creates a rentier economy that weakens class structure by 
making access to the state rather than access to private property the prime determinant of 
wealth.”48 She further goes on to say, “the fact that oil revenues go directly to the state is 
important because it means that money is centralized in the state. Individuals can become 
rich only through their relationship to the state or the state elite.”49 This may have an 
adverse effect on the social structure of the state as it struggles to juggle the roles of 
employer as well as welfare services provider. Davidson states, “the majority of the 
region’s indigenous population was increasingly being distanced from the forces of 
production and thus sidelined into becoming a rentier class dependent on government 
subsidies, rather than a distinct proletariat or middle class.”50 In this sense, Kuwait fits the 
rentier state model. Citizens have been accustomed to receiving a profit of their nation’s 
“free gift of nature,” through various subsidies and welfare benefits the government has put 
in place. The right to work, effectively the right to a job, is part of the Kuwaiti 
Constitution, and the public sector has been the biggest employer of Kuwaitis. (See Table 
9) Amuzegar states,  
In the Gulf countries, free medical services for all ages, free education at all 
levels, housing and home sites at below-market prices and on easy credit 
terms, highly subsidized basic services and essential items, generous 
retirement pensions at a relatively early age, and the right to government 
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employment at last resort became some the outstanding manifestations of 
instant economic well-being. In these and other oil-exporting countries, not 
only was the physical landscape…changed beyond recognition, but the 
standard of living for a large portion of the population reached 
unprecedentedly high levels.
51
 
Moreover, to this day, Kuwaiti citizens do not pay any taxes to the government. Instead of 
relying on taxes for income, rentier economies distribute income from oil revenues to 
citizens. Crystal states that “pre-existing traditions-patterns of paternalism and group 
solidarity-already predisposed Kuwait to distribute revenues fairly widely…This function 
has become institutionalized, and revenues are now distributed by the state through direct 
transfers, social services, and state jobs.”52 However, this generous welfare system may 
breed complacency, as the traditional concepts of labour competition and diversification 
are diminished. Gray argues that the payment of taxes holds the government accountable to 
its citizens. He states, “the state…need not concern itself with domestic bases of support of 
legitimacy either…the population in effect is ‘bought off’, with democratic input sacrificed 
by society in exchange for a share of the rental wealth accruing to the state from abroad.”53 
In the case of rentier states, economic prosperity does not mean increased productivity or 
performance, it merely indicates the government’s commitment to provide its nationals 
with a share of the oil wealth. In Mahdavy’s view, this leads to a “backwardness” prevalent 
in rentier states, and which exists independent of economic prosperity.
54
 Furthermore, 
Beblawi discusses a rentier mentality, different from conventional economic models. He 
states, “the basic assumption about the rentier mentality and that which distinguished it 
from conventional economic behaviour is that it embodies a break in the work-reward 
causation. Reward – income or wealth – is not related to work and risk bearing, rather to a 
chance or situation.”55 In the case of Kuwait, this has led to a bloated public sector 
dominated by nationals unencumbered by job competition. With the constitutional 
guarantee of a job, and a labour hierarchy in their favour, most workers are lulled into a 
sense of security not based on merit, but on citizenship.   
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 As the head of a welfare state, the Amir is seen as a sort of father figure guiding the 
country and distributing national wealth. Beblawi states that, “Kuwait was probably the 
one to introduce into the Gulf area the concept of distributing part of the oil wealth to the 
population which eventually evolved into that of the welfare state,”56 thus designating the 
ruler, and through him, the government, as the primary distributor of the nation’s oil 
wealth among its citizens. Furthermore, according to Davidson, this is part of a larger 
social contract that exists between governments of rentier states and their citizens. He 
writes, “the…social contract is rebranded a ‘ruling bargain’ for the Arab world, where 
people choose to remain politically acquiescent in return for sufficient stability and 
services from their governments.”57 This may explain why many countries in the Gulf, 
including Kuwait, survived the Arab Spring that led to unrest in other nations in the region. 
In Kuwait, the “ruling bargain” that Davidson describes has ensured that the Al-Sabah 
remain in place as the state’s ruling family, respecting the dynasty’s historical ties and 
services to Kuwait. Whereas in most nations, the government is seen as a collector of 
wealth, in form of taxes, in Kuwait, and other Gulf states, the resources of the country and 
its subsequent wealth is seen as a collective gift to its citizens, with the government being 
entrusted to be in charge of distribution. Davidson explains, “all of the Gulf monarchies 
have emphasized the state being first and foremost a distributer of wealth rather than an 
extractor,”58 which provides rulers with “eudemonic legitimacy,”59 or legitimacy that stems 
from economic and social welfare. This may also help explain why despite the fact that 
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Table 9 
many ruling family members have been found guilty of fraud, corruption, and 
embezzlement, in general, Kuwaitis would not change their parliamentary sheikhdom for 
an alternate form of government. 
 Citizenship is a guarded privilege in Kuwait, in line with the rentier state theory. 
The guarantee of employment of citizens by the state has reinforced the national identity of 
Kuwaitis, and instilled the sense that being Kuwaiti is a privilege, one to which a special 
status is attached. In many ways, this has created a shared identity within citizens. The 
state reinforces this special citizenship status by severely restricting the amount of 
nationalizations. Davidson states “the centrality of citizenship and the promotion of 
national identity in the gulf monarchies’ ruling bargains, as many of the services and 
privileges associated with citizenship can only really be sustained if the national 
populations remain distinct, aloof, and in some cases compact.”60 The establishment of a 
strong national identity, based on the privileges of being a Kuwaiti citizen is no doubt a 
ruling bargain. The scope of welfare benefits that are afforded to nationals is directly 
linked to the size of the population. As the population increases, welfare benefits will 
become more strained, which is the reason why citizenship is closely guarded in Kuwait. 
The Nationality Law of 1959 (most recently amended in the year 2000) establishes the 
rules regarding naturalizations, which state that Kuwaiti nationality must be granted by 
Amiri Decree,
61
 approved first by a Committee, then by the Ministry of Interior. It is a 
complicated process (See Appendix 4), meant to protect the country from those wishing to 
take advantage of its generous welfare benefits, a topic much discussed in Parliament. This 
year, MP Safa Al-Hashem claimed there were as many as 300,000 cases of illegal 
citizenship obtained in recent years.
62
 Although this figure has yet to be confirmed by the 
Ministry, there have been numerous cases of forged or illegal citizenships in recent years.
63
 
Regardless of the amount of years a non-Arab migrant spends working and living in 
Kuwait, naturalization is not an option. Figures on annual naturalizations are difficult to 
obtain and verify, however, it is safe to assume that the numbers are very low compared to 
the number of applications. Additionally, migrant workers are all granted temporary 
contracts in order to ensure that migration is temporary. The division of the population into 
Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis in legal, economic, and social terms creates a rentier elite class. 
As Davidson states, “as per the rentier state model, the distribution of wealth along with 
the creation of a national identity and the formation of an indigenous rentier elite class that 
sits above all expatriates have been paramount.”64 All migrant workers in Kuwait are 
dependent on a national to sponsor their work visa, as per the sponsorship law, which 
places a great deal of power into the hands of citizens and further enforces the rentier elite 
class divide.  
According to the rentier state theory, rents acquired by the state and distributed to 
the population without the need for taxation lead to little public demand for greater 
representation or involvement in governmental affairs, an acquiescence known as the 
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rentier effect. The rentier effect makes it difficult for nations to become democratic, due to 
the fact that a rentier government may easily buy off its citizens, thus creating a social 
contract where loyalty and trust are exchanged for welfare benefits. In turn, nationals will 
be “less likely to demand accountability from – and representation in – their 
government.”65 In theory, rentier states are not motivated to foster democratic reforms; it is 
in their benefit to maintain the status quo and discourage social groups. Rentier state theory 
holds that, “governments that fund themselves through oil revenues and have large budgets 
are more likely to be authoritarian; governments that fund themselves through taxes and 
are relatively small are more likely to become democratic.”66 Governments become 
immune to democratic demands by distributing rent wealth and providing their citizens 
with vast welfare assistance. Specifically, the absence of taxation directly correlates to a 
less democratic form of government. In the case of rentier states, as long as the 
government continues to provide generous welfare benefits, especially in the form of 
employment in the public sector and avoids taxation, its nationals will be remain content 
with little political participation. In this way, Kuwait does not fit the rentier state model, as 
its nationals have been politically active throughout the country’s history. 
As previously mentioned, before the discovery of oil, Kuwaitis were mostly 
engaged in seafaring and trading, which, although prosperous activities, held 
disadvantages. These activities were restricted to the male population, most of who had to 
travel for approximately ten months out of the year. This not only left a great deal of 
families without a patriarch to protect them, but also left the town vulnerable to invasion or 
raids. Since the economy depended on the sea, the merchant families entered into an 
agreement with the Al-Sabah family of the Bani Khaled tribe, in which it was decided that 
the Al-Sabah family would take charge of the everyday matters of the town, while the 
merchants devoted themselves to their trades. This meant that the Al-Sabah family would 
relinquish what little trade they were involved in, and dedicate themselves solely to the 
concerns of the town. Longva explains, “until the late 1800s, real power and social 
ascendency rested with the merchant families, whose work generated the income on which 
Kuwait critically depended for its existence.”67 This compromise is known in Kuwait as 
“the pact” that allowed the Al-Sabah family to effectively preside over and represent the 
town of Kuwait. The fact that this took place at all was very unique, especially in the 
turbulent Arabian Gulf; but it also took place naturally and out of necessity. Longva writes,  
Barred from sea-trading activities, the Al Sabah partly depended on the 
merchants for their incomes. Economic dependence made them 
accountable; hence the well-anchored tradition of political consultations 
between the shaikh and the merchants; hence also the latter’s view of 
political participation as a natural process to which they were entitled-a 
perception that deeply contrasted with the situation in the neighboring 
emirates.
68
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It was the start of a system in which neither ruler nor merchant could gain too much power, 
and one in which everyone benefitted. In 1756, Sabah Jaber Al Sabah (or Sabah I) was 
declared the first Amir of Kuwait. Since then, all of Kuwait’s Amirs have been direct 
descendants of Sabah I (the First). Kuwait remained a protectorate and its autocratic power 
in place until the sudden death of Sheikh Salem in 1921. This event brought up the issue of 
succession, and heads of the leading merchant families organized to form Al-Majlis Al-
Ishtishari, or the Consultative Council. The Council’s main purpose was the peaceful 
settlement of the issue of succession so as to prevent any disputes within the Al-Sabah 
family. To this end, Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah was chosen to succeed Sheikh Salem, a 
choice that passed without opposition. He promised to work with the Council, and include 
them in the rulings of the country. Although the Council’s purpose was fulfilled, it was 
clear that its establishment demonstrated a will by its members to launch a more 
participatory role in the affairs of the country. Even though the Council was short lived, it 
signalled the beginning of participatory government in Kuwait. This was the beginning of 
what was to be Kuwait’s Constitution and National Assembly.  
In 1938, Sheikh Jaber signed a law, effectively establishing a constitution and 
giving the Council extensive powers. The Council’s main order of business during its 
tenure was focused on the economy of Kuwait, including taxes, levies, monopolies and 
public finances. As all members were representing merchant interests, free enterprise and 
competition were also stressed. By pushing forth their capitalist interests, the Council thus 
strived to limit Al-Sabah control over the economy and free market. In 1950, Sheikh 
Ahmad Al-Jaber was succeeded by his cousin, Sheikh Abdulla Al-Salem, widely viewed in 
Kuwait as the father of reform and social welfare. It was during his reign that Kuwait 
shifted from being a British protectorate, to a fully independent state. As Davidson 
explains,  
Following independence, Abdullah was quick to draw up a new constitution 
for Kuwait and to establish a new parliament, the National 
Assembly…Kuwait’s merchant population had long been involved in 
various consultative institutions, given their relative wealth and political 
influence, so democratic or rather consultative traditions were much more 
ingrained in Kuwait than in Saudi Arabia.
69
 
This Constitution, with a few amendments and modifications, remains in place today. In 
this sense, Kuwait has proved to be the exception to the classical rentier state theory. Gray 
states, “there was no well-developed or convincing RST-centered explanation for Kuwait’s 
very activist parliament on the one hand, and the near-absence of democratic institutions in 
Saudi Arabia or the…UAE on the other.”70 Kuwait’s history with representative 
institutions distinguishes it from its neighbors, as Crystal states, “Kuwait’s social structure 
is conducive to political representation: Kuwait has few of the communal divisions that 
elsewhere inhibit representation.”71 The classical rentier state theory does not take into 
account the strong political activism that has always existed in Kuwait. Tetreault expands 
on this by stating, “the twentieth-century conflict between Kuwaiti rulers and economic 
elites over the entitlement of the latter to significant political participation both rested on 
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an assumption of institutionalized power sharing and confirmed the legitimacy of Kuwait 
as a political community.”72 Essentially, the Kuwaiti government’s control of rents has not 
given it complete autonomy from a politically involved and active native population that 
demanded a role in all aspects of political life. 
 In these ways, Kuwait both fits and does not fit the model of rentier state theory. 
While it is true that rentier states are traditionally less democratic, prone to slow socio-
political growth and demonstrate employment complacency, not all of these factors are 
applicable to Kuwait. As Ross states, “barrel for barrel, oil harms democracy more in oil-
poor countries than in oil-rich ones.”73 The unique composition of Kuwait’s political 
society has allowed it to bypass some of the predictions concerning civil unrest of the 
rentier state theory.     
Rentier states such as Kuwait are dependent on their foreign allies for their rents, 
and a great deal of rentier wealth has been spent cultivating relationships with the West 
that extend beyond economic relations. As Gray states, “rent capacity is not sufficient to 
purchase security, and states have come to realize that a more complex and proactive 
approach to foreign policy and external linkages is important to the longer-term viability 
and protection of the state and its rentier wealth.”74 In this sense, security may refer to 
military security, as well as the overall security of international acceptance and 
engagement. Today, Kuwait still maintains locational rent for use of certain areas for 
military personnel, for both the American and the British governments.  
Using its rentier wealth, Kuwait has spread aid to countries, especially other Arab 
and Muslim countries in the form of funds for various projects or donations to certain 
causes and organizations. As Tetreault states, “when oil revenues began to pour into 
Kuwait, it became the first developing country to institute an elaborate foreign aid program 
and, since the 1960s, Kuwait has used both portfolio and direct foreign investments to 
attract allies and supporters.”75 This foreign aid program has become an important aspect 
of Kuwait’s foreign policy. Crystal states that, “by international standards Kuwait has 
historically been a very generous donor. In per capita terms Kuwait has been one of the 
most generous states in the world, always standing among the top ten international 
donors.”76 In 1961, the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development was established to 
provide loans and grants to Arab countries, and to date, the Fund has committed over $21 
million in loans.
 77
 Also, in 1967, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development 
was established to provide assistance to social and economic development projects also for 
Arab countries. To date, this Fund has loaned over $2 billion for various projects or 
grants.
78
 Crystal reports that, in the 1980s, as much as 3.8 percent of the country’s GNP 
went to foreign aid programs.
79
 Kuwait has also spread its rentier wealth to the 
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international community. In 2016, Kuwait donated $4 million to the IOM’s efforts to 
support Iraqis displaced by the military operations in Mosul.
80
 The government’s donations 
also extend to non-Arab countries. More recently, at the Pledging Conference for the 
Rohingya Refugee Crisis in 2017, Kuwait pledged $15 million in aid to the UN coalition.
81
 
These donations are not only a way for Kuwait to demonstrate its commitment to the 
international community, but they also allow the country to position itself as a responsible 
member of the community.  
As mentioned earlier, many States ratify treaties in order to ease pressures for 
reforms from the international community. On the other hand, some opt not to ratify 
treaties for fear that their practices will be exposed and scrutinized. Both these analyses are 
applicable to Kuwait, a country that has made great strides in recent years regarding 
reforming its laws to offer better protections for unskilled migrant workers. By working 
closely with international organizations and NGOs, as well as by ratifying relevant treaties 
and agreements, the government is better able to align its laws and practices with 
international standards, thereby eliminating all forms of slavery within its borders.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 At present, Kuwait’s reliance on foreign labour continues to increase. As a result, 
the number of migrants in the country is at an all-time high, which is in contrast to the 
minimal protections they are offered under the law. Modern “slaveholders” take advantage 
of the global economy to exploit what are often illiterate, unskilled, needy laborers for their 
own economic benefit. Furthermore, the debts that migrants incur in order to obtain work 
abroad force them into a cycle of debt bondage that essentially exposes them to 
exploitation before they have even landed in the host country. The overall sponsorship 
system as well as false labour contracts, contract substitution and visa trading are all 
modern methods that are used to conceal slavery among unskilled foreign laborers in 
Kuwait. Greed and corruption, coupled with a lack of law enforcement has allowed 
employers to take advantage of these workers. As a result, the situation of unskilled foreign 
workers in Kuwait can accurately be labeled as slavery, servitude, indentured slavery, and 
forced labour. There is a lack of supervisory mechanisms that monitor the working 
conditions of unskilled foreign labour, who often live and toil under severe conditions. The 
lack of enforcement of existing laws, signed MOUs, ratified conventions and treaties, and 
bilateral agreements, have bred an environment that is rife with corruption, and allows 
abusers to escape unpunished, thereby perpetuating the cycle of maltreatment. 
 One reason used to explain the presence of slavery in a country where, 
theoretically, it should not occur, is rentierism and rentierist mentality. Despite the 
exceptions, Kuwait can still be classified as a rentier state, and rentier state theory may be 
used to explain why slavery and forced labour occur in the country, despite indications that 
it should not. The country’s oil wealth has allowed the government to become the 
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distributor rather than the extractor of the nation’s rent, thereby providing generous welfare 
benefits to its citizens. Over time, these benefits have created a labour hierarchy, where 
certain employment sectors are either dominated by nationals or unskilled Asians. 
Rentierism also explains the reasons for certain elitist attitudes that are a result of a 
generous welfare system and the prevalence of customary laws that continue to persist long 
after they have been prohibited. This is revealed in the contrasting living conditions 
between nationals and unskilled migrants; while nationals enjoy the full political and social 
rights of citizenship, unskilled migrants are often unprotected and vulnerable to abuse. As 
Beblawi states, “even if they form the core of the productive manpower, expatriates 
nevertheless remain alien to the body politic. Though they serve the country, live -and also 
die- on its soil, they are not part of it. Expatriates are thus part of the labour force but not of 
the society.”82 Although their earnings may be higher in Kuwait compared to their home 
countries, their lives are nevertheless unstable and endangered. On the other hand, 
Kuwait’s politically active society, as well as its parliamentary history, are in opposition to 
the traditional rentier theory and may explain the reason for its progress, albeit slow, in 
incorporating international standards into its national laws. More progress is needed 
however, and it is important that the Kuwaiti government implements measures to ensure 
proper adherence to the rights and principles engrained in the various international 
conventions and treaties that it has ratified over the years. The right to liberty and freedom 
for all those living in Kuwait is a right protected in the Constitution and must not be 
applied to nationals only.   
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Chapter 6 
Recommendations and Conclusion 
 
6.1 Introduction 
As we have seen, Kuwait is a country of contradictions. On the one hand, great oil-wealth 
has allowed it to become a generous welfare state, providing substantial services for its 
nationals, but on the other hand, a reliance on unskilled foreign labour has exposed slavery 
and forced labour within its borders. Although the country has made great strides toward 
becoming an active member of the international community, there is a great deal that must 
be done in order to meet international labour standards. Ending slavery will require a 
determined effort on the part of the government in addressing economic, political, and 
social issues. Kuwait does not fully conform to any political or academic model, and 
therefore, needs to be examined according to its unique circumstances. In my view, there 
isn’t one solution to the problem of infringement of labour rights of unskilled foreign 
workers in Kuwait. There are several suggestions that may be made however, to improve 
their status within the Kuwaiti labour force. Firstly, abolishment of the sponsorship system 
is crucial in removing notions of ownership over migrants, as it is a system that continues 
to cause a great deal of problems for both unskilled laborers and domestic workers. This 
would require the assistance of agents and governments from sending countries, in order to 
coordinate efforts. This can also be done in conjunction with an awareness campaign that 
would educate people on the realities of importing unskilled foreign labour, and the 
consequences on the future of the country’s economy. In this chapter, recommendations 
will be made regarding measures the Kuwaiti government may take to increase protections 
for migrant workers. These measures include amendments to the current laws; effective 
monitoring and enforcement of recruitment agencies, as well as subagents; cooperation 
with international organizations and NGOs; and awareness campaigns aimed at shifting 
long-held attitudes concerning migrant workers.  
          Labour migration is a global issue, and the protection of migrants remains an 
important concern for the international community. Unlike skilled migrants who are 
usually more aware of the terms and conditions of their jobs, unskilled migrant workers are 
especially vulnerable to exploitation. Throughout the GCC region, dependence on foreign 
migrants continues to increase, while in many cases, legal protections lag behind. 
International institutions, NGOs and other organizations have called for changes to the 
sponsorship system that currently governs all migrants in this region. In order for real 
change to occur, it is imperative for GCC countries to work together in addressing the 
issue. More research is required in order to understand the scale of the problem, and 
governments should work together with NGOs to implement a region-wide policy that 
benefits both employers and workers. Databases on migrants should be established in each 
country specifying details of workers such as name, age, sex, nationality and the names of 
the employer and recruitment agency. Information such as this would help governments 
manage data concerning migrant workers in order to enact policies that correspond to this 
information.   
 
6.2 The Sponsorship System and Slavery 
 Throughout the world, migrant workers are relied upon to fulfil certain areas of the 
labour market, and Kuwait is no exception. The main differences however, lie in the rights 
they are granted, the enforcement of those rights, and the social cohesion between migrants 
and nationals. Historically, migrant workers have taken advantage of their abilities to 
organize in unions, settle with their families, and apply for citizenship to become a more 
empowered workforce. In Kuwait however, unskilled Asian migrants are defined by their 
temporary status, and are therefore excluded from any social integration. This has created a 
skewed relationship between nationals and migrants, where unskilled labourers are seen as 
servants and not employees. In order for perceptions to change, the situation of unskilled 
workers needs to be changed.  
There are a number of steps the Kuwaiti government can take in order to improve 
the working conditions of unskilled foreign migrants in the country. Firstly, the 
sponsorship system needs to be reformed or replaced. The restrictions imposed by the 
sponsorship system do not offer adequate protections for migrant workers. A better system 
would be one where workers are not tied to one employer for the duration of their 
employment contract, but instead issued with an employment visa that specifies the 
profession but not the name of the employer. This type of visa is currently used in the 
United Kingdom, as well as other countries, and allows workers to change employers 
without risking their legal status in the country. Under this system, workers would still 
have to offer proof of a job offer in Kuwait before issuance of an employment visa, 
although the name of the employer is not specified. This would give workers more choice 
in employers and allow them to change jobs in cases of deception or maltreatment. It 
would also allow workers to operate on a more flexible or freelance basis in order to 
maximise income. The Ministry of Labour would be responsible for issuing visas and it 
would be this visa, not the employer, that regulates the migrant’s legal status. Migrant 
Forum Asia suggests this as an alternative: 
To discontinue the individual sponsorship system and replace it with the 
National Employment Office or Ministry of Labour (MOL) in the 
destination country overseeing the recruitment process. A Government 
officer under the MOL would take full responsibility for entry, transfer and 
departure of migrant workers. Thus the migrant worker would make a 
contract with the department, as would the employer who would pay the 
wages to the department.
1
 
Alternatives such as this would take away the power employers may exert over migrant 
workers, who are often thought of as ‘property,’ and exploited as a result. Providing 
migrants with the option of seeking better employment conditions safeguards against 
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potential abuse. It is important that the government takes more responsibility for migrant 
workers, as opposed to relying on citizens to implement the law.  
Currently, unskilled foreign workers are unable to change employers without first 
obtaining the current employer’s permission and assuming they are in possession of their 
passports, departing the country and applying for a new visa under the new employer’s 
sponsorship. This cumbersome process deters many migrants from leaving their 
employers, even in cases of maltreatment or abuse. Furthermore, many migrants choose to 
abscond and remain in the country without valid immigration status. Migrants wishing to 
change employers should be granted a grace period after the termination of their 
employment in order to seek a new sponsor, which would decrease the number of illegal 
workers in the country. This would reduce the amount of costs to migrants and in turn, 
reduce their overall debts. Furthermore, in cases of disputes between employers and 
employees, workers should be allowed to seek employment while pursuing claims against 
employers. Currently, workers who are found guilty of absconding or working illegally are 
taken to detention centres where they await eventual deportation, thus depriving them of 
employment and thus, a means to earn a living. The ability to seek employment would 
allow migrants to identify better employment opportunities and facilitate the process of 
changing employers. By granting a grace period that provides an extension on their visa, 
they are legally able to remain in the country to pursue their claims. Otherwise, if their 
status is illegal, and they are unable to financially support themselves throughout the 
duration of their claim, the right to recourse becomes futile. Under the current sponsorship 
system, migrants who wish to leave their employment must obtain an exit permit from 
their sponsor and in cases where this is not granted, migrants are classified as illegals and 
if found, placed in detention centres. A grace period would eliminate the need for exit 
visas, as migrants would not be tied to one employer, and would be able to seek 
employment while awaiting a verdict on their claims. Labour-exporting countries should 
also include grace periods and provisions regarding deportation in bilateral agreements and 
MOUs, as this would help minimize the time spent in detention. It is important for 
governments to recognize the differences in various types of illegal migrants in order to 
better implement protection measures. Special consideration, for example, should be given 
for victims of maltreatment or abuse who have absconded from their employers in order to 
facilitate their transition from illegal to legal migrants. In 2019, the Walk Free Initiative 
reported that Kuwait is one Arab state that had “significant gaps in services for some 
victims of modern slavery…domestic workers, or forced labour victims.”2 Like most 
countries in the region, Kuwait does not have a special, independent rapporteur to monitor 
the government’s response to the maltreatment of migrants. More needs to be done to 
identify victims of slavery or trafficking so that they have access to proper support 
services. A national committee should be established that includes members of NGOs, civil 
society, as well as academics, and that is led by a designated commissioner to develop and 
monitor the implementation of national laws and policies and ensure that they are in line 
with international conventions.    
         In addition, despite laws that allow migrant workers one day of rest per week, many 
employers severely restrict the movement of their employees, by either denying them a day 
of rest or confining their day of rest to the employer’s home. Though the law is clear on a 
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mandatory rest day, it does not state how or where that day may be spent. As a result, 
employers are free to decide whether or not workers may leave their place of employment, 
even on rest days. Restrictions such as these hinder the independence of workers and 
constitute forced labour, especially for domestic workers who work in their places of 
employment. Unskilled migrant workers should be granted the same employment 
privileges as other migrant workers, who are normally granted two days of rest (weekend), 
and public holidays. Statutory holidays such as these should be extended to migrant 
workers, aligning their labour rights with those of other workers in the country. In Hong 
Kong, for example, mandatory holidays such as New Year’s Day are granted to domestic 
workers, in addition to their annual leave. In this way, domestic workers are equal to other 
employees for whom mandatory holidays are allocated. Measures such as this are 
consistent with international standards and should be included in Kuwait’s labour laws. 
This would help change the present perception that domestic workers are not real 
employees, but servants at the beck and call of their employers. Including provisions for 
mandatory holidays as part of a domestic worker’s contract and making it illegal for 
employers to deny them those rights may deter employers from restricting the movements 
of these workers. On the other hand, proper enforcement and monitoring mechanisms are 
needed in order to prosecute employers for any breach of contract, which is problematic as 
domestic workers are employed in the home, and the home is not considered a workplace. 
Domestic workers must have proper access to grievance mechanisms such as hotlines in 
order to lodge formal complaints regarding their condition or treatment. Once a formal 
complaint has been lodged, a designated task team may investigate the situation and issue a 
citation if necessary. The complaint would be entered into a database that will help law 
enforcement and the Domestic Workers Department identify possible victims of trafficking 
or forced labour.      
           National governments in both labour exporting and labour importing countries play 
a crucial role in the lives of migrants, both in their home country, and abroad. Increased 
knowledge and awareness for migrants aids in their acclimation in a foreign country. 
Potential migrants need to be armed with certain information in order to make the most of 
their labour experience in Kuwait. This information may include a brief background or 
history of the country of migration, as well as its culture and language. As Anti-Slavery 
International states, “the availability of information to migrant workers throughout their 
stay in the destination country, irrespective of their immigration status, is crucial in 
preventing abuses, including forced labour outcomes of trafficking.”3 When possible, 
migrants, especially domestic workers, should enrol in training courses that teach basic 
housekeeping skills, as well as language classes so as to learn basic phrases that may assist 
in better communication with the employer. Migrants should also be aware of the 
economic, political, and social situation in their destination countries and what impact 
those issues may have on their experience. It is also important that migrants are fully aware 
of their rights under the legal system of the destination country. Workers should have an 
understanding of the immigration and employment laws and regulations of the country, 
especially those that directly impact them. Further information that may prove useful 
relates to the role of consulates and embassies and other migrant organizations that may be 
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helpful in difficult situations. In cases where migrants wish to leave their employers, they 
must be aware of their rights and where they are able to seek assistance. In recent years, 
the government of Hong Kong, with the aid of non-governmental organizations, has sought 
to provide migrant workers, especially domestic workers, wishing to work in Hong Kong 
with an informational guide on a variety of issues. The guide contains a general 
introduction to the city, as well as information related to employment rights, job 
termination, recruitment agencies, health care, cultural and social activities, local currency 
and financial institutions, places of worship, public services such as postal offices, 
embassies, consulates, NGOs and other migrant organizations. The guide also contains 
information about legal services, helplines, a list of useful phrases in Cantonese, as well as 
tips on employee-employer relationships. Guides such as this provide migrants with 
information that may guide them throughout their employment. The more information that 
is provided to migrants, the more equipped they are in managing their employment 
opportunities. By understanding their rights under the legal system of their countries of 
destination, workers are better able to identify instances that breach the terms of their 
contracts, and have access to means of redress.  
  
6.3 Recommendations for Recruitment Agencies and Subagents 
 National governments also have an obligation to monitor recruitment agencies in 
order to safeguard the rights of unskilled foreign workers. Recruitment companies play a 
key role in the experience of migrants and should be supervised to ensure their activities 
are not in violation of labour laws. Currently, only licensed employment agencies are 
permitted to recruit migrant workers and penalties exist for agencies that operate without a 
valid license or if agencies are found to have charged workers recruitment fees. Migrants 
should be aware of the legal limits on recruitment fees in their own country, as well as their 
country of destination. Recruitment agencies, agents, or subagents that are found to be in 
breach of labour laws, should be penalized, and a black list should be created for repeat 
offenders. This list should be made available for all employers and sponsors, including 
those employing domestic workers, as well as potential employees. Additionally, the 
monitoring of subagents is important in implementing reforms in both labour-exporting 
and labour-importing countries. Although recruitment agencies are required to be licensed 
in Kuwait and in most other labour-exporting countries, there are no laws requiring 
licensed subagents. As a result, many employment agencies rely on subagents to recruit 
migrants in rural areas, and pay them commissions, which in turn, results in more costs to 
migrants. States need to work together in order to ensure that intermediaries such as 
subagents are licensed, monitored and given formal government approval.   
Migrant workers wanting to complain about agencies or agents, should be made 
aware of complaint mechanisms that exist, and ways to seek redress, both in Kuwait, and 
in their home countries. Employers should also be monitored to ensure that they do not 
extract recruitment fees from workers and employers who are found in violation of this law 
should be penalized. Also, NGOs and human rights organizations within Kuwait should 
take a more proactive role in identifying companies, agencies, individual employers, as 
well as government officials who have abused workers’ human and labour rights. Naming 
and shaming constitutes an important step in raising public awareness about the situation. 
The names of these companies may be put on a list in order for future migrants to know the 
risks involved in working with such companies. Kuwaiti companies that operate on an 
international basis, as well as foreign companies operating within Kuwait are obliged to 
obey international standards of labour, and should take a more hands-on role in making 
sure that their company, as well as any related agents that they work through, operate in a 
legitimate, legal and transparent manner. This means informing foreign laborers of their 
labour rights under Kuwaiti law, prior to arrival, so that migrants have all the information 
they need to make informed choices. Publicity campaigns help in bringing the issue to the 
forefront of the public’s attention, making them more aware of the particulars of labour 
importation and reliance.  
In addition, recruitment agencies should take proactive measures to implement 
regulations among themselves that aim for fair recruitment according to international 
labour standards. The role that agencies, agents and subagents play in the lives of migrant 
workers is considerable and the success of recruitment agencies should be measured less 
by profits and more by the reliable employment placements that add to the quality of the 
lives of migrant workers and their families. Accreditation systems for licensed recruitment 
agencies should contain information regarding knowledge of current immigration laws in 
both labour-exporting and labour-importing countries, without which it would be difficult 
for agencies to feign ignorance concerning certain laws. Recruiters should also be liable for 
practices such as contract substitution, so that migrants who have to suddenly leave their 
employers may have recourse to the courts in their home countries.       
 
6.4 Improvements to Access Grievance Mechanisms 
 In cases of abuse or maltreatment, the Kuwaiti government should provide legal aid 
in the form of representatives who are able to explain the legal system and its procedures. 
Cases of absconding should be treated individually in order to better understand the 
circumstances leading to the employee fleeing the employer. When workers are unable to 
recover their passports, the government should issue temporary travel documents so as to 
reduce the amount of time workers spend in overcrowded detention centres or shelters. 
Also, collecting statistical information on the number of complaints by unskilled foreign 
migrants and the outcome of those complaints would help in better assessing the situation 
and finding solutions to persistent problems. HRW suggests that Kuwait “collect and 
publish statistics on a yearly basis regarding the number and type of complaints filed with 
both courts of law and the Domestic Workers’ Department (or any authority that assumes 
supervision of domestic labour) as well as on how these complaints are resolved.”4 This 
information would also enable NGOs and various other human rights and labour 
organizations to improve their work with migrants by identifying key areas that require 
modification. This would also enable the government to better identify possible cases of 
trafficking, forced labour or slavery. Currently, there is a lack of access to grievance 
mechanisms for those trapped in those situations, and who are unable to file complaints or 
leave their place of employment.  
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 For many migrants, domestic workers especially, the police station is usually the 
first place they seek help in instances of abuse, maltreatment or other types of conflicts 
with their employers. As previously mentioned, police stations are not equipped to handle 
many of these cases, and many times, migrants are treated in a dismissive or aggressive 
manner. The Kuwaiti government can do more to improve facilities in police stations that 
will aid staff in handling cases linked to unskilled foreign workers. First of all, female 
police officers should be present at all police stations, and should be trained in dealing with 
migrants and domestic workers specifically. Counsellors, translators, medical, and legal 
staff should be on hand to assist workers, and administer treatment. This way, migrants are 
better able to understand their situation, as well as any charges that may be levelled against 
them. Training programs for officers should be implemented in order to sensitize and 
educate staff on the best ways to handle situations adequately. These protocols would 
better enable police and immigration authorities to assess each case individually, as 
opposed to grouping all runaway workers as absconders. It is important, for example, to 
identify trafficking victims early, respond and refer the matter to the appropriate 
government authority. Crucially, officials in police stations should be prohibited from 
returning runaway workers to their employers without following certain protocols. Migrant 
workers rely on government authorities in cases of dispute resolution and in order to ensure 
justice in these cases, it is vital that authorities are properly equipped to identify and handle 
such cases.  
The Kuwaiti government can protect the labour conditions of domestic workers by 
enacting legislation that would allow government inspectors to monitor the living and 
working conditions of these workers. As previously mentioned, there is a lack of 
government supervision regarding domestic workers, mostly due to the fact that their work 
takes place in private domiciles. HRW has suggested that Kuwait authorize inspectors to 
enter homes in order to monitor domestic workers,
5
 though this is a topic that invokes 
debate. Such legislation will be difficult to pass, due to the sanctity of the private home 
within Kuwaiti culture, but it will help provide equal protection to domestic workers as 
other unskilled foreign workers. As stated previously, a task force appointed through the 
Domestic Workers Department should be created, composed of members of NGOs, civil 
society, academics, as well as government workers. This task force would have the 
capacity to investigate complaints and issue citations for employers found in breach of the 
law. Embassies should also be closely involved, as they are usually the first port of call for 
migrants seeking aid. Through embassy contacts or hotlines, this task force may investigate 
claims of abuse or maltreatment and act accordingly. This way, there would be a legitimate 
reason for government officials to enter the private homes of employers. Employers who 
are found in breach of the conditions of the labour contract should face penalties for 
violating the law.  
The Kuwaiti government should also increase the services provided for unskilled 
foreign migrants. As discussed in Chapter 3, currently, there is a single government shelter 
for domestic workers and the conditions of entry are somewhat rigid, which excludes many 
other workers seeking refuge from their employers and puts a massive strain on individual 
embassies. Another shelter for all domestic workers, regardless of their immigration status, 
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should be created in order to accommodate the many runaway and absconding workers. 
The shelter should employ staff that is specially trained to deal with traumatized or abused 
women, with facilities for medical check-ups and legal aid. The Kuwait Society for Human 
Rights (KSHR) has established a hotline for migrant workers, available in five languages 
(Arabic, English, Tagalog, Hindi and Urdu), managed by a team of experts in various legal 
fields. The government should also launch its own hotline for complaints or questions, in 
order to provide aid for migrants. All domestic workers arriving to Kuwait should be 
issued with a guide that includes the location and telephone numbers of the relevant 
embassy or consulate, as well as the government shelter.  
        Much of the maltreatment of unskilled foreign workers, domestic workers especially, 
exists due to long-standing attitudes regarding manual labour, as well as an underlying 
mistrust of foreigners. Raising awareness about the issues surrounding domestic work 
would help people understand the hardships involved in migration. This would also help 
change stereotypes and allow people to recognize the work that domestic workers perform 
and the difficulties they face. In addition, the government should place a limit on the 
number of domestic workers each household may employ over the course of one year. This 
measure would help ensure that employers take extra care during the recruitment process 
in order to hire a worker that is a good match with the required job. If employers placed a 
higher premium on their employees, perhaps they would make more of an effort at keeping 
workers satisfied. “In turn, this would protect workers from the ‘disposable people’ 
syndrome in which many employers have little incentive to cultivate a decent employment 
relationship because of an abundant labour supply.”6 The government, along with the 
media and NGOs, can play an important role in publicizing the issue to the public. Public 
information campaigns aimed at educating the public would be a significant step in 
reducing the incidents of maltreatment and abuse.  
As Kuwait forges its way into the modern arena of international relations, its native 
population is forced to deal with issues regarding their lifestyle, work, home, family, 
society and national identity. Often, there is the temptation to resort to past beliefs and 
ways of life, in order to preserve a traditional lifestyle considered safer and sensible in a 
fast-changing modern world. National and personal wealth have allowed many modern 
Kuwaitis to enjoy educated, well-endowed lives however, long-held customs and attitudes 
cannot be changed overnight and will require a great deal of work and effort.  
 
6.5 Recommendations for NGOs 
In addition, more allowance must be given to NGOs and human rights societies for 
them to actively participate in the politics of the country, so as to establish themselves 
among other political lobbyists and activists.
7
 NGOs and other such societies should study, 
investigate, and monitor the working, living, and housing conditions of these laborers in 
order to publish factual, detailed and impartial reports to be made available to the general 
public, as well as to international associations. It is important for internationally recognized 
organizations such as the ILO, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International, to 
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become more involved with local NGOs, as they have established reputations for standards 
of research, as well as the necessary resources required for in-depth studies. At the same 
time, their reports carry considerable weight and may influence countries into taking more 
action regarding the labour rights of unskilled foreign workers in Kuwait. Collaboration 
between NGOs and governmental institutions, recruitment and employment agencies, as 
well as international organizations, allows the formulation of comprehensive policies 
regarding migrants.  
Recently, NGOs have taken a more active role in raising awareness to abuses 
against unskilled foreign migrants. The KSHR, for example, works closely with the Dutch 
Embassy in Kuwait to transmit information concerning migrant workers. In 2017, KSHR 
launched a website, togetherkw.org providing information for migrant workers regarding 
their rights under the Kuwaiti law. Moreover, KSHR, in partnership with the Department 
of Domestic Labour in the Ministry of Interior and the Dutch Embassy, launched a booklet 
containing information in several languages aimed at raising awareness of local laws 
among this group of workers. This booklet is free and available at airports, clinics and 
local churches, though it does not contain advice in cases of maltreatment, such as contact 
information for embassies, consulates or the Domestic Labour Department. This kind of 
information is vital for migrant workers and should be included in all booklets or 
information packets. In addition, HRW recently launched a campaign in Lebanon and 
Kuwait aimed at raising awareness about the rights of domestic workers. The campaign, 
titled “Put Yourself in Her Shoes” depicts photos of local women dressed in uniforms worn 
by housekeepers and nannies and focused on issues such as abuse and maltreatment. 
Unlike most campaigns aimed at governments, this campaign’s intended audience is 
families and women in particular, as they are usually responsible for the supervision of 
domestic workers. Furthermore, the IOM has worked closely with Kuwait to provide 
training for government employees working with migrant workers. In past years, the IOM 
has held workshops on shelter management training,
8
 managing temporary workers,
9
 
counter trafficking measures,
10
 awareness campaigns,
11
 and other subjects.
12
 Workshops 
and training opportunities such as these are important in ensuring that the people tasked 
with dealing with migrant workers are properly qualified to do so.      
 
6.6 Recommendations for Embassies and Consulates 
 There are also steps that embassies and consulates can take to ensure that the arrival 
and work experience of unskilled foreign laborers is up to international labour standards. 
Embassies should work with the relevant ministries in Kuwait to promote adherence to 
these standards. To an extent, several embassies, such as those from Bangladesh and the 
Philippines already have such programs in place. The Bangladeshi Embassy in Kuwait, for 
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example, has worked with the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour on standard 
documents that would guarantee both employer and employee’s rights under the law. 
These documents include sample contracts, rules and procedures, as well as a list of 
responsibilities for both employee and sponsor (see Appendices 5-7). Documents such as 
these represent an important step in improving the experience of foreign workers. The 
Philippine embassy has also instituted education measures aimed at explaining the culture 
of Kuwait, as well as the labour circumstances in the country. Although most of the 
training courses are offered to domestic workers, there are also educational tools available 
for other unskilled migrants, including pamphlets specifying labour rights and other 
important information. These measures encourage the smooth transition of workers from 
their native countries and promote full disclosure in order for the migrant to decide 
whether or not to seek employment in Kuwait. Embassies offer services such as legal 
counselling, and representation in cases of criminal charges against their citizens however, 
there are more proactive measures that should be taken. Embassies and consulates should 
closely monitor the situation of their citizens in Kuwait and work to alleviate problems. 
Training programs and courses are helpful in providing the necessary tools to migrants, 
and help ease the culture shock that often comes with working abroad. Periodic reports 
should be submitted to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour, in order to collaborate 
with staff on addressing certain issues. Domestic workers make up the majority of those 
seeking shelter at embassies, therefore, systems should be put in place to address the 
growing numbers. All embassies I visited were understaffed, and in need of resources to 
accommodate the number of workers seeking assistance or shelter.
13
 Shelters themselves 
were often overcrowded, with large numbers of workers awaiting pending cases. Most 
embassies hire personnel who are trained to provide counselling and legal services to 
workers, however, their numbers are few and their resources limited. With the necessary 
resources, embassies would be able to exercise more initiatives aimed at protecting 
workers. Of course, this would have to be done with cooperation from local police 
authorities. Additionally, a system should be put in place to monitor workers who have 
previously contacted the embassy for assistance with employer issues. Embassies 
themselves need to keep a list of employers or companies that have received complaints in 
order to report data to their home and host countries. It is crucial that embassies work in 
conjunction with ministries and labour authorities in identifying problems and pursuing 
remedies.    
 
6.7 International Treaty and Convention Ratification 
 On the international level, the Kuwaiti government can improve the situation of 
unskilled foreign workers by ratifying certain ILO Conventions, such as the Equal 
Remuneration Convention (No.100), which promotes equal pay for equal work; the Private 
Employment Agencies Convention (No.181), that sets to discourage discrimination in the 
hiring, and employment of workers; the Revised Migration for Employment Convention 
(No.97); the Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention (No.143), which 
promotes equal opportunity; and the Domestic Workers Convention (No.189). 
Conventions such as these would hold the government accountable in ensuring that the 
labour rights of all migrants in Kuwait are protected. It is also important for labour-
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exporting countries to ratify these conventions, although currently, only the Philippines has 
made an effort ratifying some conventions.  
           The UN International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant 
Workers and Members of their Families (referred to as the Migrant Workers’ Convention) 
is also an important convention that Kuwait has yet to sign despite the ratification of the 
Convention by Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Philippines. This Convention “is 
currently…the most comprehensive and detailed legal treaty to address the rights that 
governments worldwide need to tackle in any attempt to promote integration and cohesion 
in their societies.”14 By identifying the vulnerability of migrant workers who are often 
exploited by the migration system in both their own countries as well as countries of 
destination, this Convention seeks to impart protections for this group of workers. Its aim 
is to promote norms that will ensure the human rights of migrant workers and their families 
and it contains provisions for the equality of treatment between male and female migrants, 
nationals and non-nationals, as well as documented and undocumented workers. In 
addition, it clarifies the responsibilities of sending and receiving states, and prohibits 
“distinction of any kind such as sex, race, colour, language, religion or conviction, political 
or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, nationality, age, economic position, 
property, marital status, birth, or other status.”15 Distinction or discrimination is clearly 
present in the Kuwaiti labour law, with unskilled foreign migrants occupying the lower 
rungs of the labour hierarchy. It is important to note that “non-discrimination does not 
prohibit all preferential treatment for citizens, only those which are unjustified or 
unreasonable.”16 Additionally, in 1996 Kuwait ratified the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), which also contains a provision against discrimination. 
Article 26 states, “all persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any 
discrimination to the equal protection of the law,”17 therefore, although the protections 
against discrimination in the Migrant Workers’ Convention are not new, they do offer a 
more comprehensive approach. Only three labour-exporting countries discussed in this 
thesis have ratified the ICCPR: the Philippines (1995), Sri Lanka (1996), and Bangladesh 
(2011). Possible reasons for non-ratification of this Convention may be an increase of 
obligations that States must adhere to, as well as a fear that these obligations may deter 
labour-importing countries from hiring workers, as “countries fear they will lose markets if 
they ratify.”18 Under the Migrant Workers’ Convention, several provisions relate to pre-
departure services such as providing migrants with information, access to consular or 
embassy staff in cases of disputes, and the obligation to monitor recruitment agencies, 
which may be beyond the capabilities of certain countries such as Bangladesh. For labour-
importing countries such as Kuwait, possible reasons for non-ratification revolve around 
socio-political and national attitudes towards migrant workers. Moreover, there is a lack of 
experts in areas of international law in many governmental organizations, whether they are 
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in judicial courts or ministries and therefore, there is limited proficiency on the application 
of these conventions. 
In addition to international treaties and conventions, bilateral treaties such as 
MOUs enable labour-exporting countries to compensate for shortcomings within the labour 
laws. For example, in the absence of a government hotline to provide aid for migrant 
workers, an MOU between Kuwait and the Philippines signed in 2018 includes “the 
activation of a 24/7 hotline for distressed Filipinos in need of assistance and the creation of 
a special police unit to respond to complaints.”19 In addition, the MOU states that domestic 
workers are allowed to own and keep mobile phones. These provisions are not in the 
labour law, but their implementation would provide for increased protections for migrant 
workers. It is important that bilateral agreements such as these are enforced, even if they 
require the establishment of institutional structures that do not currently exist.    
Ratification of these conventions however, does not guarantee an improvement in 
the lives of workers. Instead, a combined effort from various governments, international 
companies and businesses, NGOs and human rights organizations, as well as the 
international community, may help in improving conditions of foreign laborers by setting 
clear standards and penalties. At the same time, concerted efforts should be made to 
incorporate ratified international treaties and conventions into domestic legislation, and 
have frameworks in place to effectively apply those treaties. Even though abolishment of 
the sponsorship system has been discussed numerous times, it continues to exist. 
Mechanisms should be put in place to address “the particular monitoring and enforcement 
challenges that have rendered previous reforms ineffective in achieving greater protection 
for this sector.”20 Labour-importing countries and labour-exporting countries tend to hold 
each other responsible for the abuses against migrant workers, without acknowledging that 
a migrant’s labour experience encompasses both home and migrant countries. Kuwait’s 
labour migration policies focus on reducing the inflow overall migrant workers, directing 
them to mostly unskilled sectors, and nationalizing the workforce, in order to maintain its 
generous welfare system. On the other hand, the migration policies of labour-exporting 
countries focus on increasing the outflow of migrant workers, in order to reduce 
unemployment and earn remittances. Although the labour migration policies of Kuwait and 
those labour-exporting countries it relies on are contradictory in many ways, both are based 
on decisions involving the number and type of migrants that are admitted, and the rights 
that are granted to them. Both home and destination countries need to be held accountable 
for the labour employment experience of unskilled migrants, as they both play an 
important role in whether that experience will be positive or negative.  
Kuwait has made great strides in enacting a Domestic Workers Law (2016), the 
first of its kind in the region and which set standards regarding minimum wage, working 
hours, overtime payment, days of rest, annual leave and standardized contracts. Yet there is 
still much to be done. Abolishment of the sponsorship system would be an important step 
in extending the rights of migrant workers. This may prove difficult, however, due to the 
fact that, for most Kuwaitis, the sponsorship system is the only one they have ever known. 
In spite of news reports and increased international attention on the plight of migrant 
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workers in the GCC, the debate surrounding abolition or reformation of the system remains 
largely personal. Fargues and Shah state,   
Yet, for all this rhetoric and anxiety, for most citizens the debate over the 
kafala is much more personal and banal. Public opinion on reforming the 
kafala does not revolve around such esoteric concerns but those of any 
household: How will reform affect me? Will my maid quit? Will my driver 
demand a higher wage? In short, the debate over immigration reform 
evokes fear, anxiety and, most importantly, great uncertainty for the citizens 
of the Gulf. In the view of these local populations, the complex system of 
control essential to the kafala helps minimize security and cultural threats, 
while safeguarding their traditional values and basic economic interests.
21
 
With these uncertainties, personal attitudes and beliefs need to be addressed along with 
economic and security issues. It is important to address such issues in order to gain a better 
understanding of the social aspects that contribute to Kuwait’s heavy reliance on foreign 
labour. Moreover, proper enforcement of existing labour laws is important in encouraging 
and promoting standards of good practice. By granting migrant workers their full rights 
according to international standards, the government would be acknowledging the 
important role that unskilled foreign workers have played in the development of the 
country. Improvements in the treatment of unskilled foreign labour in Kuwait require the 
collective efforts of all GCC countries, in addition to support from the international 
community. This is not a regional problem affecting Kuwait, but one that affects the rest of 
the world. Increased awareness about migration and labour concerns will help educate the 
public about the circumstances of foreign laborers. Due to the complicated legal, social, 
and administrative issues involved, change will be slow, and will require a great deal of 
effort.  
              In the final analysis, the rights of unskilled foreign workers in Kuwait are 
infringed upon to an extent that can be classified as indentured labour or slavery. In the 
first place, the sponsorship system bestows upon nationals a great deal of control over 
migrant workers through various restrictions and constraints. In addition, the Kuwaiti 
government lacks the means to enforce existent laws, allowing corruption to flourish. 
Corruption has led to low public opinion regarding law enforcement, leading many to 
conclude that laws only apply to expatriates, while nationals pick and choose which laws 
to obey, many times without proper recourse. This creates inconsistencies within 
government policies, which may have adverse effects in the implementation process. 
Without the means to enforce constitutional orders and decrees, these laws cease to carry 
weight. Secondly, an important aspect in the discussion of labour rights in Kuwait is the 
social attitude of nationals. Their outlook regarding manual work remains negative and as 
long as certain fields of work remain restricted to expatriates, the attitudes of nationals are 
unlikely to change. In years to come, Kuwaitis will have to re-evaluate their ways of 
viewing manual labour so as to relieve the country’s reliance on foreign workers. It is 
important for nationals to understand their relationship to the foreign workforce, and 
become educated about labour and migration issues. Furthermore, the establishment of 
                                                          
21
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technical schools and centres of education may help in encouraging young Kuwaitis to 
pursue different career paths than those involving business, trade or banking. At the same 
time, social attitudes regarding foreigners need to be addressed. It is crucial to understand 
what motivates Kuwaitis in order to gain a better understanding of the intricacies of the 
society as a whole. Increased awareness and education regarding these issues may help to 
build a new, more inclusive ethos to Kuwaiti society. One thing however, is certain- real 
and long-term change can only occur if Kuwaitis dedicate themselves to change in terms of 
labour supply. It is necessary that change arises from within the country, through its 
nationals, as this is the most effective way to promote change and progress. Although 
recognizing the presence of slavery in Kuwait may be shameful, it is a necessary step in 
acknowledging the situation as it currently exists, and taking steps to remedy this problem.    
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